The decentralized Austronesian polity:
Of Mandalas, Negaras, Galactics, and the South Sulawesi Kingdoms*

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[*Abstract*]

Various models have been presented to describe early Southeast Asian political formations that draw on both indigenous and imported Indic ideas. The most influential of these are the "Mandala" (Wolters 1968, 1982, 1999), "Galactic" (Tambiah 1976), "Negara" (Geertz 1980), and Anderson's 1972 "The idea of power in Javanese culture." This paper represents an initial attempt to compare the salient features of these models with historical and archaeological data from South Sulawesi where, exceptionally and importantly, societies developed independently of Indic ideas. South Sulawesi is unique in being the only region of maritime Southeast Asia where there are sufficient written and oral sources, often substantiated by archaeological data, to document the social evolution of its society from scattered, economically self-sufficient communities with ranked lineages practicing swidden agriculture to large political units (kingdoms) constructed around indigenous cultural and political concepts with economies based on wet-rice

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agriculture. This wealth of data provides us with a much more detailed picture of the emergence, development and support structures of early kingdoms than found in the models, which makes South Sulawesi of fundamental importance in understanding the social and economic evolution of pre-Indic influenced Austronesian societies in Maritime Southeast Asia.

Keywords: Austronesian, South Sulawesi, Indic, Wolters, *mandala*

Ⅰ. Introduction

Various models have been put forward to describe early Southeast Asian political formations that draw on both indigenous and imported Indic ideas. The most influential of these, in relation to political and social structures, are the *mandala* (Wolters 1968, 1982, 1999) "Galactic" (Tambiah 1976, 1977), "Negara" (Geertz 1980), and Anderson's "The idea of power in Javanese culture" (1972). The general features that emerge from these models are that Southeast Asian political formations were decentralized rather than centralized; highly unstable and borderless; defined by their centers; and that inherited status or lineage played little or no role in the rise and position of a ruler or the cohesion of a polity but was instead dependent on an individual's level of "soul stuff," prowess, or other type of spiritual potency.

This paper represents an initial attempt to compare the salient features of these models with historical and archaeological data from South Sulawesi where large political formations, termed kingdoms, began to emerge at about 1300 CE and were fully established by at least the 16th century. About a hundred years after the kingdoms began to form, the Bugis adopted a script of ultimate Indic origin which they first applied to record the ruling elite in genealogical form.[1] Exceptionally and importantly, these societies developed essentially independently of Indic ideas (Caldwell 1991; Pelras 1996:

[1] Caldwell (1988) provides evidence for the development of writing among the Bugis at about 1400 CE, while Miller (2016) shows that the script was based on an early Gujarati variety.

4; Druce 2009)[2] and South Sulawesi is perhaps unique in being the only region of maritime Southeast Asia where there are sufficient written and oral sources, often substantiated by archaeological data, to document the social evolution of society from scattered, economically self-sufficient communities with ranked lineages practicing swidden agriculture to large political units constructed around indigenous cultural and political concepts with economies based on wet-rice agriculture. South Sulawesi is thus of fundamental importance in understanding the social and economic evolution of pre-Indic influenced Austronesian societies in maritime Southeast Asia and pre-European-contact Austronesian societies where Indic influences did not penetrate deeply, such as the Philippines. In addition, the data from South Sulawesi can facilitate understanding of the political and economic processes taking place in early Java and Bali below the overlaying Indic influences. I begin with an overview of the various models and then turn to South Sulawesi.

Ⅱ. Mandalas, Negaras, and Galactics

Probably the most influential model for understanding early Southeast Asian political formations discussed here is that of the *mandala*, which has also found influence and favor with international relations scholars.[3] This model has a long history in the literature of Southeast Asia and elements can be traced back to Dutch scholarship on Java[4] and seen in Heine-Geldern's "Conceptions of state and kingship in southeast Asia" (1942, 1963). Here I am concerned with later highly influential examples of these ideas, namely that first posited in 1968 by Wolters, who further developed the model in later studies (1982) and in 1999 presented a

[2] In contrast to these and other studies, Shelly Errington (1989) begins with the assumption that the South Sulawesi kingdom of Luwuq was an Indic state but provides no evidence to support this notion. Her study is an ethnological account of a particular noble environment and is heavily influenced by the ideas of Geertz and Anderson. The ideas presented in this paper are based on historical evidence. On Errington's study see Caldwell (1991) and Fox (1991).

[3] As an example see Lund's (2003) attempt to apply the *mandala* concept in modern-day Southeast Asia.

[4] See Schrieke (1955) and Moertono (1968).

commentary on this and other aspects of his work in response to research by others, although the general features of his *mandala* changed little. The *mandala* concept influenced in various ways the other models I discuss and it is useful to provide a brief account of its origins.

The term is Sanskrit, meaning "sacred circle"; a representation of the cosmos that has religious and political significance in Hindu and Buddhist thought. In relation to political formations, it is found in several Indian treatises on statecraft where it is used in reference to geopolitical inter-polity relations. The earliest and best known of these is the 4th century BCE *Arthaśāstra*, purportedly written by Kautilya, the main advisor and minister to the Mauryan Empire's first ruler.[5] The *Arthaśāstra* presents Kautilya's theory of foreign policy where the *mandala* concept is used in the sense of a "circle of kingdoms" to set out the geopolitical situation confronting his ideal king. This ideal king is encircled by other kingdoms who are his natural enemies "because they have common boundaries with him" (Olivelle 2013: 48). A further circle of kingdoms lies beyond these adjoining kingdoms. The kings in this circle share boundaries with the ideal king's enemies and are by nature both the enemy of his enemies and his natural allies against the common foe. Further circles of kingdoms extend outwards and follow the same enemy-friend pattern (Olivelle 2013: 48). While conflict is a natural state of affairs and military might important, Kautilya, noting the cost and unpredictability of warfare, presented other ways the king can achieve his objectives, such as conciliation, gifts, and dissention. However, these and other methods, such as a peace-pact, essentially represent different tactics to use at different times in order to outmaneuver an opponent and achieve the ultimate objective: the "conquest of adjoining lands" (Olivelle 2013: 49-50). Being a king thus meant that one either conquered in order to expand territory and treasury, or was conquered (Olivelle 2013: 47). Conquered lands should then be incorporated into the kingdom but at the same time, the victor should act magnanimously towards the conquered soldiers

[5] The *Arthaśāstra* was rediscovered in the early 20th century and although attributed to Kautilya, Basham (1967: 80) is of the opinion that the text is "an elaboration" of Kautilya's work.

and subjects who can maintain their own customs.[6]

Wolters, and later some others,[7] adopted and applied the term *mandala* from ancient India because they identified similar features in early Southeast Asian political formations from various data, such as Chinese records and local inscriptions. The term was also seen as preferable to "state" as early Southeast Asian polities appeared to share few characteristics with European and Chinese states, namely political centralization, developed bureaucracies, administrative integration, clearly defined borders and dynastic succession. Wolters did not so much apply the *mandala* concept to explain geopolitical relations between polities, as had Kautilya, but used it more to denote relations within a particular polity, although the general features remain evident.[8]

Wolters envisaged early Southeast Asia as a single "cultural matrix" where various overlapping *mandala* sharing similar features were spread over the landscape. Each *mandala* consisted of an unstable "circle of kings," one of whom was the conqueror, or overlord, situated at the center of the system, who claimed personal hegemony over lesser kings whose polities made up the constituent parts. While these lesser kings acknowledged the central king's authority, they were not under his direct political or administrative control. Each remained a potentially independent ruler who could either switch their allegiance to another king or mount a challenge to become the *mandala's* dominant center. These *mandalas* were

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6 In addition to the *Arthaśāstra*, it should be noted that later medieval models found in various tantric texts, such as those discussed by Ronald Davidson (2002), may have been more influential in Southeast Asia from about 500 CE to 1500 CE in relation to the transmission of Indic religious ideas and how these ideas relate to political formations. While I note their importance, I have focused on the *Arthaśāstra* as it is the predominant text that the models I discuss, in particular Wolters, draw upon.

7 In particular, see Mabbet (1978).

8 Zakharov (2009: 2-3) criticizes Wolters for using the term *mandala* in reference to Srivijaya, pointing out that in inscriptions, the kingdom never referred to itself as a *mandala* but as *kadatuan* Sriwijaya or *vanua* Sriwijaya. The term appears once in the Telaga Batu-2 inscription, where *mandala* is used in reference to the various provinces of Srivijaya, not the center or the kingdom as a whole. Reynolds (2006: 40-41) appears to consider the term more of a "heuristic device" and states that we cannot know whether early Southeast Asian rulers knew of Kautilya's concept.

easily fractured and there were no fixed borders as they "would expand and contract in concertina-like fashion" as alliances constantly shifted (Wolters 1999: 27-8). Wolters considers that they were largely individual achievements:

> The earliest Southeast Asian polities, even when Sanskrit inscriptions began to be written, were the personal and somewhat fragile achievements of men of prowess and had not been transformed by institutional innovations in the direction of more centralized government. A polity still cohered only in the sense that it was the projection of an individual's prowess. (Wolters 1999: 21).

Inherited status, or lineage, played no significant part in the achievements of these "men of prowess," which Wolters assumed was partly a consequence of the widespread practice of cognatic descent in the region (Wolters 1999: 18). Rather, it was the "abnormal amount of personal and innate soul stuff these men of prowess" had, which gave them the "spiritual and leadership resources for mobilizing settlements and *mandalas*" (Wolters 1999: 18, 112). Furthermore, this prowess was "a personal quality" and could not be "transmitted in order to perpetuate the existence of a particular *mandala*" (Wolters 1999: 112). This spiritual potency was displayed in rituals and used to expand political authority.

Wolters argues that it was the adoption and adaption of Indic ideas, or "self-Hinduization" that filled an important gap in local cultures as it presented "men of prowess" with opportunities to apply some of these ideas to local concepts. In particular, Shaivism, allowed "men of prowess" to identify themselves with divine figures and amplify "their innate soul stuff." This "heightened self-perceptions among the chieftain class and prepared the ground for an overlords' claim to universal sovereignty, based on Siva's divine authority" (Wolters 1999: 55). This enhanced the stability and durability of the mandala and helped to perpetuate their existence (Wolters 1999: 112).

In his Galactic polity, Tambiah (1976, 1977) was concerned with the Buddhist political world of Southeast Asia, focusing mainly on mainland Southeast Asia and Java. Like Wolters, his model is derived from the concept of *mandala* and it was the Indo-Tibetan

tradition of "a core (*manda*) and a container or enclosing element (la)" found in various cosmological schemes that Tambiah sees as a pattern for the "state" and prompted him to use the label "galactic" (Tambiah 1976: 102).[9] At the center of the Galactic polity was a capital under the direct control of the king. The capital itself was the symbolic representation of Mt. Meru, the pivot of the universe. Surrounding the capital was a circle of provinces ruled by princes or governors appointed by the king and beyond, another circle of "more or less "independent" tributary polities" that in theory were inferior replicas of the center, over which the king claimed personal hegemony (Tambiah 1976: 112-113). Tambiah depicts this system as "a central planet surrounded by differentiated satellites, which are more or less "autonomous" entities held in orbit and within the sphere of influence of the center" (1976: 113). The further away the satellite, the weaker the gravitational pull of the ruler. On the periphery of the state were other competing centers with their own satellites. Like the *mandala* model, Galactic polities were thus fluid and unstable as alliances often shifted. There was also considerable emphasis on individual achievement and personal relationships in line with the Buddhist idea of the *cakkavatti* king at the center of the polity who was "the pivot of the polity, and his palace and capital a microcosm of the cosmological universe" and mediator between the gods and humans (Tambiah 1976: 100).

Clifford Geertz's Negara, or "theatre state," is drawn from his work on pre-colonial Bali but presented as a model applicable to all pre-colonial Southeast Asian polities, particularly those influenced by Indic ideas. The "theatre state" shares similarities with the models of Wolters and Tambiah in that it was defined by its center, "a microcosm of the supernatural order "an image of … the universe on a smaller scale"-and the material embodiment of political order" (Geertz 1981: 13). These theatre states had a "segmental character," comprising of "dozens of independent, semi-independent, and quarter-independent rulers" and there was no defined boundaries between states just "zones of mutual interest" (Geertz 1980: 18-19,

[9] Unlike Wolters, who was mainly concerned with the convergence of pre- and early Indic Southeast Asia until about the 14th century, Tambiah considered his model applicable to later periods in history.

24). Geertz places considerable emphasis on the role and importance of ritual in these states, which is where his model mainly departs from the *mandala* and galactic.

Geertz argues that the basis of these "theatre states" was not military, political, or even economic power, and that rulers had little interest in land or trade, which was in the hands of foreigners. Rather, it was organized spectacle, the splendor and pomp displayed by the exemplary center. The nobility did little else but occupy themselves with status differentiation through various rituals while being wholly detached from the population, who were self-organized into various plural collectives. Geertz thus rejects the notion that rituals and pageantry helped shore-up political power and authority and divorces the state from both its populace and material base: "The dramas of the theater state … were, in the end, neither illusions nor lies, neither sleight of hand nor make-believe. They were what there was" (Geertz 1981: 136).[10]

In a paper originally published in 1972 (reprinted in 1991), Anderson presents an expansive exploration of power in the Javanese context, a topic not directly addressed by the models discussed above. Here, I am concerned mainly with what Anderson says about the nature of traditional polities and their rulers and subjects. Power is central to both, and a ruler, or aspiring ruler, must have power, or be seen to have it, in order to rule. In traditional Javanese thought, there is constant and fixed amounts of this power in the universe that originate from a single source and exists independently of sources associated with power in Western thought, such as material wealth, weapons, or social status. Power is thus "concrete" and not abstract, individuals can possess it but not create it, and there are no "inherent moral implications" associated with power (Anderson 1972: 7-8).

Obtaining and accumulating such power presupposed the transformation of an ordinary person to a new and higher category

[10] Compare this with Schulte Nordholt (1996:18, 55-6, 114), who notes the importance of ritual in Bali but argues that "ritual alone doth not make a ruler" and shows that Balinese rulers were directly involved in opening up new rice growing areas and expanding preexisting small-scale irrigation works.

of personhood. Orthodox methods used in this pursuit included yogic practices and extreme asceticism, or less commonly, sexual and alcoholic self-indulgence and ritual murder. In the case of a new dynasty, the first ruler was believed to have received the *wahyu* ("divine radiance"), a visible sign of power that was passed to him from the ruler of the "disintegrating" dynasty. Genealogy and ancestry were unimportant and the new dynasty's founder was often a "parvenu of relatively humble origins" who arose after instigating the "turmoil" that destroyed the old dynasty; proof of his power was the movement of the *wahyu* to him (Anderson 1972: 25). In the everyday setting, a ruler's power was visible in the *tejas* (radiance), which was thought "to emanate softly" from his face or person. Through the falsification of chronicles, these dynasty founders often attempted to associate themselves with powerful figures from the past. However, this was not done to try and "demonstrate legal, inherited legitimacy," but to attempt to "coopt and absorb" power from a recognized pool (Anderson 1972: 25-26). The successors of the dynasty derived power from the initial "impulse provided by the founder," but over generations this grew increasingly "diffused." If not renewed and reintegrated the dynasty will fall.

Anderson's depiction of the traditional Javanese polity also shares similarities with the other models, that of "a cone of light cast downwards by a reflector lamp" (Anderson 1972: 22). This metaphor is used to emphasize how power was heavily focused on the center, realized in the ruler, and faded at the periphery where it merged with the fading light of similar centers. However, the political or administrative units of the polity located outside the center should not be hierarchical as Javanese thought "implicitly denies…autonomy at each of its various levels," and seeks "a single, pervasive source of power and authority," which was realized in the ruler "who personifies the unity of society" (Anderson 1972: 22). In such a system, any form of social contract or mutual obligation between ruler and ruled is alien and there was no "formal reciprocity in political relationships" (Anderson 1972: 47-48). The sole obligation of a ruler or center was to himself or itself and the center's concentration of power was for the good of all.

Anderson also applies the *mandala* concept in the sense used

by Kautilya. Expansion was necessary because at the periphery of the state, the pull of a neighbor's power could diminish and weaken a ruler's control. Successful expansion was dependent on the level of power concentrated at the center. Rather than destroying a neighbor, which may result in the power being dispersed and potentially absorbed by rivals, the preferred option was assimilation into the state through voluntary submission that in theory led to the emergence of a *cakravatin* and brought all conflict to an end (Anderson 1972: 32). In stark contrast to South Sulawesi sources, Anderson also notes that "the glorification of the ruler does not mention his prowess in battle," as the use of warfare would be an admission of a ruler's weakness (Anderson 1972: 32).

Ⅲ. South Sulawesi

Perhaps the main reason for the late emergence of the South Sulawesi kingdoms was because the region was not linked directly to any major trade route before 1300 CE. This is attested by the archaeological data which shows that before this period, trade with other parts of the archipelago was small in scale, sporadic, and interspersed around a few coastal areas, mainly the southern coast of the region.[11] From 1300 CE, the archaeological record reveal a major change, documenting the advent of sustained and regular trade with other parts of the archipelago, as the region became incorporated into one or more major trade routes. This trade was not confined to a few coastal areas but incorporated much of lowland South Sulawesi and some highland communities (see, for example, Bahru Kallupa et al. 1989; Bulbeck 1992; Bougas 1998; Bulbeck and Caldwell 2000; Ali Fadilah and Irfan Mahmud 2000; Druce et al. 2006; Druce 2009).[12]

Over the last 30 years or so, historical and archaeological research has presented a wealth of data that makes it abundantly

[11] See Druce (2009: 32-33) for a brief overview of archaeological finds relating to trade in the period before 1300 CE.

[12] Based on mainly topnymic evidence, it seems probable that the earliest of these traders were associated with the Javanese kingdoms of Majapahit and (its predecessor) Singhasari.

clear that rice was the major product the lowland South Sulawesi kingdoms exchanged with foreign traders (Macknight 1983; Bahru Kallupa et al. 1989; Bulbeck 1992; Caldwell 1995; Bulbeck and Caldwell 2000; Druce 2009). This external demand for rice appears to have stimulated a shift from swidden cultivation to more productive wet-rice agriculture, which was continually expanded over the following centuries. This set in motion a radical transformation of South Sulawesi societies from simple, scattered chiefdoms with ranked lineages to numerous larger political entities. This transformation is clearly discernible in various indigenous oral and written sources and supported by a wealth of archaeological data. The evidence clearly points to hereditary ruling elites leading major geographic expansions that are associated with the control of agriculture and agricultural land and their populations.[13] The most successful were those chiefdoms who controlled, or came to control, the most productive agricultural land, trade routes or external trade outlets. Less successful chiefdoms entered into tributary relations with the more successful ones, either through defeat in war or voluntary agreements that provided protection and economic benefits. Most were cemented by marriage alliances. The elites who led these expansions were clearly ambitious and may well have been charismatic, but they were not Wolters' "men of prowess," and any divine radiance is only associated with the recognition of the ancestors who initiated the transmission of status, not with a current ruler.[14] Their claims to power were derived from inherited status and backed up by military and economic might.

By the 16th century, various large and small kingdoms were firmly established. Trade and agricultural expansion continued on larger scales and kingdoms came into increasing conflict and alliance with each other as they competed for control of resources. Conflicts appear to have abated, at least for 60 years or so, following

[13] In particular, see Macknight's (1983) analysis of the Boné and Wajoq chronicles which show the rulers of these kingdoms conquering agricultural settlements, directing subjects to open new rice-fields and bringing defeated hill people down to the plains to do agricultural work.

[14] Any form of radiance is associated only with founding rulers, who in various oral and written traditions are said to have either descended from the Upperworld or ascended from the Underworld (see below).

the Makasar kingdoms of Gowa and Talloq's success in defeating and Islamizing their Bugis neighbors in the early 17th century.[15]

As in other parts of Southeast Asia, as Wolters (1967) and others (Miksic 1985; Christie 1990, 1995; Hall 2011; Druce 2016b) show, trade was thus the major stimulus for the rise and progression of these kingdoms to complexity. However, their development was determined by indigenous, not imported, political and cultural precepts.

3.1. Political structures

The political structure of the South Sulawesi kingdoms that began to take shape from 1300 CE appears similar to that set out in the models, in particular the *mandala*, in that they were highly decentralized and had multiple centers (Druce 2009: 1):

> A Bugis, Makasar or Massenrempulu kingdom is a political unit occupying a defined geographic territory within which there exists one primary settlement with a paramount ruler chosen from the highest-ranking nobles of the ruling family and a varying number of secondary settlements, each with their own paramount rulers, laws and government. The name of the kingdom is derived from the primary settlement, to which are attached all other settlements through tributary relationships.

Both the central polity and each tributary had their own directly ruled lands (domains, cluster of villages) that formed the core of each constituent part, directly supervised by members of the ruling family or subordinates. Many of the tributary lands of a kingdom also had their own tributaries which were not directly linked to the kingdom (Druce 2009: 29, 256-258). The kingdom's primary settlement rarely interfered in the affairs of the tributaries and unlike the suggestion in Anderson's model, there was no concentration of power at the center, nor was the autonomy of the tributaries denied. Rather, power was fragmented between the

[15] Makasar (with one "s") refers to the ethnic group of that name and their language; Makassar refers to the historical kingdom and the capital of South Sulawesi, formerly Ujung Pandang.

numerous tributaries that made up a kingdom with the ruler of the central polity the leader, or *primus inter pares*, of the numerous other rulers of the tributary lands. Nor did a ruler's power radiate from the center and grow dimmer in the most distant tributaries. Some tributaries were clearly less integrated than others but proximity to the center was not necessarily a factor in this.

3.2. Sources of stability: Oaths, treaties, and familial ties

Most of the models tend to conceive such a structure as being continually unstable and prone to constant fracture as rulers of constituent parts continually break off and attach to other similar formations or challenge the central ruler. In South Sulawesi, tributaries sometimes switched allegiance from one kingdom to another for various reasons, and sometimes switched back again, but these kingdoms were not the fragile and unstable "circles of kings" of the models. While clearly not unitary formations, there was far greater stability than the models suggest and, despite almost constant warfare between kingdoms, they did not fall apart or disintegrate. Those kingdoms archaeologically attested to have emerged at about 1300 CE—which for some there is reliable written information dating to 1400 CE—still existed during Indonesian independence, and in many cases their geographic extent was not radically different to the data we gathered for the 16th and 17th centuries (Druce 2014).

The relationship between a kingdom's primary polity and the lands that became tributaries were not personal relationships forged between two rulers that only lasted while those involved were still alive, as the models suggest, but always between two lands. When a land became a tributary—whether for reasons of defeat in war, protection or economic alliance—the relationship between the two lands was set out in oaths and treaties that invoked each other's ancestors and called on the living and future generations of the lands not to break the relationship. They also set out the supernatural consequences that may be unleashed if one side broke them.[16] Often these relationship transcended generations, as both

[16] Many such examples of agreements, oaths, or treaties made between two lands,

sides appear to have remained loyal to the arrangement. Moreover, such relationships were not one sided as there was generally economic advantage for both parties, particularly through the redistribution of elite goods.

The most common reason a tributary became detached was because of warfare between kingdoms, often over fertile rice producing areas, which meant a tributary was forced to swear an oath renouncing its earlier tributary relationship and establish a new one with the victor (Druce 2009: 29). A typical example is the conflict between the expanding agricultural kingdoms of Sidénréng and Wajoq in the 16th century, who vied for control of the major rice producing lands of Otting and Bulucénrana (Druce 2009: 228-231). These lands become tributaries of Sidénreng in the latter part of the 15th century, but in the first decade of the 16th, Wajoq, in alliance with the kingdom of Luwuq, defeated Sidénreng, Otting, and Bulucénrana. After swearing a new oath of loyalty to Wajoq, which replaced the one with Sidénreng, both lands became Wajoq tributaries. About 35 years later, Sidénreng regained these tributaries after defeating both of them and Wajoq in war, with the help of the Makasar kingdom of Gowa. In both wars the two tributaries did not voluntarily break their oaths and remained loyal by fighting on the side of the kingdom to which they were attached at the time.

Oaths, treaties, and the distribution of elite goods, clearly played important stabilizing roles and fostered loyalty networks within a kingdom. Perhaps the most important factor in terms of stability was strategic marriage between a central polity's ruling family and those of its tributaries, which strengthened or initiated kinship ties and led to greater degrees of internal cohesion within a kingdom.[17] Such a marriage is recorded between the rulers of

not individuals, can be found in the Wajoq chronicles (Noorduyn 1955; Zainal Abidin 1985). For further examples of treaties, see Andaya (1978) and Macknight (1983). In some cases, kinship terms are used to set out the relationship between lands in oaths or treaties, such as older and younger siblings, or mother and child, as in the following example from a Wajoq chronicle of an agreement between the lands of Wajoq and Timurung: "No mother (Wajoq) wishes ill-fortune on her child (Timurung) and no child plots against their mother. Whoever breaks this agreement will be cursed by the one deity. We shall tell our descendants of this so that our lands will not suffer calamity and death."

Sidénreng and Bulucénrana shortly after the defeat of Wajoq (Druce 2009: 170, 146), although most marriages appear to have been between the children of rulers. As Caldwell (1995: 397) notes, this concern with internal cohesion is specifically evident in the 15th and 16th century sections of genealogies, while marriages between kingdoms become more frequent in later periods. Offspring from such marriages could be a leading contender to succeed as the tributary land's ruler. Strategic marriage, as with warfare, was also a means of expanding political and economic power and influence, and was perhaps the preferred method of expansion, as set out in the Bugis concept of *tellu cappaq* (the three tips): tongue, blade, and penis. The tongue is first used as a means of persuasion in order to achieve or obtain something. If this does not work, then the blade (force) is used. The third tip, which the Bugis say is the preferred method of integration, is marriage (Druce 2009: 31).[18]

In an exhaustive and systematic analysis of genealogies combined with archaeological data, David Bulbeck (1992, 1996, 2016) has documented the spatial extent and influence of the Gowa and Talloq major patrilines. He demonstrates how marriage alliances, together with warfare, was used as a key strategy to expand and maintain the Makassar Empire and its political and economic bases in the 16th and 17th centuries. The maintenance of these internal marital alliances was a constant priority and the continual reassessment of ascribed status in accordance with individual achievement promoted initiative and reward. The general picture that emerges from the various genealogies is not entirely dissimilar to the argument presented by Tony Day (2002: 38-9) in relation to the emergence of Southeast Asian states, some years after Bulbeck's initial analysis, where family networks and their ideologies were central to power relations and political life and "assumed statelike form." Indeed, it is these genealogies that illuminate the internal mechanisms of a kingdom and these familial ties played a

[17] There were also numerous marriages between the rulers of different tributary lands that are set out in various genealogies. Roll 5/7 in the Makassar Branch of the Arsip microfilm collection contains numerous such examples.

[18] Caldwell and Wellen (2016: 132-3) present evidence from the kingdoms of Wajoq and Boné to show that marriages were more common when a tributary attached itself voluntarily rather than being defeated in war.

major role in the stability, cohesion, and progressive integration of the kingdoms over generations.

This greater degree of stability in the South Sulawesi kingdoms than found in the models suggest that borders and boundaries were not as fluid as supposed, and the general statement that early and emerging polities had no fixed borders appears as an oxymoron, as a fixed border would preclude any expansion. None of the models accurately capture the situation in South Sulawesi and while one can readily appreciate that land was of less value to trade-based kingdoms such as Srivijaya and Brunei, this was not the case for those of the Bugis and Makasar and, I suspect, many other agricultural kingdoms or communities. Certainly, borders were not demarcated in the modern sense but South Sulawesi written and oral sources do show a concern for boundaries. The kingdom's core and each of its tributaries appear to have had fairly well defined boundaries, often based on geographical features, and there are a number of texts that set out these boundaries between some kingdoms, the tributaries of a kingdom, and even between villages that made up the core of a kingdom.[19] Some texts also tell of conflicts over boundaries, such as that between Bojo and Népo in the early 16th century, which were both attached to the kingdom of Suppaq. In this account, a representative of the kingdom arrives and manages to convince the two parties not to go to war over the disputed border, but to allow the matter to be decided through dialogue. Each party is then questioned, and seven days later, a decision was announced at the site of the dispute:

> This mango tree will mark the border [between you]. It aligns with those small hills to the west of Panyanyang, the great mountain going upwards and downwards to the sea south of Baki.[20]

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[19] The texts I refer to are mainly concerned with borders between the Ajattappareng kingdoms, which formed a confederation from the 16th century, and some of their tributaries. Most are found on pages 260-279 of Roll 60/7 in the Makassar Branch of the Arsip Nasional microfilm collection. The Wajoq chronicles (Noorduyn 1955; Zainal Abidin 1985) provide examples from other areas.

[20] This text is found on pages 219-220 of Roll 40/7 in the Makassar Branch of the Arsip Nasional microfilm collection.

In the 17th century, the Makasar kingdom of Gowa played a similar role in conflict management and resolution in a border dispute between Sidénréng and Wajoq. A Bugis text tells of how a Gowa official was sent by the *karaeng* (ruler) of Gowa to set out clearly the border between the two kingdoms who were in dispute. Geographic features, the names of settlements, and compass points are used to indicate changes in direction and mark out the boundary.[21]

A concern with boundaries is also reflected in a particular category of texts termed as Tributary and Domain Lists (TDL), which can be found for all of the Bugis kingdoms and many of their tributaries, the Massenrempulu and Mandar kingdoms and a number of Makasar kingdoms. These TDL's are divided into three parts: kingdom, tributaries, and the domain of the kingdom, all of which are set out in the lists. They appear to be a record of the geographic boundaries of power and influence achieved by a kingdom.[22]

3.3. Rulers and ruled: Men and women of white blood

There was no indifference to lineage or descent in South Sulawesi and the emergence and development of the kingdoms were not the work of individual "men of prowess." Nor is there any evidence of the transference of divine favor, rulers with a common origin or ascetic practices as a route to obtaining power to rule. All the evidence points to a central concern with ascribed status, which largely determined the opportunities a person had to become a ruler or hold political office. This evidence is found primarily in numerous origin stories and elite written genealogies, the latter of which form the largest genre of Bugis and Makasar writings. Recording the elite in genealogical form appears to have been the main motive for the development of writing (Macknight 1993: 11) and the subsequent obsession with documenting elite marriages and blood relations present a

[21] This text is found on page 267 of Roll 60/7 in the Makassar Branch of the Arsip Nasional microfilm collection.

[22] For examples of TDL's, see Caldwell and Druce (1998) and Druce (2009: 255-264; and 2014).

remarkable picture of elite political and economic history that reveals the importance of "origins and status as claims to power" in an "un-Indianised (and before 1605 un-Islamized) Austronesian society" (Caldwell and Wellen 2016: 121).

Justification for social differentiation between nobles, on the one hand, and commoners and slaves on the other, is set out at the beginning of these genealogies and origin traditions which trace the ruling elite of the numerous kingdoms and tributaries to a class of founders: typically white-blooded *tomanurung* (male) who descended from the Upperworld or *totompoq* (female) who ascended from the Underworld.[23] In theory, the elite were ranked according to their level of white-blood, which will dilute when a high ranking male took wives from commoner or slave classes, leading to a complex system of ranks that determined the status of a person based on their degree of white blood (Pelras 1996: 169-70; Druce 2009: 161-3).[24] In this system, women acted as status markers for kin groups and they were forbidden to marry below their status, which was recognized across the boundaries of kingdoms. This status was intrinsic to the individual and did not depend on control of land or wealth.

There was, however, some fluidity in the system as it was possible for lower ranking elite group members to rise based on personal achievement and qualities, which Susan Millar (1989: 29) suggests may be seen as a recognition or reevaluation of status. Political office was thus not strictly hereditary, as personal qualities played a role in attaining positions or becoming a ruler, regardless of whether one was male or female, as long as they were from the higher echelons of the group. This system ensured that claims to power remained the prerogative of the small elite class while being sufficiently flexible to ensure choice, or as Henley and Caldwell (2008: 271) put it, "the structure of the political hierarchy was always more flat-topped than pyramidal." For the Makasar, David Bulbeck (1996; 2016) applies Fox's notion of "apical demotion" to show how

[23] In a few written and oral traditions *tomanurung* are female but such examples are rare.

[24] This system of ranks is set out in Mattulada (1985: 25-9) and Pelras (1996: 169-70).

there was a continual reassessment of ascribed status depending on achievement. Wolters' notion that in early states there had to be some kind of monitoring to "spot potential leaders" broadly fits here but his context of how his leaders emerged is quite different to the one found in South Sulawesi.

Despite their claimed origins, South Sulawesi's kings and queens were thus not absolute rulers, and the concept of divine kingship appears to have been unknown. Mostly, they appear to have been chosen for the position, often by a council, and may be removed from office or even killed without unduly disturbing the kingdom's stability. The earliest example I know of a ruler being deposed comes from Wajoq in the 15th century. La Pateqdungi was removed and later killed, for various arbitrary actions (Noorduyn 1955: 165; Zainal Abidin 1985: 99). A particularly good example is mentioned in the chronicle of Boné, which discusses the killing of a high ranking person, late 16th century ruler La Icca, because of his cruel rule (Macknight and Muhklis n.d.). A Makasar example is the late 16th century Gowa ruler Tunipasuluq, who was removed and replaced by his brother because of his despotic manner that led to a number of foreign traders leaving the kingdom (Wolhoff and Abdurrahim n.d.: 54-56; Cummings 2007: 42). In some instances, the council that selected a ruler included some of the tributary land rulers whose agreements were needed (Pelras 1996: 178; Druce 2009: 125, 251; Druce 2016a: 91).

Nor did a ruler or ruling group of the central polity necessarily have the highest status in a kingdom. In some situations, this position was held by rulers of tributary lands, based on claims to precedence that set out their earlier founding ancestry, or that the kingdom's founding rulers are descended from one or more of their elite ancestors. Some of these claims were acknowledged by a kingdom's rulers and probably emerged before the rise of the kingdoms, when the political landscape was made up of simple chiefdoms that had yet to coalesce. However, in kingdom-tributary relations, this was largely ritual seniority, and while those with precedence were always accorded respect, they acknowledged their position as tributaries of the kingdom and its political, economic and military ascendance. Such a relationship is embodied in the

phrase "*macowa* Kabelangeng *kakaq* Sawitto" (Kabelangeng is older [but] Sawitto is the elder sibling) (Druce 2009: 164). Sawitto was the kingdom and while the phrase sets out Kabelangeng's precedence, it also acknowledges Sawitto as the more powerful.[25]

As opposed to Anderson's model, mutual obligations between ruler and ruled were not alien in South Sulawesi, as recorded in numerous oral traditions and written texts purportedly made between the first ruler and the people. The example below comes from an agreement between the first ruler of Manuba, a tributary of Suppaq, and the people:

> The people of Manuba said: "We wish to make you *arung* [ruler] of this place." The person who was to be made *arung* said: "I have a condition, which must be accepted first, people of Manuba. You, people of Manuba, must have no other lord, none among you must act as a lord, I alone am your lord." The people of Manuba said: "We accept your condition, lord, but you must also accept our condition." The person who was to be made *arung* said: "What is also your condition, people of Manuba?" The people of Manuba said: "We will establish *paqbicara*, lord.[26] If the disposition of the *arung* becomes unkind towards the people then the *arung* can be removed by the council and we will take back our wealth." (Druce 2009: 162).

Ⅳ. Conclusion

Wolters surmised that the origins of his *mandalas* and their "men of prowess" were rooted in the social and political culture of all early Southeast Asian societies before they interacted with Indic culture. The data from South Sulawesi, which allows us to observe the emergence, development, and support structures of early kingdoms in much greater detail, questions the existence of such

[25] Another example comes from the kingdom of Soppéng where its ruler could never be seated above the ruler of its tributary land, Umpungeng, and no new Soppéng ruler cold be inaugurated without his presence (Druce 1997: 43). For further examples and a discussion on origin and precedence in the South Sulawesi context, see Druce (2009: 159-199).

[26] *Paqbicara* (literally, "someone who talks") were responsible for upholding the law and administering fines in the Bugis political system.

mandalas and "men of prowess" before the impact of Indic ideas. Clearly, early polities were decentralized and lacked bureaucratic apparatus or administrative integration. However, the evidence from South Sulawesi suggests there was greater stability, mainly because of hereditary elite kinship networks, and these kingdoms were certainly not prone to fall apart.[27] In addition, one can also observe in some kingdoms, such as Gowa and Boné, the setting up of incipient administrative apparatus.

The continual emphasis on the role of the individual, whether "men of prowess," absorbers of power or accumulators of merit, in the creation of these *mandala* and their attempts to maintain fragile personal alliances, does not equate with the processes that were at work in South Sulawesi. Rulers and other members of the elite who attained high office were probably charismatic and showed achievement, but at the same time were members of a restricted hereditary elite who could be chosen or dismissed, while any potency they may have had was directly derived from ancestry. The visible signs of power were political, economic and military. Moreover, Peter Bellwood (1996) has identified the widespread occurrence of a "rank-focused ideology" in the Austronesian world, perhaps stimulated by Austronesian expansions several thousand years ago, in which there is a reverence for founders and high rank is derived from "genealogical closeness to a founder."[28]

While Wolters attempted to show the convergence between pre-Indic and Indic ideas, Tambiah's model was specifically formulated for "Indianized" societies, as were to a lesser extent those of Geertz and Anderson. It is however, notable that the general features of his model do not diverge significantly from

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[27] From the work of Heather Sutherland (1983), it is clear that the decentralized nature of the South Sulawesi kingdoms was still evident in the 19th century, despite greater integration.

[28] There is also data from historical linguistics were words such as *datu* and its various cognates formed part of the Proto-Malayo-Polynesian. In a recent exhaustive analysis of the word *datu*, which was a title used by a number of South Sulawesi rulers, Blust (2010: 48) concludes that the word minimally implies "ancestor-oriented corporate kin groups and hereditary distinctions of rank, features that persisted in some attested societies long after they had been significantly transformed by external contacts."

Wolters, and the "Galactic king" and "man of prowess" are almost interchangeable. Wolters' model has also been criticized by the Sankritist Sheldon Pollock (2006), who refers to such models as "civilizationist indigenism" (2006: 533). Pollock considers that Wolters exaggerates localisms and, noting that his model provides no evidence from "non-Indian Southeast Asia" (2006: 531), argues that many of the features Wolters considered uniquely Southeast Asian are also found in South Asia, and more likely linked to transregional Sanskrit political culture.[29]

If one were to accept that the processes that led to the emergence and development of the Bugis and Makasar kingdoms are more reflective of "state" formation in island Southeast Asia, at least among agricultural communities, then the general features of the *mandala* may appear to be more post- than pre-Indic. This emphasizes the problems historians face in attempting to understand the evolution of pre-Indic influenced societies through the application of limited sources produced by societies influenced by these very Indian ideas. Fortunately, there is no such problem for those striving to understand the political and social evolution of South Sulawesi societies.

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[29] Pollocks's main hypothesis is that elites in South and Southeast Asia were participants in a complex "Sanskrit Cosmopolis," a "transregional cultural formation" through which passed "similar claims about the nature and aesthetics of political rule" (Pollock 2006: 257).

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