



## The Household and Shared Poverty in the Highlands of Central Sulawesi

Albert Schrauwiers

*Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, Volume 1, Issue 2 (Jun., 1995), 337-357.

Stable URL:

<http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=1359-0987%28199506%291%3A2%3C337%3ATHASPI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-R>

---

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at <http://www.jstor.org/about/terms.html>. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission.

*Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* is published by Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland. Please contact the publisher for further permissions regarding the use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at <http://www.jstor.org/journals/rai.html>.

---

*Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*

©1995 Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland

JSTOR and the JSTOR logo are trademarks of JSTOR, and are Registered in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. For more information on JSTOR contact [jstor-info@umich.edu](mailto:jstor-info@umich.edu).

©2002 JSTOR

# THE HOUSEHOLD AND SHARED POVERTY IN THE HIGHLANDS OF CENTRAL SULAWESI

ALBERT SCHRAUWERS

*University of Toronto*

Analysis of Geertz's concept of 'shared poverty' has generally been restricted to the case of Java. By examining a newly created peasantry in the highlands of Sulawesi, I challenge the assumptions underlying Geertz's formulation of 'shared poverty' and that of his critics. These critics have questioned the applicability of the concept in a commodified economy, but have accepted its relevance in an increasingly more remote and 'traditional' past. This case study, in contrast, attempts to demonstrate that 'shared poverty' is less a characteristic of a traditional economy, than the product of the differentiation of the peasantry under capitalism. Geertz's original universalistic ethical formulation of the concept is criticized for failing to specify the bounded kin groups within which it applies.

In this article, I address the apparently incongruous processes of development and the intensification of tradition in a highland village in Central Sulawesi, Indonesia. The To Pamona of the village of Tentena<sup>1</sup> are swidden cultivators resettled by the Dutch from several nearby hill-top hamlets in 1908 and forced to take up wet-rice, or *sawah*, agriculture in the valley floor on the shores of Lake Poso. This change in productive technologies was part of a broader programme of development intended to incorporate them into the larger capitalist structures of the Netherlands East Indies. Wet-rice cultivation was but one of the policies intended to create a nuclear family household peasant economy. Multiple household longhouses (*banua*) were to be broken up into their constituent units, and each of these units was to own and individually to work its own property. In this way, 'native communalism' was to be discouraged, and an ethic of individual initiative and self-interest introduced, a policy which Dutch liberals considered the only means of bettering native welfare (de Kat Angelino 1931 II: 517-30; Kahn 1993: 75-81; Kruyt 1924: 50).

During the last eighty-five years, development has been accompanied by the fragmentation of land holdings and the commodification of the means and relations of production. I found, however, that the differentiation of the peasantry had been uneven, blunted by 'shared poverty' among kin, to use Geertz's (1963) phrase. Geertz used the term to refer to a pattern in which agricultural output was evenly divided among village households through the elaboration and expansion of traditional systems of labour relations, especially share cropping, rather than through changes in proprietary control of land (1963: 98). This ethic of 'shared poverty' limited the differentiation of the peasantry in

Java to 'just enoughts', and 'not quite enoughts' (Geertz 1963: 97). In an analysis of sixty-eight related households in four highland villages,<sup>2</sup> I found that differentiation in land ownership seemed clear: land holdings varied from those with no *sawah*, to those with up to 6 hectares. There were clear differences in lifestyle between the well-to-do (nineteen households), middle peasants (nineteen households) and the poor (thirty households).<sup>3</sup> However, like Geertz in Java, I found that differentiation in ownership of land was only an 'indifferent guide to the social pattern of agricultural exploitation' (1963: 99), and necessitated a careful examination of how agricultural production was distributed. Much of the difference in wealth between households derived from civil service jobs or pensions. Wealth and land ownership seemed to have little to do with relations of production. Members from all three groups took part in traditional labour exchanges, *pesale*, and a significant proportion of all three groups depended on hired agricultural labour to work their holdings. The persistence of 'traditional' labour exchanges and their attendant metamorphosis into new forms among all three groups, the development of sharecropping, and the existence of an ethic of sharing among kin all led me to wonder if shared poverty was typical of the peasant economy, despite the absence of a significant plantation sector which Geertz thought central to the development of shared poverty in Java.

As this last point makes clear, the analysis of 'shared poverty' has taken place within a 'dual economy' framework first proposed by the Dutch economist J.H. Boeke (1953), and refined by Clifford Geertz in *Agricultural involution* (1963). Although Geertz's argument deals with Java, his theoretical formulation has provided impetus for the analysis of the role of culture in the modernization of all Indonesia. Geertz argues that Indonesia had two economies: one, a modern plantation sector, the other, a subsistence-oriented indigenous sector. These two sectors were distinct but interrelated, because of the unique characteristics of *sawah* fields which allowed for seemingly infinite degrees of intensification of production. Plantation sugar and subsistence rice crops could be cultivated on the same land without decreases in rice yields, because of a process he calls 'involution'. Involution refers to the intensification of prior social patterns of production and a refinement of agricultural techniques. Since traditional production techniques are intensified rather than altered, involution should be contrasted with evolution (the emergence of new forms) and revolution (an abrupt radical change) (White 1983: 20). The involution of the peasant economy was the product of an ethic of 'shared poverty' which seeks to divide the reduced economic product into ever more minute shares, 'if not altogether evenly, at least relatively so' (Geertz 1963: 97). This egalitarianism manifests itself in relatively small and equal holdings, work-sharing, and income-redistributing institutions.

Even this brief outline of the involution thesis makes clear that Geertz holds a Chayanovian model of the peasantry (Kahn 1993); that is, he asserts that land is in flexible supply to all households, that their production is geared to securing a socially determined minimum income, and that any income beyond this minimum has diminishing marginal utility (Hunt 1979: 248). As the ratio of workers to consumers within a household rises, the amount of labour required

from each worker to meet that socially determined minimum income will *decrease*, leaving workers 'spare time' which could be utilized on the plantations. The 'dual economy', with distinct capitalist and subsistence sectors, is thus conceptually created. Capitalist agriculture in the plantation sector fails to impinge on the cultural norms and relations of production of the peasant sector, despite appropriating much of the village rice lands for sugar production. The economic logic of the Javanese peasant remains insulated, entrapped in an involuted subsistence ethic which precludes any radical differentiation of the peasantry and hence an indigenous capitalist revolution. Geertz's model of an insulated subsistence logic, and the resultant intensification of tradition, *appears* apt in describing the development of the To Pamona peasant economy due to a very limited land base suitable for *sawah*, high population density in these areas, and the concomitant necessity of seeking wages through the collection of forest produce, such as ebony, rattan and resin.

By transposing Geertz's argument on 'shared poverty' to the highlands of Central Sulawesi, I argue that Geertz's critics to date have not gone far enough (Alexander & Alexander 1982; Collier 1981; Knight 1982; White 1983). This transposition allows us to examine the theoretical underpinnings of Geertz's argument and those of his critics, apart from the particular historical example used to demonstrate them. These critiques have emphasized the theoretical shortcomings of the 'dual economy' model and rightly questioned the mutualism of sugar and rice cultivation. They have failed to demonstrate, however, that the differentiation of the peasantry has been a salient feature of the Javanese social landscape, or that 'shared poverty' has failed to blunt class polarization. Rather, these critiques have

appeared in reverse chronological order, pushing the temporal boundaries of the 'traditional' economy further and further back in history. Indeed, the break with Geertz is less radical than his critics would have us believe, since almost all those attempting to demonstrate the demise of involution appear to posit an historical period in which Geertz's model, or something quite close to it, is said to be pertinent. But positing a 'traditional' economy and contrasting it with the 'fact' of commoditisation, inequalities in land distribution and the like is not the same as demonstrating a secular trend towards increased class differentiation (Kahn 1985: 78).

In contrast, I would like to demonstrate that 'shared poverty' is not a feature of some earlier 'traditional' period but is the product of the processes of differentiation and commodification. That is, shared poverty is the unintended result of liberal policies aimed at creating simple commodity producers integrated into commodity and labour markets, not an insulated peasantry. Geertz observes that Javanese peasants had one foot in the plantation economy and the other in a subsistence-oriented peasant sector (1963: 90 sqq.). The peasant's ability to obtain a minimum income from subsistence farming reduced the amount of wages that needed to be paid in the plantation sector. In Sulawesi, the continued need to engage in subsistence agriculture with only minimal capital inputs and an overabundance of labour led to the reconstitution of To Pamona kinship and the household such that they were excluded from the commodified production process (cf. Smith 1989: 163-6). Shared poverty then, emerges with the need to maintain a kin-based, subsistence agricultural sphere in an otherwise commodified economy.

Like the other critics of Geertz noted above, my analysis of the commodification of production, consumption and social reproduction within and between households begins with a repudiation of the dual economy model underlying Geertz's involution thesis, while accepting his 'culturalist' position that 'tradition' has served to blunt class polarization. By rejecting the dual economy approach, I reject Geertz's treatment of capitalism as a monolith restricted to the modern sector of the economy; rather, capitalism is treated as a multi-variant process in which the commodification of product, land and labour must be separately accounted for (Kahn 1985: 82). By focusing on the uneven commodification of specific processes, it should become apparent why some relationships are subjected to maximizing calculation, while others are apparently excluded (Smith 1989: 163-6). This is what I refer to as the reconstitution of kinship within the constraints of differentiation.

This analysis of the reconstitution of kinship begins by questioning the analytic usefulness of the concept of 'household'. Much of the literature on differentiation assumes that the simple family peasant household is a self-contained unit of production and consumption, and that the differentiation referred to is a differentiation of peasant households (Wong 1987: 21). A growing literature has increasingly challenged a number of cardinal presuppositions behind the conception of the household as a bounded and independent unit (Wong 1987; Yanagisako 1979; Sanjek 1982). It has become increasingly apparent that the various facets of the household need to be distinguished. Co-residence, kinship, production, consumption and social reproduction are all factors which occur within households, without being its defining features. The moral valuation of domestic relations similarly fails to delimit household boundaries; supposedly 'domestic' values such as sharing and lack of calculation may bridge households; the co-resident group itself may be characterized by relations of hierarchy, servitude, or dependency (Harris 1982: 150).

It is only through attention to the dynamic interplay of these features within the arena of the household that we can escape the constrictions of 'ideal type' analysis which masks the unevenness of the capitalist reformation of the To Pamona peasantry. By examining patterns of production, consumption and social reproduction in turn, I hope to show how commodification has altered the logic of social reproduction; that is, the creation of viable new peasant enterprises. The acquisition of land through inheritance leads to both the differentiation of land holdings and the concomitant need for family labour to offset the high costs of production. I found that *the unequal distribution of land was essential to the creation of viable peasant enterprises, and that 'kin', not land, were redistributed*. I now attempt to show the implications in terms of shared poverty and inter-household relations and to show that the To Pamona household cannot be defined in terms of domestic functions; it is, rather, an amorphous arena whose membership is determined by the synergistic logics of simple commodity production and the 'axiom of amity' of kinship (Fortes 1969: 235-7).

### *The sombori*

Descent among the To Pamona is traced bilaterally. A group of bilaterally related kin descended from a common ancestor is called a *potina*, which generally

extends to include third cousins. The *potina* is not a corporate group since its shared inheritance, the elite goods required for bridewealth and funerals (i.e. cattle, brass trays and cloth) are dispersed in the very rituals which bring the *potina* together as a group. At one time the salient constituent units of the *potina* were a number of longhouses (*banua*) composed of from four to six matrilineally related households (*sombori*). Each *banua* was a corporate group and retained control of a common inheritance of elite goods used only for life cycle rituals. *Potina* members retained rights in the shared inheritances of other *banua* for as long as their shared inheritance lasted intact. Since marriage was matrilineal, men left their share behind. Whenever these men engaged in life cycle rituals, they could call on their kin for a contribution from this shared inheritance (*posintuwu*). It was these same exchanges of *posintuwu* which continued to link the various longhouses of a *potina* after the inheritance was dispersed. *Posintuwu* exchanges and the system of ritual feasts they supported formed the basis of the traditional political system.

The word *posintuwu*, or one of its cognates, provides the ideological underpinning of all interhousehold relations. It is a cultural keyword inextricably bound up with the problems of kinship, production, reproduction and feasting which it is used to discuss. The root of the word is the verb *tuwu* (living). *Mosintuwu* means 'to live in friendship', 'mutually to engage in activities with the implication of a return' (favour, gift, labour). The noun form is *posintuwu*, 'friendship', and its objective manifestations, the gift and mutual assistance. In translating *mosintuwu* I have, in part, followed Adriani (1928), a missionary linguist. Adriani's selection of the word 'friendship' correctly captures one aspect of the word, the feeling of amity, but ignores both the kinship aspect and its material manifestations. Inscribed on a 10 metre high sign at the village gate of Tentena is the motto '*sintuwu maroso, tuwu siwagi, tuwu malinuwu*'. *Sintuwu maroso* denotes a strong sense of living together, of being together, of doing together. *Tuwu siwagi* denotes a lifestyle of supporting or aiding others. *Tuwu malinuwu* denotes an unending life, one continuously renewed, like a clump of bamboo; though one bamboo plant might die, its roots constantly give off new shoots, giving the clump the appearance of living forever. The motto thus roots life itself in an ideal of communal activity, mutual aid and relatedness in a common origin. It is this relatedness which provides the rationale for common action and mutual support.

The household (*sombori*), as it was historically constituted, can only be understood in relation to the *potina* and the *posintuwu* networks which tied it together. *Sombori* is a term derived from longhouse life, and literally means 'those who live on one side of a hearth' (Adriani 1928: 759). The *sombori* was created through marriage, and refers primarily to the husband-wife pair. The *sombori* was thus defined in terms of a conjugal relationship, rather than as a unit performing necessary domestic functions. This couple would sleep together. The wife would cook for the two of them, and they would eat together but not alone, since they ate and shared their cooked food with others in the longhouse. Unmarried boys and girls slept in communal chambers. Kinship, co-residence and consumption were intertwined, although the *sombori* was not the clearly delimited unit within which they took place (cf. Sanjek 1982: 98).

Related *sombori* within a longhouse performed many of the domestic functions normally attributed to the household. This fits well with To Pamona developmental conceptions of the *sombori*, a unit which they see as growing increasingly independent through time as its members gain required skills and resources, but cushioned within a larger kin network which assumes those domestic duties it is unable to accomplish alone.

The *sombori* was also a potential production unit; that is, a unit which farmed its own fields and engaged in labour exchanges with other *sombori*. A gendered division of labour made husband and wife the *minimal* unit of production, not the *necessary* unit of production. Unmarried individuals were unable to cultivate their own fields, since they could not participate in the exchanges of opposite-sex labour required for certain tasks. A newly married couple might continue to farm together with the wife's parents, if the bride was too young and inexperienced to assume all domestic responsibilities. Such a multiple-family household was said to be *sanco-ncombori* (from the same root as *sombori*). This relationship would continue as long as required, as the couple first cooked separately, then later established its own fields. This household form might also result when parents became elderly. Such a relationship need not imply co-residence and the couple might continue to cook separately as well.

The responsibility for raising children and the intergenerational transfer of productive resources was assumed by the wider kin group (i.e. the *banua* and *potina*). That is, the *sombori* has been defined in terms of a *relationship*, that of a conjugal partner, rather than in terms of a domestic function, child-rearing. This 'domestic' function is a *kin*, not a household responsibility. This is now most clearly seen through high rates of fosterage within the *potina* with 38 per cent. of the households in the study group currently fostering children (Goody 1971). The role of kin in social reproduction was also seen during the creation of new *sombori*, a process which involved the *potina*'s approval of the match, their collection of the bridewealth through gifts of *posintuwu* and the exchange of bridewealth. Marriage was made possible through a series of bridewealth prestations which legitimated the groom's *potina*'s rights in the children of the union. In the case of both marriage and child-rearing, larger kin groups controlled the constitution of the household and its membership.

Production, consumption and social reproduction are treated separately here because they implied different moral imperatives within and between households. My first criticism of 'shared poverty' is that it assumes a universal moral ethic shorn from the constituent social relations within which it is enacted; it is inherently teleological (Alexander & Alexander 1982: 599). In contrast, my research revealed a more complex moral universe. For example, production was characterized by work exchanges (*pesale*) marked by exact reciprocity between production units within the same agricultural season. Although the harvest from one's fields was dependent upon the labour of others, this exact exchange of labour precluded any claims being made upon it. One's harvest was one's own, and taking any part of another's harvest was theft. On the other hand, consumption was marked by generalized reciprocity across household boundaries. Although individual *sombori* cooked their own meals, all the *sombori* within a longhouse ate together and shared their food; those who had fish or

other delicacies would divide these among those present. To be present while someone eats is to be obliged to join them; to leave without eating is *kasalora*, an invitation for divine retribution. Eating together is a symbol of kinship and amity. Such generalized exchange was not limited to cooked foods eaten in the presence of others. Any surplus foodstuff was distributed with no calculation of an exact return. Such sharing was explicitly phrased in kin terms, and should not be interpreted as a universal ethic; as Wong notes,

In many Southeast Asian societies the cognatic character of the kinship system has accentuated the perception of inter-village relations as being based on sharing, if only because within a few generations the rapid spread of bilateral links tends to extend the kinship ideology of help without calculation to most if not all residents (1991: 194).

I would like carefully to distinguish consumption from social reproduction, because the sharing of the elite goods needed for the creation of new households fits within a distinct exchange economy (*posintuwu*). The *potina* provides the means to marriage, a bridewealth consisting primarily of cloth, a water buffalo and a brass tray, but does not directly provide the means of production that the new household requires for its subsistence. In swidden cultivation, access to marriage determined access to labour. This was tantamount to providing the productive resources which the new household required, since land was freely available. Importantly, the giving of bridewealth also legitimated the kin group's rights in the children of the union. With the introduction of *sawah* these two aspects of social reproduction have been disassociated. While bridewealth continues to legitimate the kin group's rights in children (and their labour), it no longer guarantees the new household's access to land. One must be generous in providing bridewealth for kin but such generosity need not extend to providing *sawah*. If the moral ethic governing *posintuwu* exchange regulates social reproduction, then the social formation will be regulated by the 'axiom of amity' and characterized by the redistribution of production and 'shared poverty', rather than the differentiation of holding size and the emergence of class divisions.

By the time of my fieldwork (1991-3), both production and consumption had been commodified; hence the ethic of 'shared poverty' appeared to operate only in the process of social reproduction. Although there was a clear differentiation of holding size among the sixty-eight households I interviewed, this differential was blunted by the porousness of household boundaries, that is, the transfer of kin and their labour. Wealthier households appear to be aiding their poorer kin generously, by providing food and residence for their children. However, the redistribution of productive labour is different from the redistribution of productive resources, although both were traditionally linked through the giving of bridewealth. In aiding their *potina*, large landowners gained unpaid 'kin' labour which could be utilized in petty commodity production to reduce capital costs and ensure the continued viability of their enterprises. I will argue that these inter-household kin ties are kept non-commodified; hence a non-capitalist logic *appears* to be at work, even though production itself is fully commodified. This form of shared poverty is the product of the differentiation of ownership of productive resources.



We must be careful not to dismiss prematurely this 'moral economy' as fully subsumed to capitalist relations of production. As noted, the spread of capitalism has been an uneven process and the commodification of product, land and labour must be separately accounted for. A careful analysis of the shift from swidden to *sawah* production is required to determine to what degree agriculture has been subsumed by capitalism. This historical treatment will be limited to Tentena, the village I know best.

*The commodification of sawah production in Tentena*

*Sawah* was introduced in Tentena about 1908 by the Dutch (MVO MMK 303: 25). Each household was required to cultivate 0.02 hectare of *sawah*, a larger burden than might appear, as neither hoes nor ploughs were available; the ground was worked by driving cattle through the mud. Of little productive value, these plots were viewed as another form of government corvée. Since the work had little productive importance, adults left *sawah* cultivation to their children, who were receiving additional instruction in specially laid school *sawah* (Kruyt 1924: 44). The village *sawah* has been used to teach other villages the basic techniques involved; hence Tentena has consistently benefited first from the introduction of new technologies. Ploughs, for example, were introduced in Tentena as early as 1925, but by 1935 had not been adopted elsewhere (MVO KIT 1213: 4).

Rice grown on *sawahs* was less appetizing, hence the small amounts grown were sold to raise the money needed for the new head tax (Kruyt 1924: 52). Wet field rice was the first commodity; to this day, dry field rice is not marketed. The government also attempted to commodify the land itself. *Sawah*, unlike the dry fields, was not abandoned, hence remained the property of those who opened it. Pamonans, contrary to government desires, continued to treat land like other forms of property such as cattle, which could be owned either by individuals or by several related households who worked it together. The land market remains restricted, and most *sawah* is acquired through inheritance.

The introduction of the plough around 1925 altered the balance between dry- and wet-rice cultivation. Both types of cultivation require labour during the rainy season. When *sawah* fields were small and left to the care of children, dry-rice cultivation proceeded unhindered. As the *sawah* expanded in size in accordance with government dictates (the original minimum of 0.02 hectare was increased to 0.1 hectare), the labour demands of *sawah* began to impede dry field cultivation. The introduction of the plough increased the amount of *sawah* which could be easily cultivated, and gave rise to a land rush as *sawah* fields were expanded to a maximum of 2 hectares in Tentena, and 6 hectares elsewhere, depending upon population densities and the amount of suitable land. Since the plough could not be used on hilly dry fields, these fields were eventually abandoned. Neighbouring villages resort to dry field cultivation only when their *sawah* are insufficient in size to meet both cash and subsistence needs, although this pattern disappeared in Tentena just before the second world war. Abandoning swidden cultivation did not, however, imply a shift to commodity production. The *sawah* fields were now producing for both

subsistence and sale. As population increased, saleable surpluses grew increasingly smaller, and *sawah* was reserved for subsistence production. The switch in farming technologies did not lead to the commodification of relations of production, which remained subsistence-oriented.

*Sawah* fields were not as responsive to population pressure as swidden production. The limited amount of irrigable land meant a limit of approximately 110 hectares of *sawah* for Tentena. Since land could be obtained only through inheritance, holdings tended to be fractionalized as parents divided their *sawah* among maturing children. Parents then cultivated dry fields, or lived *sanco-ncombori* with one of their children. This fragmentation of holdings was combatted in a number of ways, including the unequal distribution of *sawah*.<sup>4</sup> Some relief was also obtained in the late 1950s, when half the village moved to found the new village of Petirodongi, and during the early 1970s, when the green revolution doubled productive capacity through the introduction of high yield varieties of rice. By 1991, *sawah* holdings in Tentena varied in size between 0.09 and 2.0 hectares, the result of varying fertility rates between families, inheritance strategies and resettlement. The relatively small size of land holdings has prevented the emergence of a class of *kulak* landowners; as Geertz notes of Java, 'farmers of a dimension and disposition sufficient to qualify as proper kulaks, to the degree they appear at all, seem but bubbles in the stream, local, fragile and evanescent, soon engulfed by the central current' (1984: 519).

The logic of *sawah* production in Tentena precluded the commodification of the product or relations of production. Rather, the impetus for the commodification of all factors of production can be traced to Chinese merchants who settled in Tentena during the 1930s. As holdings were fractionalized, some farmers were forced to engage in wage labour, or to sell or rent their holdings. The absolute need for cash to pay taxes, school fees and bridewealth in an otherwise non-commodified economy created debts which could only be met on these Chinese merchants' terms. By the 1950s, the Chinese had acquired intermediate-sized holdings which they cultivated as typical capitalist enterprises. Similarly, the terms under which the peasant sector worked were being increasingly, if unevenly, commodified as a result of peasant debt. The ability to resolve debt with surplus production marks the difference between viable and non-viable enterprises. Those with non-viable holdings became increasingly dependent upon wage labour for the primary reproduction of their households. The commodification of labour and land thus began among those with non-viable enterprises, and only peripherally affected those with viable holdings who remained entrenched in a 'subsistence economy'.

The existence of non-viable holdings and the emergence of wage labouring clearly indicate that 'shared poverty' does not operate at the level of land redistribution. Access to 'surplus' *sawah* for the landless has been partially but not completely commodified. Few farmers could afford to purchase land if their own small holdings were the result of fragmentation. The purchase of land may thus be undertaken by a group of siblings who own and work it in common. The terms under which this and other types of 'communal land' are worked vary immensely. In some cases, not all of the siblings reside in the

village: hence the non-residents may receive only a small part of the harvest. This amount may be specifically set (a form of sharecropping) or left to the goodwill of the cultivating relative. An example of how the means by which land was acquired affects the terms of sharecropping relationships was provided by one widow and her sons who cultivated two plots belonging to her non-resident sister. The first plot was her sister's share of their father's inheritance, and the sister had purchased the second. No rent was paid on the first plot, although each year the widow would 'remember' her sister with a part of the harvest, commensurate with her own circumstances. For the second, purchased plot, she paid a fixed rent of 100 kilograms of rice (close to the market rate).

Few non-resident kin demand a rent from siblings, first or second cousins for the use of inherited land, although they will invariably be 'remembered' in kind after the harvest. Those with salaried jobs frequently allowed a sibling to work their share of *sawah* and took a houseyard plot in the village as their share of the inheritance. If no land of this sort is available, the landless may turn to other villagers with surplus land. They may work the land in common, the harvest being divided on a ratio of 7 to 3 to the benefit of the landowner; or, the land may be granted in exchange for work elsewhere. The land might also be sharecropped, with payment of a cash rent or a third of the harvest. These patterns demonstrate that the landless can obtain access to land on flexible terms, although in few cases is this access to land granted without a return in either kind, labour or cash. As a result, there is clearly a *net* transfer of wealth from the poorer to the richer households. Significantly, this transfer of wealth can be phrased in market terms with fixed rents; or, it can be expressed in the language of kinship, with poorer families 'remembering' (*ndaendoka*) their benefactors with whatever surplus they can spare.

The commodification of agricultural labour, like land, has occurred as holdings became insufficient for subsistence. Agricultural labour was traditionally exchanged through *pesale*, a pattern of labour exchange adapted from swidden cultivation. It is marked by the exact exchange of a day's labour for a day's labour during the agricultural season. The workers bring their own cooked rice, but the host provides fish and coffee for all, creating a festive atmosphere. Many farmers emphasized that they hold *pesale* to liven up the drudgery of field work. The Chinese merchants refused to engage in these work exchanges and offered a wage for the day's work. Indigenous civil servants were the first to attempt to follow their example; they could afford to hire labour, and because they worked in offices could not exchange labour.

Caught in a network of kin relationships, it was difficult for these civil servants to hire wage labour from their fellow villagers. Rather, they were forced to hold a *pesale* and offer a cash replacement for the day's labour they were unable to return. They could only issue a general call for labour and wait to see who showed up; the hiring was out of their hands. All who came had to be paid, even if their numbers exceeded that required for the task itself. This added immeasurably to the festive atmosphere of the *pesale* but precluded the widespread hiring of wage labour.

On the other hand, the larger landholders were unable to reciprocate all the labour required to work their land and thus were forced to either rent out part of their holdings, or to expand their households so as to increase the amount of labour available to them. Large landholders would frequently foster their poorer relatives' children, transferring 'kin' labour from those without resources to those with labour needs. This is the opposite of the Chayanovian expectation that land be redistributed in a 'communal' economy of simple family households, a point to which I will return. These landholders with viable subsistence farms were not at the forefront of the commodification of labour, since their enterprises increasingly drew on domestic labour supplemented by fostered children. Rather, the commodification of labour arose among those with an absolute need for cash who lacked other resources with which to obtain it. A pool of daily wage labourers with insufficient land holdings for subsistence emerged during the late 1950s. Since they did not require labour exchanges to work their own miniscule plots, they began to demand a cash substitute like that they received from the civil servants whenever they joined in *pesale*. At about the same time, farmers also began demanding a wage substitute from those who did not return their *pesale* labour obligations by the end of the agricultural season. In this way, wage labouring emerged separate from the holding of *pesale*.

Ploughing has been completely commodified, but other more generalized tasks such as planting, weeding and harvesting demonstrate a more complex pattern subject to rigorous calculation of the costs and benefits. *Pesale* continues to occur for planting and weeding, due to its low cash costs. Those with no other regular cash income may resort to *pesale* because they cannot afford to pay for labour, even though, in their own words, '*pesale* are not economical'. All the farmers I spoke to were quick to commodify the costs involved in a *pesale*: they must provide food for the workers and then must replace each worker day with a day's labour of their own, at a *potential* loss of Rp. 3.500 a day (the daily wage rate of a labourer). According to these farmers, hiring workers appears more 'economical' since they do not have to pay for the workers' food, but it requires a greater up-front cash outlay. This option is thus adopted only if they have a shortage of household labour to exchange. The opportunity cost of *pesale* is further reduced since certain kinds of 'kin' labour do not have to be exactly reciprocated. In one case, for example, two cousins with no land joined another cousin's *pesale*. Since the two had no land of their own, they had no use for the landowner's labour. However, the landowner 'remembered' their unasked-for aid, and called on them for help with harvesting, which was paid with a share of the harvest. The landowner's plot was insufficient for his own subsistence, but his own poverty prevented him from adopting the most 'economic' strategy; as a result, his poverty was 'shared' and his minuscule production divided.

Those with an outside source of income who could afford to pay wages but who have surplus household labour demonstrate another strategy for the adoption of *pesale*. Like the others, they opt for *pesale* because of its lower cash costs. This group tended to have the largest land holdings, and hence required the greatest amount of capital for hiring labour. But because of their larger holdings, they also had difficulty in returning all the labour they required through

*pesale*. They thus worked only a portion of their land with *pesale*, and rented the rest out; only if their outside incomes were large enough did they utilize wage labour to farm it all. The largest landowner in Tentena is a teacher in a state school. He could easily recruit labour from among his students, and the labour was returned by a combination of members of his own household and other 'kin' labour which need not be reciprocated.

The commodification of agriculture has resulted in the emergence of alternate forms of work exchange. *Mombesale* (from the same root as *pesale* with the prefix *mombe-*, mutually) is labour-oriented, whereas *pesale* is task-oriented. It developed as the wage labouring workforce in Tentena grew larger. Five or six workers form a group, working in turn for each member. Members of this group might include both landless labourers and mid-sized landholders. The group's labour is used for the benefit of each member in rotation, who may either use their labour in his own fields, or *sell* it to the highest bidder. Thus, group members work continuously, but their costs are minimized since each worker provides his or her own food. The system meets the needs of those requiring labour, as well as those requiring cash. Similar to *mombesale* is the *partei* (Indonesian, 'party'), or *regu* (Pamona, 'to play'), which operates on the same principles but with a larger group of up to thirty workers.

The differentiation of land holdings is thus historically linked to the commodification of production. There are many non-viable holdings insufficient to meet subsistence needs, thus necessitating wage labour outside the household 'unit of production'. The differentiation of holdings has been accentuated by other costs of farming, such as the costs of fertilizer. These costs are often sufficient to prevent smaller landholders from cultivating their land. The need for an outside income for even 'subsistence' production has meant that all households now engage in wage labour. This includes agricultural wage labour, the collection of forest products on commission, or sending older children to work in distant cities or plantations and depending on their remittances. Multi-occupational households have become the norm.

Given the commodification of labour and the need for cash for even subsistence production, the continued use of 'kin' labour by wealthier farmers is analytically problematic. This issue is usually resolved with reference to 'shared poverty' or 'moral economy' type arguments. I similarly attempted to understand the use of kin labour with reference to a non-commodified subsistence ethic but found my informants' 'subsistence-oriented strategy' was based upon rational calculation of the factors of production. In all cases, farmers sought to reduce the costs of production as much as possible so as to minimize their subsistence costs and maximize their cash income from their surplus. However, since incomes are low even among the larger landholders, kin ties are mobilized in a variety of ways to reduce these costs. Although the villagers emphasized that the calculation of costs and benefits between kin is improper, *be maya mombereke* ('should not be mutually counted'), the decision to utilize kin labour was itself subject to calculation. Villagers refused to commodify specific kinds of 'kin' labour but did calculate the costs and benefits of utilizing those forms of labour. Kin labour included both household labour as well as that of other households. Hence, the teacher mentioned above would reciprocate

labour with that of his non-resident father-in-law's temporary ward. The utilization of kin labour is often physically eased by the transfer of kin between households, which is phrased in terms of aiding poorer relatives, of 'sharing poverty' (*tuwu siwagi*). The relationship between kinship and household enterprises thus requires a more detailed examination.

### *Kinship and the household*

The use of extra-household kin labour demonstrates that in Tentena, household boundaries are porous and counters the image of the peasant household as a direct production-consumption unit. Pamonans view the *sombori* in developmental terms, as an increasingly independent unit of production that must be cushioned within a larger kin network which assumes those domestic duties it is unable to accomplish alone. The fuzzy household boundaries which result from the sharing of domestic functions among kin precludes any analysis of household consumption and social reproduction, except in relation to the wider network of households of which it is a part, i.e. the *potina* (cf. Sanjek 1982: 98). This analysis must carefully describe which features of the social structure 'lead individuals to provide work for other households at the expense of their own' (Alexander & Alexander 1982: 599).<sup>5</sup> While an ideology of shared poverty characterizes Tentena, this egalitarian *ideology* stands at odds with the differentiation of the peasantry and a hierarchical social structure. As Kahn notes, ideologies 'should be objects of analysis rather than tools *for* analysis' (1978: 130, emphasis in original). The place of 'kinship' in levelling differences in wealth between households must thus be treated as problematic, rather than explanatory.

We must be careful not to separate morality from the relationships within which it is embedded. Sharing, the redistribution of consumables, must be distinguished from shared poverty, defined in terms of social reproduction. The ideology of sharing in Tentena emphasizes only the obligation to divide a surplus with little emphasis on the needs of the receiver. Independence is highly prized, hence the gift should not connote 'charity'; one must share equally among all present. Sharing requires no immediate return, but givers will eventually stop sharing if they are not 'remembered' (*ndaendoka*). The return prestation need not be of 'equal' value. Even if the amount shared is small, its value is not decreased, since even in a time of scarcity the receiver has been remembered.

Generalized exchange marked the local economy until the 1970s. Few goods had a commodity value, hence their availability was dependent upon personalized ties of sharing. This is no longer the case. 'Sharing' has been replaced with taking goods on credit. Although most goods now have a commodity value, generalized exchange still continues on a more limited scale, especially of items such as home-grown vegetables and cigarettes. In the newly commodified economy, these persisting exchanges have acquired new emotive importance, emphasizing solidarity.

Balanced reciprocity of consumables can be contrasted with unbalanced reciprocity typical of shared poverty in social reproduction. This distinction is of importance, because an individual or household surrenders its independence

through its inability to reciprocate. These relationships are marked by a clear hierarchy of dominance and subordination. Harris reminds us that while the 'language of kinship is concerned with generosity and sharing ... this is only one side of the story ... relations of extreme authority and dependence may be expressed in kin terms. In some cases it has been argued that kin terms and kin relations effectively disguise class differences' (1982: 150). Unbalanced reciprocity may take the form of fulfilling certain kinds of domestic functions, such as the provisioning of a home, clothing, food or education for another family or their children.

As already mentioned, one aspect of shared poverty in the highlands is the redistribution of kin, not land, through widespread fosterage. Analysis of household composition in the study group of sixty-eight related households (i.e. recognized as *potina*) from the four villages mentioned earlier shows that 44 per cent. were nuclear family households, 49 per cent. were extended family households fostering children (or other kin), and a further 6 per cent. were multiple family households living *sanco-ncombori* (see table 1). These figures show the failure of the liberal development policy of creating a peasantry composed of nuclear family households, despite the policy's success in eliminating the *banua*.<sup>6</sup> These household forms are not stages in a single household development cycle but are, rather, the product of a common kinship logic.

Shared poverty follows from specific obligations to aid in the social reproduction of kin. By social reproduction, I am referring on the one hand to the means by which households are created, and on the other hand to the means by which the ties within and between households – which I have referred to as 'kinship' – are simultaneously created and perpetuated. These processes are cemented by the exchange of bridewealth. That which Geertz characterizes as shared poverty, I see as the specific relationship between kinship (the *potina*) and the household.

TABLE 1. Household composition in study group

<i>Type</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Per cent.</i>
<i>No family</i>	1	1.5
<i>Simple Family Household</i>	30	44
( <i>denuded</i> )	(10)	(15)
<i>Extended Family Household</i>	33	49
( <i>denuded</i> )	(8)	(12)
<i>Multiple Family Household</i>	4	6

As we saw, the creation of a new household and the acquisition of land were traditionally accomplished through marriage. The switch from swidden to *sawah* cultivation altered this system, shifting the process of land provisioning from marriage to inheritance, although the inheritance is often distributed shortly after the marriage. The resulting differentiation in land holdings is ameliorated by the transfer of responsibility for the social reproduction of kin to other households. Since this responsibility transcends household boundaries,

it is exceedingly difficult to categorize household forms based on the genealogically defined kin types contained *within a sombori*. The variety of household forms encountered in the sample, whether nuclear family, stem family, lateral or downward extended household are not the product of a uniform developmental cycle, but the product of this complex reallocation of kinship responsibility in relation to the specific demographic circumstances of the wider kin group and the availability of resources. The household can only be defined in terms of roles, not its domestic functions, since such domestic functions are often assumed by others in the kin group. The household is not a necessary unit of production, consumption or social reproduction. The household is, rather, a flexible structure within which the members of a *potina* achieve these ends.

A married couple assumes responsibility for the social reproduction of the kin group which paid their brideprice. They may thus assume the burden of raising the children of others, often as distant as third cousins. Such appeals for help are frequently based upon the prior residence of the householder or his or her parent in the household of the ward or his or her parent or grandparent. A significant proportion of the children from extended family households were themselves fostered out. It is important to emphasize that fostering is not the simple transfer of children from poor to rich households (cf. Wong 1991: 201). Fosterage is a means by which the *potina* helps its kin to fulfil the domestic functions which some households are unable to provide themselves. For example, one set of parents may foster a poorer relative's child, providing food and shelter, but require assistance themselves in acquiring higher education for one of their own children .

Fosterage is a relatively new phenomenon among the To Pamona,<sup>7</sup> meeting a number of new needs, and must be clearly differentiated from adoption. Goody differentiates fosterage from other forms of pro-parenthood by emphasizing that the nurturing, educational and sponsoring roles of parenthood are assumed without 'effect[ing] the status identity of the child, nor the jural rights and obligations this entails' (1971: 336). Foster-parents nurture children without the jural obligation of dividing an inheritance with them. Their parental role and authority are unchallenged, but the jural status of the ward *may* lead to a clear domestic distinction being made between own and foster children. In one case, a young woman who lived with her cousin assumed a servant role. She was asked to live with the family to prevent her making what they considered an undesirable marriage. She was given a small allowance for doing the house-cleaning, but the reason for her stay was always expressed in terms of their parental role in arranging her marriage. I noted one day that she never rested; she was always cooking or cleaning, hence I likened her role to Cinderella,<sup>8</sup> a reference which she surprisingly understood, having seen the Disney film. She was horrified at the suggestion, and begged that I never repeat it. She insisted that she worked only because she felt that she should fulfil her responsibilities as a family member, not because they *made* her. They had assumed a parental role, were attempting to find her a job and were assuming responsibility for her marriage. By working hard, she showed the depth of her appreciation as she would to her own parents. Such relationships are cast in



kinship terms, and hence invoke patterns of authority as well as amity. Given these patterns of authority, we must be careful in asserting that the transfer of dependants is a 'levelling mechanism'.

The terms under which wards are accepted vary greatly. In the majority of cases, the ward was accepted because he or she was attending a local school. However, that reason often hid more complex situations; in one case, for example, two sisters living in two different towns exchanged their similarly aged children so that they could attend the high school in the other town. The exchange of these children hid other motives, such as a discipline problem and the desire to strengthen an emotional bond between the sisters through an exchange of their children. While fosterage may be a means by which resources are redistributed within a kin group, levelling differences in wealth, that is not necessarily its only intent.

One effect of the sharing of domestic functions within a *potina* is that it simultaneously provides 'kin' labour for those with greater resources. While the intent of fosterage may not be to gain such labour, having acquired it, the labour is utilized in familial enterprises and heightens differences in production and wealth. I have emphasized the ambiguity of fosterage as both leveller and accentuator of differences in wealth because it remains a kinship phenomenon, hence regulated by the 'axiom of amity' outside of the cost-benefit analysis now common in many aspects of production. Although several wealthier families have actively sought 'kin' labour for their household enterprises, they have also been asked to aid distant family, to foster a child whose productive labour is inconsequential. A strict calculation of costs and benefits is explicitly ruled out, while allowing those with resources to utilize the domestic labour they acquire to ensure the viability of their peasant enterprises. 'The poor "lose" their children and thus their ability to increase resources, whereas the wealthy can profitably "bind" them by means of their resources in property' (Wong 1991: 201).

### *The household developmental cycle*

An analysis of household formation highlights the effect of the economic viability of peasant household enterprise on the redistribution of kin between households. This household developmental cycle is not unilineal but follows two major paths depending upon the viability of the peasant enterprise. In the first case, poorer families dependent upon the market for the social reproduction of their enterprises are more likely to live in denuded simple family households, or *sanco-ncombori*. In contrast, wealthier families with viable land holdings are more likely to live in extended family households, supplemented with their poorer relatives.

Parental property is usually divided as children marry. Although inheritance law states that property should be divided equally, in practice the division is often unequal to ensure the viability of the new *sombori*. Sufficient resources to form an independent household are in short supply. The resources sufficient to support husband and wife may be insufficient when children are added, or alternately, labour may be in short supply if they are childless. Or, having obtained land, the household may be unable to afford to farm it. In either case,

children may be fostered out, resulting in a denuded simple family household. In the poorest of families, family lands will not be divided and families will live *sanco-ncombori* until further resources are found. Every group living *sanco-ncombori* with which I spoke emphasized that their ideal was to live in a simple family household.

Extended family households follow a different developmental path. The extended family households are a subset of the wealthier simple family households, hence are not a product of the lack of resources which force poor families to live in complex households. I found that 63 per cent. of wealthy families formed extended family households, whereas only 21 per cent. lived in simple family households. Many of the wealthy living in simple family households had fostered children in the past. In contrast, among the poor households 63 per cent. were living in simple family households, while 37 per cent. were living in extended family households. As noted above, the more resources a household has at its command, the greater its labour requirements and hence its willingness to accept foster children.

Although there is no common developmental cycle, the second point I would like to make is that both paths follow a shared logic of social reproduction, since the extended family households could not exist except for the net transfer of children from denuded simple family households. All of the household types noted take shape because of a shared ideology which emphasizes kin responsibility for the social reproduction of the kin group through the transfer of people. Although there is some sharing of resources among kin, it appears that people are far more mobile than land. The co-residence of often 'distant' kin brings them emotionally closer and this in turn strengthens the solidarity of the kin group. Children from a number of branches of the group will meet within one household and learn of the wider kinship ties binding them, as well as of the practical limits of 'kinship'. The emotional ties created must, in turn, be contrasted with the hierarchical relations simultaneously established. In raising these children, foster parents may assume parental responsibilities extending to control of subsequent marriages. Their advice is frequently sought and their organization of marriage preparations is often essential. The ties which link households of whatever type are thus conceived of in kin terms, with attendant responsibilities, rights and duties.

Lastly, it is important to note the changes brought about by development, by the commodification of labour and the sharpened differentiation of land holdings. The government-imposed shift from *swidden* to *sawah* cultivation and the resultant fragmentation of land-holdings has deprived a number of *sombori* of the resources they need to establish an independent household, a rare phenomenon under *swidden* cultivation. Living *sanco-ncombori*, which at one time was a means to support elderly parents who were unable to farm for themselves, has become a parental support of married children unable to establish themselves independently. Similarly, poorer simple family households are denuded of children, and wealthier households expanded. Paradoxically, government policies aimed at creating simple family peasant households have had the effect of increasing the tendency to live *sanco-ncombori*, and of strengthening the wider kinship system which it sought to destroy by eliminating longhouses.

### *Conclusion*

That the differentiation of the peasantry should be accompanied by the reassertion of the pertinence of kinship in a commodified economy brings me back to the point with which I began. I noted that 'the persistence of tradition' did not imply a static perpetuation of an earlier mode of production. The penetration of capitalism has been uneven, leaving the relations of social reproduction, the ties between households, as a domain outside the arena of commodity production. Within the new social formation, 'kin' labour substitutes for wage labour where capital is scarce. By asking why wealthier households have utilized kin labour rather than wage labour, it becomes apparent that the continuing injunction against strict accounting of costs and benefits of kin relationships works both ways. On the one hand, it gives the ideology of kinship in Tentena the appearance of 'shared poverty', of a redistribution of wealth. On the other hand, differences in wealth are evident and by not calculating the value of the net transfer of labour to wealthier households, poorer households are deprived of that labour for use in their own enterprises.

One important aspect of shared poverty, as I have developed the concept, is that the redistribution or 'levelling' of wealth simultaneously gives rise to hierarchical kinship relationships. Although class divisions are blunted, and an ideology of economic and political egalitarianism asserted, kin relations translate actual economic inequalities into genealogical seniority. Familial patrons assume parental roles for their extended kin group, and in so doing control the constitution, membership and access to the means of production of newly formed households within that wider group. Familial clients with non-viable peasant enterprises and few wage opportunities become dependent upon this wider kin network for their own social reproduction. In transferring the responsibility for the social reproduction of their households to their kin group, they acknowledge this dependence in kinship rather than economic terms. That is, they are not employees, but children.

Shared poverty in the Geertzian sense thus requires qualification as a theoretical model, specifically with regard to the failure to define the kinship-bounded groups within which it operates, as well as with regard to its treatment of impinging capitalist relations. Although I have inverted Geertz's Chayanovian assumptions, I agree that the differentiation of the peasantry and the resulting reconstitution of kinship and the household is not the result of capitalist 'maximizing individualists'. *Contra* Geertz, I argue that the mechanisms of shared poverty are not 'traditional' but emerge as a response to differentiation and the introduction of capitalist relations of production. This is seen clearly among the To Pamona who have only recently been reconstituted as a peasantry. I have attempted to show that viable peasant enterprises (Geertz's *cukupan*) have maintained their viability by preserving specific types of kinship labour in non-commodified form. A maximal economic surplus is not re-invested in production, but subsidizes a more extensive kin network which serves as a political unit, an issue I have not addressed here. This apparently contradictory articulation of commodified production and shared poverty is thus seen to be the product of the problematic relationship between kinship

and a form of peasant household which is not a self-contained unit of production and consumption.

The alternative model of shared poverty discussed above attempts to redress the problems of Geertz's original formulation, as well as that of his critics. Both Geertz and his critics share a model of capitalism as a monolithic entity. Smallholder production is rarely so completely commodified, because it depends upon 'kin' (not household) labour. The incomplete commodification of productive relations which results has the *appearance* of being a distinct 'subsistence oriented economy'. The concept of 'shared poverty' is useful wherever such an economy *appears* to be at work *within an otherwise commodified economy*, but this descriptive concept should never be mistaken for economic analysis.

#### NOTES

Fieldwork was conducted in Kecamatan Pamona Utara, Central Sulawesi between Nov. 1990 and Oct. 1991 and between Nov. 1992 and June 1993, financed by a Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada Fellowship and sponsored by the Puslitbang Kemasyarakatan dan Kebudayaan of LIPI (the Centre for Social and Cultural Studies at the Indonesian Institute of Sciences). A version of this article was presented at the Graduate Seminar, Department of Anthropology, University of Toronto in December 1993. I am grateful to Shuichi Nagata, Gavin Smith and the anonymous reviewers of *JRAI* for their insightful criticisms of earlier drafts of this article.

<sup>1</sup> The village of Tentena with a population of 1400, is not to be confused with the administrative city of the same name of which it is a part. The city of Tentena is composed of six distinct villages whose distance from each other belies its official designation. The village was settled by members of the *To Wingke mPoso*. This group, like others around Lake Poso and to the west of River Poso, had no stratified ranks nor a 'Big Man' type political system. They differ in numerous respects from the more stratified *To Pamona* living to the east of the River Poso.

<sup>2</sup> Rather than limit the focus to Tentena, I explored the kin ties linking the villages of Tentena, Petirodongi, Taripa and Kamba.

<sup>3</sup> This arbitrary division summarizes a number of variables. Those classified as well-to-do had incomes above Rp. 250,000 per month, and usually owned their own concrete walled homes. Most obtained their incomes from civil service jobs, which many reinvested in petty trade. On average they had the largest land holdings. Middle peasant households had incomes between Rp. 125,000 and 249,000, and lived in their own, usually wooden walled houses. The poorest households had cash incomes below Rp. 125,000. They usually lived in inherited houses, shared a house, or had a bamboo slat walled house, and the smallest land holdings.

<sup>4</sup> Pamonan customary law specifies that all children have an equal right to a parental inheritance. However, parental property is usually divided while the parents are still alive, as their children marry, and hence is subject to uneven distribution in an attempt to ensure the viability of the new household.

<sup>5</sup> Geertz answered the Alexanders' critique (1982) of the 'ideology of shared poverty' by asserting that 'Whatever happened in pre-Independence Java – involution, class formation, or anything else – it did not consist in the progressive working out of 'the logic of capitalism', and it did not take place in a cultural vacuum' (1984: 520). I, in turn, have tried to emphasize that the 'logic of capitalism' is not a uniform process, and that attention to culture need not preclude attention to material factors.

<sup>6</sup> This liberal policy has been consistently applied during the eighty-five years I have examined in this article, first by the Dutch colonial government, and successively by the Japanese and Indonesian governments. Present Indonesian government programmes all assume a nuclear family household with a male household head as their basis. Space limitations have precluded any analysis of how this policy was applied in each regime.

<sup>7</sup> Kruyt (1989; 1950) commented on adoption (*adoptie*), but made no mention of fosterage (*opkweking*).

<sup>8</sup> The reference was inappropriate in that Cinderella was a step-sister, and hence eligible for inheritance, whereas, as will be made clear, foster children are distinctive precisely in that they are not eligible.

#### REFERENCES

- Adriani, N. 1928. *Bare'e-Nederlandsch woordenboek met Nederlandsch-Bare'e register*. Leiden: Koninklijk Bataviaasch Genootschap van Kunsten en Wetenschappen.
- Alexander, J. & P. Alexander 1982. Shared poverty as ideology: agrarian relationships in colonial Java. *Man* (N.S.) 17, 597-619.
- Boeke, J.H. 1953. *Economics and economic policy of dual societies*. Haarlem: H.D. Tjeenk Willink.
- Collier, W. 1981. Agricultural evolution in Java. In *Agricultural and rural development in Indonesia* (ed.) G. Hansen. Boulder: Westview Press.
- de Kat Angelino, A.D.A. 1931. *Staatkundig belied en bestuurszorg in Nederlansch-Indie: tweede deel: De overheidszorg in Nederlandsch-Indie*. S-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff.
- Fortes, M. 1969. *Kinship and the social order: the legacy of Lewis Henry Morgan*. Chicago: Aldine.
- Geertz, C. 1963. *Agricultural involution: the processes of ecological change in Indonesia*. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press.
- 1984. Culture and social change: the Indonesian case. *Man* (N.S.) 19, 511-32.
- Goody, E.N. 1971. Forms of pro-parenthood: the sharing and substitution of parental roles. In *Kinship* (ed.) J. Goody. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Harris, O. 1982. Households and their boundaries. *Hist. Workshop* 13, 143-52.
- Hunt, D. 1979. Chayanov's model of peasant household resource allocation. *J. Peasant Stud.* 6(3), 247-85.
- Kahn, J. 1978. Ideology and social structure in Indonesia. *Comp. Stud. Soc. Hist.* 20(1), 103-22.
- 1985. Indonesia after the demise of involution: critique of a debate. *Critique Anthropol.* 5, 69-96.
- 1993. *Constituting the Minangkabau: peasants, culture and modernity in colonial Indonesia*. Providence, RI: Berg.
- Knight, G. 1982. Capitalism and commodity production in Java. In *Capitalism and colonial production* (eds) H. Alavi et al. London: Croom Helm.
- Kruyt, A.C. 1899. De adoptie in verband met het matriarchaat bij de Toradja's van Midden-Celebes. *Tijdschr. Ind. Taal- Land- Völkerk.* 41, 80-92.
- 1924. De beteekenis van den natten rijstbouw voor de Possoers. *Koloniale Studien* 8(2), 33-53.
- 1950. *De Bare'e sprekende Toradja van Midden Celebes*, 3 vols., second edition. Amsterdam: Verhandelingen der Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, Afdeling Letterkunde, New series. Vol. 54.
- MVO (Memorie van Overgave) MMK 303 1926. Bijdrage voor de memorie van overgave van den Resident van Menado J. Tideman, voorzoover betreft de afdeling Midden-Celebes door E. Gobeë. Unpublished Government Report, Ministerie van Kolonien, Royal Dutch Archives, Den Haag.
- MVO (Memorie van Overgave) KIT 1213 1935. Algemene gegevens over de Afdeling Poso van den Asst. Resident van Poso door A.W. de Haze Winkelman. Unpublished Government Report, Ministerie van Kolonien, Royal Dutch Archives, Den Haag.
- Sanjek, R. 1982. The organization of households in Adabraka: toward a wider comparative perspective. *Comp. Stud. Soc. Hist.* 24, 57-103.
- Smith, G. 1989. *Livelihood and resistance: peasants and the politics of land in Peru*. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press.
- White, B. 1983. 'Agricultural involution' and its critics: twenty years after. *Bull. concerned Asian Scholars* 15(2), 18-31.
- Wong, D. 1987. *Peasants in the making: Malaysia's green revolution*. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

- 1991. Kinship and the domestic development cycle in a Kedah village, Malaysia. In *Cognition and social organization in southeast Asia* (eds) F. Husken & J. Kemp. Leiden: KITLV Press.
- Yanagisako, S.J. 1979. Family and household: the analysis of domestic groups. *Ann. Rev. Anthropol.* 8, 161-205.

### **L'unité domestique et la pauvreté partagée dans les hautes-terres du Sulawesi (archipel des Célèbes) central**

#### *Résumé*

Le concept de 'pauvreté partagée' proposé par Geertz n'a pas encore été analysé en dehors du contexte javanais. L'examen d'une couche paysanne formée récemment dans les hautes-terres du Sulawesi permet à l'auteur de mettre en question les suppositions contenues tant dans la formulation geertzienne que dans celles de ses critiques. Si l'applicabilité du concept de 'pauvreté partagée' aux économies de marché a été remis en cause, les critiques ont généralement accepté son utilité pour ce qui est d'un passé traditionnel de plus en plus lointain. Cette étude de cas, au contraire, cherche à démontrer que ce concept, loin de caractériser une économie traditionnelle, est le produit d'une différenciation sociale au sein d'un paysannat soumis au régime capitaliste. L'auteur considère la première formulation, éthique et universaliste, du concept de 'pauvreté partagée' proposée par Geertz comme étant déficiente. En effet, elle ne permet pas de préciser la nature des groupes de parenté auxquels le concept est censé s'appliquer.

594 Timothy Street, Newmarket, Ont., Canada L3Y 1R2