RITUAL AND REVOLUTION:

CONTESTING THE STATE IN CENTRAL INDONESIA*

Thomas Gibson, University of Rochester

This paper is intended as a contribution to an anthropological theory of resistance and revolution. The empirical material used to advance this theory is drawn from the turbulent political history of the province of South Sulawesi, Indonesia. During the last century alone, periods of relative political normality have alternated with revolutionary upheavals with great frequency. After their conquest of the Makassarese kingdom of Gowa in the 1660s, the Dutch established a sort of 'para-colonial' government in much of the peninsula, leaving a hereditary nobility in place until the imposition of direct rule throughout the area by 1910. Between 1600 and 1900, the legitimacy of this nobility was based on an indigenous royal ancestor cult and on a version of Sufi Islam. Beginning in 1860, the Dutch slowly undermined the nobility by appointing commoner officials loyal to the colonial government. Many of these commoners turned to a form of Sufism purified of local spirit cults to legitimate their own rule. In the 1930s, the Dutch attempted to restore the old nobility as a counter-force to rising nationalism. The 1940s were marked by Japanese occupation and an anti-Dutch war of national liberation that militarized the province in an unprecedented way. The 1950s and 1960s saw a radical Islamic insurgency seize control of much of the countryside. The period since 1965 is best characterized as a 'cold war' between the adherents of the old spirit cults, traditional Sufism, and Islamic modernism.

---

* Published in Jennifer Nourse, ed: *Official Rhetoric, Popular Response: Dialogue and Resistance in Indonesia and the Philippines*, a special issue of *Social Analysis* 35: 61-83, 1994.

In order to understand this history, I shall employ the concepts of 'ritual practices' and 'ritual complexes' as the basic units of analysis, instead of the more usual individual actors, economic classes and cultural wholes. I will show, first, that ritual complexes are a source of ideal models for political action; second, that they are formed over the course of centuries, and so can be explained neither in terms of particular conjunctures nor in terms of the strategies of individual actors; third, that they pertain to a realm of experience distinct from that of everyday economic activities, and cannot be construed as the direct expression of class interests; and finally, that the models of political order they generate contradict one another, so that no one of them can be taken as reflecting the essence of the cultural whole.

As Leach argued in *Political Systems of Highland Burma*, ritual practices are the source of ideal models of the social order. Ideal models based in ritual may sharply contradict knowledge based in techno-economic practices (cf. Bloch, 1986). They may also contradict other ideal models, linked to competing complexes of ritual practices (Leach, 1954). In a normal political situation, while several models of the ideal social order exist in competition with one another, one model enjoys a relative dominance, or hegemony, over the others. Political activity in such a situation may be usefully compared to a game, in which the identity, interests and admissible moves of each player (category, class or individual) are defined by the hegemonic model.

I reserve the term *resistance* for the strategies employed in normal political conditions by the players defined by the hegemonic model as subordinate. Such strategies pose no threat to the hegemonic model as such, and may compared to what Lenin called 'spontaneous trade-unionism' in capitalism (Lenin, 1970). I reserve the

term *revolution* for a situation in which the hegemony of one model of the ideal social order is displaced by another. While a group advancing the new model may try to eliminate all competing models outright, any such attempt will prove impossible to sustain. After a brief 'utopian' or 'millenarian' interlude, the situation will tend to revert to normal politics again, either with the reimposition of the old hegemonic model, or its replacement by the new one. In either event, competing models will continue to exist.

Revolutionary situations often arise because changes in techno-economic practices undermine the power or legitimacy of a ruling elite. It is a central contention of my approach, however, that such changes cannot of themselves account for the form a subsequent revolution takes. As Lenin realized, experience within the techno-economic domain is not sufficient to define either a politically conscious class subject or a model of a new social order. A revolutionary group must have available to it an alternative model of the social order that is the product of a long period of development, often in an alien setting, and not of a localized, short-term techno-economic conjuncture. Now, some group of people must choose this alternative model as appropriate for advancing their interests. These will be defined, in part, by their perceived short-term economic interests, as in normal political activity. But in a revolutionary situation, by definition, long-term interests in the ideal social order are at stake. The new ideal model will itself define, in part, the boundaries and interests of a new group of agents. To take the example of Lenin again, it was only in light of the Bolshevik model of socialism that 'workers and peasants' could be understood as a single interest group (Lenin, 1970).

Of more direct relevance to the case at hand, many of the Islamic movements that emerged in the Middle East and South Asia between 1000 CE and the present have contributed to the formation of 'counter-hegemonic' models in South Sulawesi and

elsewhere in Southeast Asia. Among these movements, the various Sufi *tarekat*, or religious orders, are the most important for the period until 1900. After that, organized Sufism itself increasingly came under attack from a new set reformers. Each of these ostensibly religious reforms had deep political implications, because they targeted ritual practices central to the legitimation of the hereditary nobility. Each time, they only succeeded in further complicating the politico-ritual situation, being unable to extirpate what they viewed as pagan survivals.

The point is that South Sulawesi has been integrated into a world religion and a world economy for centuries, and no reaction to local economic conditions can be understood without taking into account the ability of actors to adopt ritual models developed far across the Indian Ocean and over long periods of time. Put this way, the point may seem obvious, especially to historians. And yet within anthropology it is usually ignored, and authors turn either to the economic conjuncture to explain political action, or to a purely endogenous cultural tradition.

Scott's analysis of everyday forms of resistance among Malay peasants provides a particularly lucid example of an attempt to explain political action solely in terms of the economic practices of everyday life (1985).

> Resistance in Sedaka begins as, I suspect, all historical resistance by subordinate classes begins: close to the ground, rooted firmly in the homely but meaningful realities of daily experience. . . The *goals* of resistance are as modest as its values. The poor strive to gain work, land, and income: they are not aiming at large historical abstractions such as socialism, let alone Marxism-Leninism. (Scott, 1985: 348)

It is Scott's disenchantment with Leninist revolutions that leads him to shrink from all revolutionary activity as leading inevitably to intensified misery among the

peasantry (1985: 350-352). As a result, he is explicitly uninterested in ritual practices and revolutionary situations, although he admits their inter-relationship:

For Malaysia as a whole, Stockwell has documented the reappearance of millennial and ecstatic Islamic cults during *virtually every episode of historical crisis*. Had I attended more carefully to it, I am certain I would have uncovered more *surat layang* and local prophecies. Under exceptional circumstances it is entirely possible that such marginal phenomena could move quickly to the center of the political stage. (Scott, 1985: 334-335, my emphasis)

His failure to take account of these 'marginal phenomena' on a theoretical level means that he misses out half of the peasantry's political repertoire. That these phenomena are not so marginal after all is indicated by the fact that in Southeast Asia peasant uprisings are both extremely common and usually expressed in religious terms.[i] The models employed in such uprisings can be traced back over many centuries, and cannot be explained in terms of the extremely short-term crises Scott refers to. That Marxism-Leninism has made little headway in South and Southeast Asia only points to the relative vigor of the existing ritual complexes of Hinduism, Buddhism and Islam. It does not mean that Southeast Asians live by bread alone.

Attempts to discuss political action in South and Southeast Asia in terms of purely endogenous cultural traditions include Geertz's reduction of the Balinese state, and by extension all 'Indic states' to 'theatrical' ritual (1980), Ortner's reduction of Sherpa history to a single 'cultural scenario' (1989) and Errington's account of power in South Sulawesi solely in terms of the Austronesian concept of *sumange'* (1989). The latter is in fact a *tour de force* of this sort of approach, since she manages to ignore Islam entirely despite having done fieldwork among the relatives of the leader of the Islamic

rebellion of the 1950s. The coherence they look for in Balinese, Sherpa and Bugis culture respectively derives from the Weberian assumption that cultures are constructed by individual subjects searching for an overall meaning to life and the universe. There is thus a tendency for 'culturist' analyses to be linked to actor-centered ones. This is most explicit in the case of Ortner, who reproduces the classical Parsonian theory of social action in the guise of practice theory, but it is implicit in Geertz and Errington as well.[ii] There is also a tendency among these authors to assume that the endogenous cultural traditions they investigate are more or less impervious to change, and that the fundamental symbolic oppositions they locate within them have been operative for centuries. Apparently foreign borrowings are interpreted as a mere relabelling of pre-existing concepts, or simply ignored.

I will return to these alternative theoretical approaches in the conclusion and argue that they do allow one to apprehend a certain level of phenomenal reality: in the course of fieldwork, one can actually observe individual and class agents choosing strategies to advance their interests from a repertoire provided as a synchronic cultural whole. I will also argue, however, that the identity of historical agents, the definition of their interests, and the range of strategies available to advance those interests are largely determined by ritual complexes that are heterogeneous in their origins, effects and rates of temporal development. The analysis of ritual complexes is thus logically prior to the analysis of individuals, classes and synchronic cultural wholes.

* * *

The population of South Sulawesi is divided into several ethno-linguistic groups, of whom the most important are the Toraja (500,000), Mandar (400,000), Bugis (3,200,000), and Makassar (1,500,000). I will not be dealing with the Toraja and

Mandar, who occupy the northern end of the province. I will refer on occasion to the Bugis-Makassar as a whole, but will focus on a sub-group of Makassar known as the Konjo, who live between the Makassar proper and the Bugis. Even more specifically, I will be making reference to the district of Bonto Bahari in the regency of Bulukumba, and at certain points to the village of Ara where I conducted most of my field research in 1988 and 1989.[iii] Such particularism is necessary to capture the true dynamics of these struggles, but much of what I write applies *mutatis mutandis* to other Bugis and Makassar villages, and I will try to indicate where this is the case.

Kingship, kinship and tradition

From the Dutch conquest of Makassar in 1667 until they began to impose direct rule throughout the province in 1860, the Dutch operated as but one state among others in the area. This period is thus best characterized as 'para-colonial'. During this time an accommodation was reached between a set of indigenous politico-ritual practices and a universal religion. In the indigenous system, political merit was ascribed to a class of hereditary nobles said to be descended from celestial beings, while religious merit was ascribed to the local descendants of Islamic saints and prophets and to the masters of Sufi orders. Many rulers of the states of Gowa and Bone claimed to be Sufi masters themselves. In both cases, ideology stressed a finely graded hierarchy fixed largely by birth, and the performance of collective rituals.

The indigenous ritual system rests on a cult of 'nature spirits' associated with rocks and trees, on a series of life cycle rituals, culminating in a highly elaborated cult of the ancestors, and on transvestite spirit mediums. Certain features of these cults can be traced back over a millennium through comparisons with non-Islamic peoples of Sulawesi, such as the Toraja, or even beyond to other central Indonesian peoples such as

the Ngaju of South Kalimantan (cf. Schärer, 1963). The cult of the nature spirits focuses primarily on the placement of offerings at certain sacred trees, stones, caves and other topographical features to propitiate tutelary deities. In the village of Ara, there are a number of female ritual specialists who continue to carry such rituals out, despite accusations that they are consorting with devils (*setan*).

The cult of the ancestors is focused on a shrine, called a *palangka* among the Konjo. These shrines are constructed when a ritual specialist (*sanro*) decides that an individual has been afflicted by the *alusu* (subtle essence) of an ancestor. Such ancestors are so long dead they have become anonymous and their specific genealogical relationship to the living has been obscured. Because of a preference for close marriage within a bilateral, localized descent group, all members of an individual's household can be vaguely thought of as sharing the same distant ancestors. The relationship between an ancestral spirit and the members of a household is thus one of a generalized, anonymous ancestor to an undifferentiated group of co-resident descendants. Once installed, the spirit must be fed regularly with 'complete offerings' of rice, meat and betel ingredients. These offerings are completely standardized, making no provision for the individual personality of the dead person.

Transvestite mediums are regularly possessed by the spirits of powerful royal personages. The medium's body is said to be just a vessel for the possessing spirit, which is always of the opposite sex to the medium. In the village of Ara during the 1980s, there was one male medium, who was possessed by the spirits of foreign princesses, and one female medium, who was possessed by the spirits of local kings. The former claimed to be a physiological hermaphrodite and lived openly with a series of 'husbands'. The latter dressed as a woman, but behaved in a markedly masculine

manner and lived openly with a long-term 'wife' (for fuller accounts of these rituals see Gibson, in press a and b).

While the cults of transvestite mediums, and of tree and ancestor spirits can be seen as very ancient institutions among the Bugis, Makassar, Toraja and Ngaju, other ritual practices appear to be linked to the appearance of the first maritime states in South Sulawesi in the period between 1100 and 1300 CE. Certain authors claim that the social conditions of this period are preserved in a vast mythical corpus of the Bugis known as the La Galigo (e.g. Pelras, 1981 and Harmonic, 1991).[iv] Those who have studied it often compare it to the Homeric legends of ancient Greece.

> In brief, the myth describes a time when the gods of the Upperworld and Underworld decide to transform the chaos on the earth into a habitable place to be ruled over by one of their own kind. A god of the Upperworld and a goddess of the Underworld meet in Luwu', are wed, and begin a civilization which spreads throughout the neighboring areas. These gods continue to rule on the earth until one day, for some unexplained reason, the gods return to their worlds and leave mankind without divine rulers. For seven generations mankind is left without rulers and 'becomes like fishes devouring one another'. (Andaya, 1975: 115-16)

After the seven generations of chaos following the withdrawal of the gods described in the La Galigo, various human communities began to encounter a new set of celestial beings, known as the *Tomanurung*, 'Those Who Descended'. The communities invite these male *Tomanurung* to restore order and rule over them. The chronicles and genealogies of the ruling families in various parts of the peninsula usually begin with one or another of these *Tomanurung*, and begin sometime in the fourteenth century. The

period of chaos before the return of the celestial beings is linked by historians to a transition from maritime states to inland states based on intensive riziculture in the period 1300-1500 CE (MacKnight, 1975; Reid, 1983; Pelras, 1981).

According to Andaya, the primary function of the descendants of the *Tomanurung* was to mediate politically between local communities (Andaya, 1984: 25-27, but see Caldwell, 1987: 17). Each local community was an internally ranked bilateral descent group defined by its relation to a sacred object known as a *gaukang* or *arajang*. In the great kingdoms of Bone, Luwu and Gowa, the most powerful regalia were in the keeping of a class of transvestite priests, the *bissu*, whose function it was to mediate ritually between the celestial male rulers and the terrestrial female communities (Harmonic, 1987). These priests are to be distinguished from the village-level spirit mediums mentioned above. Harmonic speculates that it was these *bissu* who developed the ideology necessary to legitimate the first agrarian states by combining elements of the indigenous ancestor cult with Sanskritic influences emanating from the fourteenth century Javanese empire of Majapahit.

The *bissu* played an active role in constructing, for the first time in the history of this society, an extremely well-structured, imaginary religious hierarchy, which was then going to serve as a model of reference – and of legitimacy – in the creation of South Sulawesi kingdoms from the thirteenth to fifteenth centuries, or the era called *tomanurung*. (Harmonic, 1991: 14-15)

The *Tomanurung* themselves can be seen as mediators between this new pantheon and the old ancestor cults, which were often focused on particular topographic features. The chronicles of each autonomous political community in South Sulawesi recount the first encounter of the commoners with the celestial ancestor of their rulers. In most

cases, he is seen standing on top of some local elevation, which becomes the focus of the local cult of the royal ancestors.

Normally, the *tomanurung* are described as having been clothed all in white. White blood is said to flow in the veins of high nobles to this day. I was told a rather unusual version of the origin myth, however, by a high-ranking noble of the most prestigious Konjo kingdom, Kajang.

The Three Heavenly Beings

> Once a heavenly being dressed all in white descended on a field in Bone, and all the people approached out of curiosity. But the being disappeared. The next year he returned in the company of another being who was dressed in yellow. Again they disappeared when the people approached. The third year they returned in the company of a being dressed in black. They were about to leave again when the Black One told his companions to stay and speak to the people. The people asked them to organize a government and bring order to society, which they agreed to do, so long as the people agreed to obey their orders. The Yellow One was then sent to rule Gowa. The White One stayed in Bone but sent his son to Luwu. The Black One went to Tana Towa in Kajang.

This version of the myth maps ethnic and political cleavages onto color symbolism.[v] According to this version of the myth, the Makassarese in Gowa enjoy primacy in the things of this world (yellow = gold = wealth and power), the Bugis in Bone and Luwu enjoy primacy in things of the upper world (white = purity = heavenly ancestors), and the Konjo in Kajang enjoy primacy in things of the earth itself (black = earth = fertility). In one story recorded in a chronicle of the district of Bonto Bahari, the

King of Gowa accepts only exotic garden produce from the Konjo as tribute, rejecting their offers of gold and jewels as superfluous. To this day the Konjo inhabitants of the sacred village of Tana Towa, 'The Old Earth' or origin point of the world, are famous for dressing all in black. I will return to the sacred Konjo community of Tana Towa below.

The innate superiority of the nobility recounted in the myths above is reasserted at every life cycle ritual, including birth, marriage, and death. In a manner familiar from many other traditional societies, social distinctions are thus linked to natural processes and made to seem as unalterable as the latter. During such rituals, only nobles have the right to employ certain symbolic devices such as bamboo decorations, to demand and receive high amounts of indirect dowry, and to compete with one another in the scale and length of the ceremonies.

In addition to such conspicuous domestic rituals, office-holding nobles also sponsor a cult of their local ancestors regarded in their public aspect as patrons of all the inhabitants of a territorially defined realm. This cult takes the form of processions to the tombs of the royal ancestors to pay homage to them and perform music and dance in their honor. In the district of Bonto Bahari, royal ancestors are associated in one village with the sacred objects mentioned above, the *gaukang*, in another with actual physical remains such as skulls and clothing, and in Ara they actually returned to speak to their descendants through female spirit mediums (*karihatang*, from Sanskrit, *dewata*). These mediums are possessed involuntarily by the spirit one of their own ancestors. The spirits are quite explicitly pagan: they lived and died before there was an opportunity to convert to Islam, and as a result are trapped on earth. A central feature of all such royal ancestor rituals is a procession by all devotees to the topographical feature with which the spirit is

associated, usually an elevation, cave, or local 'navel of the earth'. There music and dances are performed in honor of the spirits. The mystical power they represent runs parallel to the power of the later Islamic saints, but is the product of a distinct set of practices and beliefs.

Many of the rituals mentioned above still take place with varying degrees of elaboration in South Sulawesi. In some areas they have been driven underground by Islamic modernists, while in others they continue to flourish openly. As we shall see, they have been severely repressed in Ara for over sixty years. Specialists in these sorts of rituals are almost all female today. Such specialists learn their craft by imitating the public ritual actions of others, usually a close female relative. The rituals they perform are rich in visual and tactile symbolism, but relative poor in verbal content. In the case of spirit mediums, the performer denies any conscious knowledge of the ritual as a matter of dogma. In sum, participants in these cults submit themselves to a hierarchically structured, public performance.

Mediation, sainthood and collectivism

Although Muslim Malays had been trading along the west and south coasts of the peninsula since at least 1480, there was no great move to convert to Islam during the sixteenth century. Pelras suggests that the long period of hesitation in converting to Islam, and the initial attraction to Christianity, may have been due to the fact that when first acquainted with Islam,

South Sulawesi rulers found in its teachings certain aspects that would jeopardize social order and threaten their power . . . the main point of incompatibility was the myth of divine descent of the nobility through the *manurung*, white-blooded people come from heaven, which all local dynasties claim as their founders. (Pelras, 1985: 116-117)

Catholicism, on the other hand, with its apparently transvestite priests, paralleling the indigenous *bissu* priests who were in charge of the cult of the state regalia, and its doctrines of the Trinity and the Holy Family, paralleling the notion of human descent from divine beings, may have led sixteenth century rulers to believe that conversion to Christianity would pose less of a threat to the ideological foundations of their power. Only when they realized their misunderstanding, and when a new generation of Muslim mystics from Sumatra arrived, did conversion take place (Pelras, 1985: 118).

A similar hesitation concerning conversion had occurred in Sumatra several centuries previously. Muslim merchants had been passing through the Straits of Malacca since the time of the early Abbasid Caliphate in the eighth century, yet no conversions occurred until the end of the thirteenth century. It is increasingly clear that conversion was due to the development of a new role for the Muslim King in Persia and North India, especially after the Mongol destruction of the last vestiges of the Abbasid Caliphate in Baghdad in 1258.

Two strands of Islamic thinking, therefore, appear to have appealed to the Malay and probably other Muslim rulers of Southeast Asia: Persianized kingship and the mystical concept of the "Perfect Man". . . Just as the South-East Asian ruler of earlier centuries had appropriated Indian doctrines such as that of the *boddhisattva*, doctrines having in their homeland no specific reference to kinship, so Muslim mystical techniques enhanced the ruler's armoury. (Milner, 1983: 42, 45)

Conversion finally occurred in South Sulawesi when a group of three companions arrived from Sumatra around 1600. The eldest, Abdul Makmur, had preached in Makassar in 1575-76 without success (Pelras, 1985: 112). This time he went with his companions to Luwu, traditionally the most prestigious of the indigenous states, since its

rulers were thought to have the purest ‘white' blood. They converted the ruler in February, 1605. The middle companion, Sulaiman, stayed in Luwu and is known as Datu ri' Pattimang after his place of burial there. Abdul Makmur returned to Makassar, where he converted first the ruler of Tallo, Karaeng Matoaya, in September, 1605, and then the ruler of Gowa, who took the name Sultan Abdullah. Abdul Makmur stayed in Gowa and is known as Datu ri Bandang after his place of burial there. The youngest companion, Abdul Jawad, went to the apparently insignificant backwater of Bulukumba, in the southeast corner of the peninsula. He is known as Datu Tiro after his place of burial there.

This story recalls in many respects the *Tomanurung* myth mentioned above. There too there were three figures with supernatural powers who brought a new teaching to the Makassar, Bugis and Konjo. A noble from Luwu, Andi Muchlis Pangerang, explicated the parallelism in the following way. The Raja of Aceh sent the eldest brother to Luwu because he knew that Luwu had the highest status in the peninsula and its conversion would legitimate conversion by the rest. Gowa was converted second because of its wealth and temporal power. This suited it for the role of enforcing conformity to the outer forms of religion, the *shariah* law. Finally, the task of spreading the deep inner meaning of Islam, the *tarekat* ‘mystical path' and *hakekat* ‘metaphysical truth', was lodged with the youngest brother, Datu Tiro, who is said to have belonged to the Naqshabandiyya Order of Sufism. He took up residence in a realm that was rich in neither social rank nor temporal power, but which was widely regarded as a place of mystical power.[vi] The parallelism holds also on the ritual level. The tomb of Datu Tiro is a place of great power and attracts thousands of pilgrims from all over South Sulawesi

and beyond each year. It is located only about twenty kilometers away from the village of Tana Towa, home of the purest version of the indigenous religion.

Under threat of Holy War by the ruler of Gowa, almost all of South Sulawesi had officially converted to Islam by 1610. Andaya claims that this was carried out in the face of popular opposition. 'It is likely that the leaders of the *gaukang* communities, these guardians of the *adat*, were as aware as the rulers that the introduction of Islam would mean the strengthening of the position of kingship at their expense' (Andaya, 1984: 37). He goes on to argue that Islamic officials such as the Kali (Arabic *qadi*), Imam, Khatib and religious teachers, known collectively as the *sara'*, came to be closely identified with the royal power. They were of noble blood and intermarried with the royal family. Against them stood the traditional *adat* leaders of the local communities. This opposition between *sara'* and *adat* (or *adé*) continues to this day. Initially, at least, Islam came from the top down.

The marriage between the Islamic *sara'* and the ruling dynasties, both literal and figurative, can be observed to this day in the villages of Ara and Bira. Until the 1950s, every village had an Islamic official known as a *kali* in charge of the obligatory rites of circumcision, marriage and funerals. *Kali* tended to be descended from other *kali*, much as rulers were descended from other rulers, and the two lines intermarried. Instead of tracing their origins back to celestial beings, however, the genealogies of *kali* tended to go back to Arabia, and even to the Prophet Muhammad.

The rulers of the major states of South Sulawesi certainly took a close interest in Islamic mysticism. The first three Islamic Sultans of Gowa (1601-1669) all probably saw themselves as mystical adepts (Andaya, 1984: 40-41). The ruler of Bone in this period, La Madarammeng (r. 1626-1643) , attempted to institute a rigorous Islamic

regime, prompting a popular revolt and appeal to the Sultan of Gowa. In 1643, La Madarammeng was defeated and exiled to the Gowanese possession of Maros, where he established a center of Sufi learning (Pelras, 1985: 135 n.77). The year after this defeat, a certain Shaykh Yusuf left Makassar to go on pilgrimage to Mecca. He stopped to study in Aceh, Gujarat, Yemen, Mecca and Damascus, where he was initiated into the Khalwatiyya order (founded in central Asia in the fourteenth century). He returned to Makassar only in 1678 and was shocked by the state of Islam. After failing to reform the local political and religious system, he went to Java to join the fight against the Dutch. His son and three of his disciples stayed on to induct a large number of nobles into the Khalwatiyya order in the early eighteenth century. The Dutch exiled Yusuf to first to Ceylon and then to the Cape, where he died in 1699. After his death, the King of Gowa, Abd al-Jalil (r. 1677-1709), began to see him in dreams and petitioned the Dutch to return his remains. Yusuf was reburied in Gowa in 1705, and Sultan Abd al-Jalil granted his descendants freedom from tolls, levies, taxes and feudal service. Later in the century, a King of Bone, Jalil al-Din (r. 1749-1775) created a circle of mystics and personally translated a number of works by Yusuf (Cense, 1950).

A generation later, the ruler of the Bugis state of Wajo' from 1821-1825 tried to institute a reform of Islam along the lines marked out by the Wahhabis (whose doctrine was formulated in Arabia in the early eighteenth century) who had held power in Mecca from 1804 -1818. The ruler of the Bugis state of Bone from 1860-1871 came under the influence of the Sammaniyya branch of the Khalwatiyya (founded in Egypt in the eighteenth century), instituting further reforms. This order eventually became more popular among commoners than nobles (Pelras, 1985: 124-127; al-Attas, 1966: 13; Trimingham, 1971).

Mystical Islam was not the exclusive preserve of the nobility. Popular Islam in South Sulawesi in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries consisted largely in the recitation of *sikiri* (Arabic *dhikr*, 'remembrances' of Allah) by a group under the leadership of a spiritual master, in recitations of a pious poem recounting the life and perfections of the prophet Muhammad called *barasanji*[vii], and in ritual processions to the tombs of saints which recalled in many details the processions to the tombs of the royal ancestors described above. There was a whole hierarchy of these saints, ranging from figures of purely local significance, to the twelfth century founder of one of the largest Sufi orders, Abd al-Qadir Jilani, who is associated in South Sulawesi with Mount Bawakaraeng. Many people believe that a journey to the third and final peak of this mountain is equivalent to performing the Hajj to Mecca. Islam was in this period treated as a religion of mediation and immanence. This was true throughout much of the Islamic world at the time, so that the claim by authors such as Geertz that Islam is an essentially austere religion stressing the absolute transcendence and remoteness of God, is quite misleading (Geertz, 1960).[viii]

On the ritual level, many occasions that called for the ministrations of the Islamic *kali* also required those of *sanro*. In such cases the Islamic part (*agama*) of the occasion would be segregated from the 'customary' part (*adat*), and performed first by the male *kali* who then withdrew and was succeeded by the female *sanro*. There was thus a sort of peaceful coexistence between the two sets of practices, rather than a complete fusion or syncretism between them.[ix] In both the 'feudal' and Islamic rituals described here, we find parallel models of power and authority. While there is a single ultimate source of power in both cases, it is mediated by innumerable layers of mediators, whose role is ascribed to them due to their innate virtue. Individuals are integrated into a great chain

of being stretching from the lowest slave to the most elevated saint or royal ancestor. The most significant spiritual experiences take place in the context of a large group, structured by rank, age and gender.

However close the parallels between these two domains of experience, they never became identical. The fragility of the accommodation became evident during the period of direct colonial rule between 1860/1910 and 1940. As native officials were appointed by the Dutch without reference to their descent, they often encountered resistance from the hereditary nobility they were displacing. Unable to base their authority on genealogical ties to royal ancestors, some stressed patronage of the cults of the local Islamic saints instead. The old complementarity between *kali* and *sanro* was disrupted, and the two sorts of ritual specialist were set against one another.

The villages of Ara and Bira, where I conducted most of my research, were subject to varying influences over the centuries. According to a manuscript chronicle of Bira, they were under the protection of Luwu until about 1540, when Gowa made them tributaries. They passed to the Dutch by right of conquest in 1667, but were turned over to Bone as a reward for the latter's assistance in the war with Gowa. Bone kept them until sometime after 1737 when the Dutch demanded them back and built a fort in Bulukumba. As Dutch interest shifted away from Sulawesi and the V.O.C. grew increasingly corrupt, Bone again asserted its influence in the area between 1790 and 1825, when the Dutch defeated them in the First Bone War. It was only after the Second Bone War in 1859-60 that the Dutch attempted to 'rationalize' local government and to control the activities of local rulers. They struggled for fifty years to subordinate the local Konjo chiefs to a small number of government-appointed 'Regents', but by 1920

were forced to give up. The Regency of Bira was broken up into its component local communities, each answering directly to the Dutch Controleur in Bulukumba (Goedhart, [1901], Collins, 1936: 139)

The Dutch appointed a man known as Gama ruler of Ara in 1915. He had no genealogical claim to rule, and indeed his father was an itinerant of unknown origin. It took him fifteen years to overcome the resistance of the traditional nobility. In the end, he launched a frontal assault on the cult of the royal ancestors, driving it underground and breaking the traditional coexistence of the *kali* and *sanro*. After he had consolidated his power in the 1930s, he is said to have prowled the village at night in disguise, to identify and disrupt seances. He personally cut down the most sacred tree in the village to show that no harm would come to a believer from the resident spirit. He also went into people's houses and threw out their ancestor shrines (*palangka*).

Attacks on the ancestor cult and on related spirit cults seem to have been quite general in South Sulawesi during the period of direct colonial rule (1910-1940). Writing about the kingdom of Gowa Chabot states that before 1905 every house had a 'doll house' in the attic called a *pantasa'*. Every Thursday evening, an offering was made to the ancestors in this house which consisted of water and a prepared betel chew called a *parappo*. By 1949, after campaigns against them by the Dutch and local Muslim modernists, many houses had lost their *pantasa'* entirely, although some had replaced them with simple bamboo trays called *andja* (which means 'ghost' in Konjo) (Chabot, 1950).

In opposition to the spirit cults, Gama threw all his efforts into policing Friday mosque attendance and the payment of obligatory alms, and, above all, into sponsoring the cult of the local saint, Saluku Kati, better know as *Bakka' Tera* 'Great Belcher'. In

all probability this 'saint' lived a century before the coming of Islam to Ara, and was in fact a noble of Gowanese descent who married into the local community. This is shown by his position on several independent genealogies as having lived over twenty generations ago. It is not uncommon for the tombs of powerful pre-Islamic ancestors to be 'converted' in this way to sainthood. Thus while Gama was a fierce proponent of Islam, in many respects it was an Islam with its roots in earlier centuries. Not only did he intensify public worship at the tomb of the local 'saint', he practised private austerities in pursuit of *ilmu*, mystical knowledge. He is still widely believed, even by his enemies, to have had exceptional magical powers of invulnerability and clairvoyance.

Education, modernism and revolution

Gama's stress on Islam as the sole legitimate basis of morality and ritual practice served the function both of undermining the traditional aristocracy, and of deflecting attention from the fact he was in effect serving a foreign master. A new generation of idealistic nationalists came of age in the period following the Japanese occupation. They had all received a modicum of formal education, which combined a stress on literacy with a new concept of discipline and individual achievement. Some were educated in the first Dutch schools, set up at the village level in the 1920s, and in schools organized by the Muhammadiyah in the 1930s and 1940s (cf. Pelras, 1985, Noer, 1973: 78). The Muhammadiyah was an organization of Islamic modernists much influenced by the Egyptian modernist Muhammad Abduh who lived at the end of the nineteenth century (Hourani, 1983). It stressed the reform of religion and the modernization of education over direct political action, but the implications of its teachings were to have a profound political impact after the Second World War.

Unlike Gama, who was barely literate and derived his legitimacy from the favor of the Dutch and from non-scripturalist Islam, this new generation combined a belief in national liberation from the Dutch with a scripturalist version of Islam. This version stressed individual interpretation of the sacred writings, rejecting any appeal to traditional authority, and any 'innovations' in ritual practice introduced since the time of the Prophet and his Companions. Many members of this generation joined the nationalist guerrilla movement fighting Dutch attempts to reimpose colonial rule after the Japanese surrender. When the post-colonial government refused to accept most former guerrillas into the new national army, they took to the hills and fought in the name of *shariah* law and anti-feudalism for the next fifteen years.

The leader of the Islamic revolution in South Sulawesi was a minor Bugis noble from Luwu called Kahar Muzakkar. He was born in 1921, and given the name La Domeng. He completed his primary education in 1934 and from 1937 to 1940 attended a Muhammadiyah teacher's school in Surakarta, Java. He took his new, Islamic name from his favorite teacher there. In 1941-43 he taught in a Muhammadiyah school in Luwu. In 1943 he was banished from Luwu for denouncing the existing 'feudal' system in South Sulawesi and advocating the overthrow of the aristocracy.[x] He spent 1943-45 in business in Solo in Java. From 1945 to 1950 he led a group of guerrillas against the Dutch in Java (Harvey, 1974: 181-2, 474).

These facts concerning the life of Kahar Muzakkar, provided by Harvey herself, call into question her view that it was mainly tactical considerations that made the guerrilla movement choose to express their grievances in Islamic rather than socialistic terms (Harvey, 1974: 250-260). In my own discussions with veterans of the movement, it is clear that at least in retrospect the civilizing and leveling role of Islam was of

paramount importance to them. The version of Islam they had acquired from the Muhammadiyah satisfied whatever aspirations they had to reconstruct the social order on more egalitarian terms. But Islam was also part of everyday life for them in a way the utopian projections of socialism were not. For a generation Islam had served as a symbol of resistance not only to the Dutch, but as providing an alternative source of legitimation from the indigenous cults of the nobility.

In June, 1950 Kahar Muzakkar was sent by the new Republican government to Makassar in South Sulawesi to help resolve the 'guerrilla question'. This concerned what was to happen to the irregular forces that had been fighting the Dutch under the new Republic of Indonesia. Many were untrained and uneducated and there was a reluctance among the professional officer corps to admit them into the regular army. Muzakkar, however, fully expected that his men would be inducted into the regular army and that he would be put in command of all South Sulawesi. When this did not happen, they felt they were being passed over as an untrained rabble and that their honor (*siri'*) was at stake. Muzakkar withdrew into the *hutan*, the 'bush', almost as soon as he arrived, and engaged in a long series of inconclusive negotiations with the authorities until August, 1953 when he declared his support for the Negara Islam Indonesia (Islamic State of Indonesia, NII), also known as Darul Islam (Dar al-Islam, 'Abode of Islam', or DI). The army of the rebellion was known as the Tentara Islam Indonesia (TII), hence the combined acronym for the revolutionary government used most often by villagers, DI/TII. Muzakkar's bodyguard and elite strike force was the *Mobile Moment Comando*, 'Instant Mobile Command', or MOMOC, set up in 1953 (Harvey, 1974: 406). This is a play on the Indonesian *momok*, bogeyman or ghost. The guerrillas were sometimes referred to as the 'ghost army', since they moved invisibly at night. The ideology the

movement advocated combined a rigid form of religious modernism together with an extreme ‘anti-feudalism'. Strict *shariah* law was introduced in areas under guerrilla control, Sufism and the spirit cults were suppressed, and all symbols of social ranking were excised from life-cycle rituals.

By 1953, the guerrillas had gained control of much of the countryside, including all of the regency of Bulukumba except for the city. The situation in Bulukumba reached a peak of chaos in 1953 and 1954, when the breakdown in government authority and the absence of an effective DI/TII provisional government allowed large numbers of personal vendettas full rein and many killings occurred. Modernist intolerance and the imposition of *shariah* law led to a backlash among the devotees of the spirit cults and of the Amma Towa, whose title means ‘The Old Father’. In 1954 an adherent of this cult set himself up as the Amma Lolo, ‘The Young Father', to defend the cult from the Islamic revolutionaries. He formed a millenarian army distinguished by the traditional head cloth its members wore, folded so that a triangular peak drooped over the top in a style called *dompe*.

The low-lying swampy area stretching along the river from Tana Towa in Kajang through the Districts of Hero and Lange Lange to the sea is even today notorious as the haunt of banditry, gambling and the drinking of palm wine. It was from this border area between the northern and southern coastal Konjo that the Amma Lolo recruited most of his followers, although there were some from as far away as Tanete in the north and Ara in the south. According to one noble informant who was in the local government at the time, the Dompe Army received government support at first, as they thought it might form a counter-weight to their common enemy, the DI/TII guerrillas.

Some time in 1954 the Amma Lolo summoned the leaders of all the Konjo districts to a meeting in Tanutung. He made a speech announcing his opposition to the DI/TII, and warning that any of its supporters found in a village under his control would be killed. My noble informant seemed generally sympathetic to the movement, which was, among other things, opposed to the leveling tendencies represented by the DI/TII guerrillas, many of whom were from lower ranking families. He denied that the Amma Lolo was against Islam or prayer in mosques, saying that it was only some of his more hot-headed supporters who went to such extremes. Another informant said however that the Dompe movement had tried to change the declaration of faith from 'I bear witness that there is no God but God and Muhammad is His Prophet' to 'I bear witness to the Amma Towa and the Amma Lolo'.

In 1955, the Dompe Army swept down from the northern Konjo lands all the way to Bira at the southern end of Bulukumba and executed many supporters of the DI/TII. They began attacking mosques and forbidding people to pray in them. In Ara, even very conservative elements such as the mediums of the royal spirit cults were afraid of Dompe fanaticism. It was at this point, in the face of the advancing Dompe Army, that the skull of the chief royal ancestor, Karaeng Mamampang, was removed from its shrine and hidden in a cave.

The Dompe Army was armed only with swords, spears and magic. News of the chaos they were causing and of their anti-Islamic actions eventually reached Kahar Muzakkar himself. He set out with his well-armed band of trained soldiers, and marched on their positions in Kajang. They first met the Dompe forces at Panremo in Bonto Tanga, and there were many casualties on both sides. The Amma Lolo rallied his forces and the two sides met again some time later. A ninety-year old informant who had sided

with the Dompe army described to me the final climactic battle on Mount Lembang Gogoso in Sinjai, the Regency just north of Bulukumba. Muzakkar's elite bodyguard was armed with machine guns, the Dompe army with spears. The Amma Lolo told his followers that the chattering of the machine guns was only the sound of the bamboo clappers used to frighten pigs from ripening grain. The louder the machine guns sounded, the further the Dompe army advanced. Many men, women and children were slaughtered that day by Muzakkar's troops, the Amma Lolo was killed, and the movement was liquidated. My informant attributed their defeat to the fact that the leaders in the field had been too hot-blooded, and had not waited for the blessing of the Amma Towa, with which they would have been invulnerable.

Perhaps the most extraordinary aspect of this episode is that instead of executing the Amma Towa, Kahar Muzakkar took him into custody and treated him with consideration for the next five years. In 1961 he was returned unharmed to Tana Towa, and died soon after. According to some accounts he was killed, ironically, by government soldiers for having supported the DI/TII rebellion. The 'pagan' village of Amparita in Sidenreng was similarly spared: although it was surrounded at one point by the Islamic guerrillas and threatened with forcible conversion, a General who was from the area intervened.[xi]

I return to the situation in the district of Bonto Bahari at the height of the insurrection. In Ara, Gama symbolized everything reactionary to the local guerrillas, both because of his patronage of the cult of the saints, and because of his patronage by the Dutch government. Gama was removed as village head in 1949, but continued to travel freely around the area during the next five years. One day in 1954 he was returning by bicycle from the district capital Tana Beru when he was stopped by an

insurgent unit. A column of government troops had been spotted marching south from Tiro, and the unit suspected that Gama had been informing on them in Tana Beru. They told him they were going to execute him. Since it was the time for evening prayers, he asked their permission to pray first. They agreed, and as he bent to the ground, he was shot through the heart, and then his throat was cut. One informant who was a practising magician (and a modernist) said that he had to be shot by the wife of the guerrilla commander with a gold bullet to circumvent his invulnerability magic (*kebal*): steel bullets fired by a man could not penetrate his body. The magician knew all this because he had meditated at Gama's grave in search of esoteric knowledge (*ilmu*). Gama's ghost had appeared, its head hanging down to one side from the slit in its throat. It told him who had carried out the execution and then taken his keris and his ring, the foci of a man's magical powers. The magician later went to the house of the man Gama had accused, and his wife admitted that they did indeed have the keris. The legend of Gama's supernatural powers thus survived even among his modernist enemies.

As I have said, the Islamic revolutionaries outlawed all but the minimum Islamic practices at life cycle rituals, abolished the payment of all indirect dowry except for the minimum as stated in the *shariah* code, attacked the cult of the prophets and saints as polytheistic, and suppressed the Sufi orders as illegitimately interposing a human master between man and God. The old tomb of the local saint in Ara was destroyed and replaced by a modest wooden marker. Many of these practices have reappeared since 1965. Semi-clandestine visits to the tomb of Ara's saint have resumed under the leadership, ironically, of the local spirit medium whose grandmother was Gama's greatest enemy. Wedding rituals have everywhere resumed their former expense and elaboration, even within modernist families.

Modernists thus now form only a faction in most villages. What collective ritual they do perform is egalitarian in nature. For example, they perform as many of the five daily prayers as possible together in the mosque, a practice in which all men line up shoulder to shoulder as equals. The only distinction is between men and women, who must line up at the back of the mosque. Even so, unlike most other Islamic societies, a remarkably large number of women of all ages attend evening prayers at the mosque. They also refuse to enter a house in which al-Barzanji's Life of Muhammad is being recited. As this is done during almost every life-cycle ritual, villagers are constantly required to reassert their factional affiliations.

Revelation, magic and individualism

The ex-guerrillas I knew were on very friendly terms with a number of men who sought esoteric knowledge (*ilmu*) by means of direct revelation. Much of this knowledge is of a 'magical' sort, giving its possessor invulnerability, or the ability to find lost objects, ease difficult childbirths, cure illnesses and so on. It is gained through the practice of austerities: fasting, meditating on top of graves at midnight, steeling oneself to confront and speak with ghosts. Magical knowledge is almost entirely in the form of spells (*mantera*) recited in private by a practitioner over an object to be treated. Spells are mostly made up of sacred Arabic phrases and archaic Konjo terminology. Some magic, such as that connected with boat building, is handed down from father to son, but much of it is unique to individual magicians. In all these respects it contrasts with the rituals conducted by *sanro*, which are non-verbal, public and acquired from a female elder.

For a long time I could not understand why magical practices were acceptable to the Islamic radicals, while the apparently more Islamic veneration of saints and the

prophets was not. The answer is that it is the use of human mediators the radicals find objectionable, not the pursuit of mystical experience as such. There is an indigenous belief that the use of magic is a very dangerous business. The forces unleashed are apt to get out of control and backfire on the magician, turning him into a witch (*parrakan*). Even one tiny mistake in reciting a spell (*mantera*) may cause this to happen. Now, knowledge derived from other human beings is inherently fallible: they may neglect to give one the complete formula, or they may already be witches in the first place. Reliance on other human beings to acquire esoteric knowledge thus opens one to the danger of being transformed into a witch. This is an accusation made by Islamic radicals against the devotees of the spirit cults. Either they acquire their mystical powers from other human beings both living and dead, or they rely on the intervention of spiritual beings other than Allah to accomplish their aims. These beings are in the view of the radicals *setan*, and traffic with them tantamount to devil worship.

Only direct personal experience is a guarantee of truth, whether in the witnessing of mundane events or in the acquisition of esoteric knowledge. A number of highly 'modernist' or 'scripturalist' individuals, including school teachers and civil servants, claim to have had direct personal revelations (*hidayat*) from angels or God himself that have given them the power to heal those attacked by witches and other evil spirits. Such mystics may vigorously oppose not only the spirit cults discussed at the beginning of this paper as witchcraft, but all the hierarchical cults of the saints and prophets as 'polytheism' (*shirk*: the association of lesser beings with God). The attribution of witchcraft to those who claim to gain their powers from indigenous ancestor and nature spirits allows mystics to claim sole legitimacy for their own sort of esoteric knowledge (*ilmu*). It is a tactic they share with other modernists to undermine the legitimacy of the

hierarchical 'feudal' social order that was premised on the inherent potency of the nobility and the hierarchical mediation of saints and their descendants.

Both the Islamic modernists and the mystical adepts share a vision of the source of power as absolutely transcending human society, and of the right to exercise power as deriving from an individual's own efforts and achievements. The former stress close adherence to the external manifestation of God's will, the *shariah* law and the 'five pillars' of Islam, while the latter stress the pursuit of the inner truth of God's will, the *tarekat*, which has as its goal ultimate reality, *hakekat*, and finally gnosis, *ma'rifat*. The two groups see no contradiction between external legalism and inward mysticism. Both are suspicious of Muslim traditionalists who they view as substituting a host of ritual innovations such as the worship of saints and the prophet for the legal minimal ritual observances and for a sincere individual quest. For these men, the most significant spiritual experiences take place in the context of a lonely and arduous quest for knowledge.[xii]

The long-term, the short-term, and the ethnographic present

The period since the suppression of the Darul Islam movement in 1965 has been marked by the uneasy coexistence of all the ritual complexes discussed in this paper: ancestor cults, tomb worship, scripturalism, and individualistic mysticism. The meaning of each complex is given to actors not by its historical origins, but by its place in a total synchronic field wherein each serves to define the others through relations of complementarity and opposition. I offer Table I as a convenient summary of the highly unstable field of models available to actors in the village of Ara in 1989. According to this table, an actor has a choice between hierarchical and egalitarian political values.[xiii] A choice made on this level tends to commit him or her to a certain complex of ritual

practices as well. Within the 'feudal' column, one may choose to stress 'religious' (*agama*) practices over 'customary' (*kebudayaan*) ones, but within this sub-field each must be understood as defining the other. Within the 'bureaucratic' column, one may choose to stress the outer forms of religion (*shariah*) or the inner meaning (*tarekat*), but again, the two must be understood as defining one another.

TABLE I

SUMMARY OF RITUAL COMPLEXES

	'Feudal'		Bureaucratic	
	Ascription (descent from *Tomanurung*)		Achievement (formal education)	
	Royal ancestor cult (*Kebudayaan)*	Saint cult (agama)	Shariah (outer form)	Tarekat (inner meaning)
	Ascription (descent from royal ancestor)	Ascription (descent from Saint or Kali)	Achievement (Koranic learning)	Achievement (revelation)
	Hierarchical whole (seance/procession)	Hierarchical whole (procession)	Egalitarian whole (prayer in mosque)	Solitary individual (ascesis/meditation)
	Plastic and gestural (offering to spirits)	Plastic and gestural (offering at tomb)	Verbal (scripture/prayer)	Verbal (incantations)
	Female (both mediums and followers)	Female/male (females leading mixed processions)	Male/female (males at front, females at back)	Male (all magicians and mystics)

1. Hegemonic political model
2. Mode of acquiring political power
3. Associated ritual complexes
4. Mode of acquiring power/knowledge
5. Social organization of ritual activity
6. Dominant vehicle of symbolic expression
7. Gender of participants

A preliminary analysis of this table shows that in many ways the cult of the royal ancestors stands in absolute symbolic opposition to the practice of Islamic mysticism (*tarekat*): the former is female-dominated, symbolically plastic and gestural, hierarchical, holistic, and ascribed; the latter is male-dominated, symbolically verbal, egalitarian, individualistic, and achieved. The cults of the saints and the practices of the *shariah*-minded modernists fall somewhere in between these two poles. On a political level, however, one finds the greatest opposition between the latter two practices since the 1940s. Modernists are more likely to dismiss the practices of the spirit mediums as harmless matters of female 'superstition' (*kepercayaan*), or, more charitably, 'cultural tradition' (*kebudayaan*), than they are to tolerate the cult of the saints, which they regard as a corruption of 'religion' (*agama*) itself. Between 1910 and 1940, devotees of the cults of the saints were in turn less likely than modernists are now to tolerate the cults of the ancestor spirits precisely because of their uncomfortable similarity to their own practices.

Finally, the attitude of the mystics toward the other three complexes is less easy to characterize because of the idiosyncratic character of their practices. Some of them actually perform many of the same plastic and gestural rituals as the female ritual specialists in the first column, but they give them a completely different interpretation. One mystic explained to me in great detail how the 'true meaning' of traditional life cycle rituals had been given to him in a dream, and he explicated them in great detail according to Sufi doctrine. Other mystics will have no truck whatsoever with such ritual forms, but work only through incantations revealed to them as a result either of voluntary seeking or involuntary revelation.

One could elaborate such an analysis of the patterns present in the table almost indefinitely, but certain cautions are in order. The first point to note is that this table is a *summary* field, a retrospective totalization of the alternative practices available at one point in time. Following Lévi-Strauss, a symbolic structure at any given time is the result of *bricolage*: the bits and pieces that are assembled into a collage by the analyst or the native each have separate origins and destinies. The relative autonomy of each practice can also be seen from the wide temporal gaps between the introduction of each of them: many aspects of the spirit cults clearly go back at least to the period before the formation of the earliest states a thousand years ago. The cults of the royal ancestors were probably first elaborated between 1300 and 1500. Sufi Islam was introduced around 1600 and continued to bring in new currents of opinion from around the Indian Ocean until 1900. Bureaucratic government dates only from 1860 or so, and modern military drill from the 1940s. As each new practice was introduced, it was both modified by the total system into which it entered, and it modified that system, but equilibrium was never reached before some new practice appears to cause further perturbations. As Lévi-Strauss writes, structure is a never-ending attempt to cope with the disruptive events of history (Lévi-Strauss, 1962).

A second point to note is that 'mytho-logic' is only able to construct a provisional pattern out of the various elements represented in each column: there is a relation of 'elective affinity' among them, not a relation of logical implication. For example, those who have a stake in the cult of the royal ancestors, i.e. the descendants of the nobility, also tend to practice hierarchical Sufism. But, as we have seen, Gama was able to turn hierarchical Sufism against the feudal nobility. Those who have a stake in the bureaucratic state, i.e. village school teachers, also tend to practice scripturalist Islam.

But, as we have seen, the Islamic radicals were able to turn scripturalist Islam against the Republican government. There is thus no *necessary* linkage between the elements in each column. Their alignment with one another in opposition to corresponding elements in the other column is a transient phenomenon. Only historical analysis can reveal the extent to which the trajectory of each practice in a column is autonomous from the others. Another example of the unlinking of these elements in political practice is provided below.

Writers who adopt 'cultural wholes' as their unit of analysis, such as Dumont, Geertz and Errington, wish to discover the *generative* field of a culture, the deep set of cultural principles which govern the historical trajectory of a society, causing it to endless reiterate its basic symbolic schema.[xiv] This deep structure determines which foreign influences are accepted and rejected, making revolutionary change impossible. Cultural traditions are represented as closed organic wholes. Data which cannot be assimilated to a single coherent schema are ignored, as when Errington ignores Islam in South Sulawesi. The assumption of a coherent set of underlying principles thus proves to be an analytical strait-jacket.

To turn now to the question of agency as an explanatory principle in historical change. Two sorts of agency were mentioned in the introduction: that of individual actors, and that of economic classes. It is my contention that the strategies available to a historical agent at any given time are determined by the total field of ritual complexes available to it. These strategies can be illustrated at the level of the individual over the medium term by the methods Gama and his descendants used to rise from a position of genealogical obscurity to high ascriptive rank. Beginning in the 1890s, Gama and his

father managed to achieve great prestige in the village of Ara by stressing hierarchical Sufism at the expense of the cult of the royal ancestors. Gama's son was then able to marry the niece of the leader of the cult of the royal ancestors in the neighboring village of Tana Beru in the 1940s. That son's son married the daughter's daughter of the owner of the most sacred ancestral relics in the whole district in the 1970s. Gama's great grandson is now in possession of the most aristocratic of heirlooms: it has taken four generations for a family of outsiders with no name to achieve a high ascribed status.

When faced with such apparent opportunism, it is tempting to adopt the cynical approach of transactionalism, in which all rituals, symbols and ideologies are simply 'resources' used to maximize individual prestige. This would be a mistake. First, the competing practices pre-exist their adoption by individuals, and will in most cases outlive them. They are not 'invented' on the spur of the moment by 'actors', and so are not explicable in terms of their intentions. They are, of course, modified by each usage, but we would do better to take the practice as our unit of analysis, rather than the individuals who perpetuate now one practice, now another. Second, it focuses attention on the actions of abstract individuals, rather than on what is most interesting about ethnography: the concrete rituals and ideologies which point to radically different models of social life. Individuals may make choices, but they choose between existing models and usually alter them only in unintended ways.

I turn finally to economic classes as historical agents organized to advance their interests in particular politico-economic conjunctures. The fit between classes and ritual complexes may be illustrated by the elections for village chief held in Ara 1989. There were four candidates in the end. The front runner was Haji Mustari who had been

elected village chief in 1967, but who was removed from office in 1971 for refusing to join the party of the national government, GOLKAR. He resolutely adhered to the party of the Islamic modernists, the 'United Development Party' (the Indonesian acronym is PPP). One of Haji Mustari's strongest backers in the election was Idris, who is married to his sister, and who shares his views on religion. Idris served for nine years in Kahar Muzakkar's personal bodyguard during the Darul Islam period. He derives great prestige from this experience, but has been unable to rise to a above his position as an elementary school teacher due to his lack of higher education. This is true of a number of other ex-guerrillas who spent their youths fighting in the bush instead of studying in the cities. Most of these ex-guerrillas backed Haji Mustari for his rigorously modernist views on religion.

Ironically, Haji Mustari also received support from many of the old nobility whose position had been undermined by Gama and the Dutch starting in 1915. His great grandfather was Kali of Ara at the time of Gama's installation, and was one of the first nobles to break ranks with the other nobility and support him in the 1920s. Haji Mustari's elder brother, Dg. Pasau, had held the office of village chief for much of the 1970s and 1980s, and is much more sympathetic to the spirit cults than is Haji Mustari. This led supporters of the spirit cults to feel that the latter would rely more on persuasion than repression in promoting his views on orthodox religion.

The third wing of Haji Mustari's bloc came from a more marginal economic grouping. After his dismissal as village chief in 1971, Haji Mustari had moved to the capital city of the regency and worked as a building contractor until 1989. He soon found that he could not survive even in private business without connections to the government party, and finally joined GOLKAR after all. He then managed to become

head of the Ara branch of a government development agency (KUD) that extends credit, mostly to farmers. Funds are disbursed at each level of local government, and being able to control this agency at the village level gives an individual a significant amount of power. As there is very little farming in Ara, Haji Mustari was working to get loans for women to purchase materials for embroidery and for retired boat builders to make models for tourists. He thus added to his constituency a number of economically marginal petty commodity producers.

Opposition to Haji Mustari centered on the private merchants of the bazaar. The government loans controlled by Haji Mustari charge an interest rate of only 1% per month, while the private merchants can charge up to 30% a month. They thus viewed the KUD as a threat to their material interests. They began quietly to organize their economically dependent clients to vote for Pahatte, a well-educated young man without strong views on religion.

Another group of opponents centered on the descendants of the colonial officials of the inter-war period. This group has managed to retain many salaried positions in the local government throughout this century, being as ready to work with the Dutch and Japanese as with the Republican governments. They backed Haji Arifin whose commoner father had been one of Gama's right-hand men in the 1920s and 1930s, and who had participated in the overthrow of the noble families. Members of this group see themselves as fervent Muslims, but of a more 'traditional' style than the school teachers mentioned above: while they are fiercely antagonistic to the spirit cults, they are less likely to oppose the rituals of hierarchical Sufism.

A fourth candidate also came forward, who was none other than Gama's grandson Andi Azikin. He seemed to have no independent power base, but to regard himself as a

plausible candidate because of his birth. Realizing they had no chance of defeating Haji Mustari in a field of four, the bazaar merchants tried to persuade Haji Arifin to withdraw in favor of his nephew, Pahatte. When he refused, the merchants threw their bloc of votes to Andi Azikin in protest, producing the result shown in Table II. The result was closer than it appeared. Had Haji Arifin withdrawn, then all of his votes and half of Andi Azikin's votes might have gone to Pahatte. He would then have defeated Haji Mustari by 200 votes.

TABLE II

RESULTS OF 1989 ELECTION FOR VILLAGE CHIEF OF ARA

1. Mustari	582	35%
2. Arifin	467	28%
3. Andi Azikin	441	27%
4. Pahatte	94	6%
Spoiled ballots	67	4%
	1,651	100%

In summary, a coalition of hereditary nobles, modernist school teachers and marginal craftsmen dependent on the state defeated a coalition of conservative state functionaries and small entrepreneurs. More generally, one can find a certain correlation in South Sulawesi between socio-economic categories and certain ritual complexes. A poor commoner who succeeds in formal education will find a religious stress on individual progress more plausible than a noble, who might in turn be drawn to a religious stress on the innate possession by certain individuals of God’s grace. But there is no necessary congruence, and the ideologies in question could certainly never be

derived from the economic experiences of the actors. Haji Mustari, despite his noble background, is also a well-educated modernist. It was the combination of these characteristics that allowed him to forge a winning coalition. This political event can only be understood by reference to the short-term strategies employed by economic interest groups, the medium-term strategies employed by individuals and families for social climbing, and the long-term 'strategies without subjects' I have characterized as ritual complexes (cf. Foucault, 1977). While reduction of the event to any one of these levels would impoverish our understanding, I regard the third level as enjoying logical and analytic priority over the others.

* * *

My interest in this paper has been in revolutionary political situations, which, as we have seen, have not been all that 'exceptional' in South Sulawesi. For most people, revolutionary practices derive from the altered states of everyday consciousness produced in ritual and not from everyday experience. In a world economy, rituals are often linked to world religions. To put it another way, while the experience of oppression is relatively local, the means of resisting it are relatively global. This is true for two reasons. First, 'oppression' does not generate its own resistance, and indeed can only be experienced as such in light of some alternative model of reality. Second, the very long time span required to formulate a new set of ritual practices makes it more likely that alternative political models will develop once and diffuse to other situations, as happened with Islam and Leninism, than that models will develop independently in each local situation.

Notes

[i] For religious rebellion in the Philippines, see Sturtevant, 1976; Ileto, 1979. For more on Islam as an autonomous force in Malaysia, see Milner, 1986.

[ii] The approach outlined in this paragraph is a form of what Althusser condemned as 'expressive causality' (Althusser and Balibar, 1970).

[iii] Fieldwork in South Sulawesi was made possible by a grant from the Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation.

[iv] Significantly, this cycle is confined to the Bugis areas of the peninsula, and is unknown to the Makassarese, a fact supporting the notion that the two groups had little contact until after 1300.

[v] Color symbolism in South Sulawesi is influenced both by the Hindu scheme of the four *varna* (white/Brahman, red/Kshatriya, yellow/Vaishya, black/Sudra) and by the neo-Platonic/Islamic theory of the four elements (water, fire, air and earth). White is the color of the element water, and symbolizes purity, including purity of birth. Red is the color of the element fire, and symbolizes blood and violence. Yellow is the color of the element air, and symbolizes gold, wealth and power. Black is the color of the element earth. Many offerings to the spirits must contain four 'colors' of glutinous rice, although there is a good deal of ambiguity about the color yellow. Some say it is only offered to *setan*, and plain white rice is often substituted for it instead.

[vi] Datu Tiro is said by some to have been a member of the *Tarekat Naqshabandiya*, a Sufi order, and to have been influenced by the theosophical system of Hamzah Fansuri, a member of the *Tarekat Qadiriyya* who lived in northwest Sumatra in the late sixteenth century (al-Attas, 1970: 12; Pelras, 1985: 120).

[vii] This poetic life of the Prophet was composed by the Shafi'i mufti in Medina, Ja'far ibn Hasan al-Barzanji (d. 1764) and adopted all around the Indian Ocean, being translated into Swahili as well as Malay (cf. Knappert, 1971).

[viii] Cf. Milner, 1983 and Woodward, 1989 for refutations of Geertz's views on Javanese Islam.

[ix] This distinction between *adat* and *agama* is today made by all actors. It would be interesting to know when it was introduced, and whether it was made, or made in the same way in the last century.

[x] The term *feodal* has been adopted by modernists throughout South Sulawesi to refer to the pattern of hereditary privilege they are opposing. I use 'feudal' in this sense.

[xi] In 1970, the ruling party of Indonesia, Golkar, recognized these villagers as adherents of a form of 'Hinduism' (Maeda, 1984).This is significant because, under the Indonesian constitution, everyone must belong to one of the recognized *agama*, 'religions': Islam, Hinduism, Protestantism, Catholicism, Judaism, Buddhism, or Confucianism. Those 'without religion' are liable to forcible conversion. The inhabitants of Tana Towa are now officially 'Muslim'.

[xii] Despite their well-founded critiques of authors like Geertz and Scott, Woodward (1989) and Milner (1986) persist in opposing 'shariah-mindedness' to mysticism in Islam. Among all the 'modernists' I spoke with in South Sulawesi, the two are seen as outer and inner sides of the same dedication, not as alternatives. It is not mysticism but mediation that they oppose.

[xiii] Much as Leach's Kachin can choose between *gumsa* and *gumlao* values. Another example of such a synchronic totalization of a heterogeneous set of ritual complexes is

proved by Tambiah's account of Buddhism and the spirit cults in Northeast Thailand (1970: 338).

[xiv] This tendency has rightly been castigated by Bourdieu (1977). In my view, his critique applies to both the Geertzian school of symbolic anthropology, and to the Oxford school of structuralism as represented by Needham and Dumont. It does not apply to Lévi-Strauss, who is always at pains to stress the retrospective nature of all such symbolic totalizations, whether carried out by the anthropologist or by the natives. See Gibson, 1990.

References

al-Attas, Syed Muhammad Nauguib (1966) *Raniri and the Wujudiyyah of 17th Century Aceh*. Singapore: Monographs of the MBRAS III.

---- (1970) *The Mysticism of Hamsah Fansuri*. Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press.

Althusser, L. and É. Balibar (1970) *Reading Capital*. London: New Left Books.

Andaya, L. (1975) The nature of kingship in Bone. In *Precolonial state Systems in Southeast Asia* (eds) A. Reid and L. Castles. Kuala Lumpur.

---- (1984) Kingship-Adat rivalry and the role of Islam in South Sulawesi. *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 15: 22-42.

Bloch, M. (1986) *From Blessing to Violence*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bourdieu, P. (1977) *Outline of a Theory of Practice*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Caldwell, I (1987) State and society in South Sulawesi A.D. 1300-1600. *KITLV International Workshop on Indonesian Studies No. 2.*

Cense, A. (1950) De verering van Sjaich Jusuf in Zuid Celebes. In *Bingkisan Budi*. Leiden: A.W. Sijtohoff.

Chabot, H. (1950) *Kinship, Status and Sex in South Celebes*. New Haven: HRAF.

Collins, G. (1936) *East Monsoon*. London: Jonathan Cape.

Errington, S. (1989) *Meaning and Power in a Southeast Asian Realm*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Foucault, M. (1977) *Discipline and Punish*. London: Penguin.

Geertz, C. (1960) *The Religion of Java*. Glencoe, Ill: The Free Press.

(1980) *Negara*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Gibson, T. (1990) Are social wholes seamless? In *Author Meets Critics* (ed) S. Ortner. Working papers of the Center for CSST 32. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan.

---- (In press a) 'Childhood, colonialism and fieldwork among the Buid of the Philippines and the Konjo of Indonesia' in (eds) Jeannine Koubi and Josiane Massard, *Enfants et sociétés d'Asie du Sud-Est*. Paris: L'Harmattan.

---- (In press b) 'Having your house and eating it: houses and siblings in Ara, South Sulawesi.' In (eds) Janet Carsten and Stephen Hugh-Jones *About the House: Buildings, Groups, and Categories in Holistic Perspective*. Essays on an idea by C. Lévi-Strauss. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Goedhart, O. [1901] (1933) De pangadakang in Bira. *Adatrechtbundels 36:* 222-243.

Harmonic, G. (1987) *La langage des dieux*. Paris: Éditions du CNRS.

(1991) God, divinities and ancestors. In *Southeast Asian Studies* 29 (1): 3-34.

Harvey, B. (1974) Tradition, Islam and rebellion: South Sulawesi 1950-1965. Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University.

Hobsbawm, E. (1959) *Primitive Rebels*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Hourani, A. (1983) *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1798-1939.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ileto, R. (1979) *Pasyon and Revolution*. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila Unversity Press.

Knappert, Jan (1971) *Swahili Islamic Poetry* Vol. I. Leiden: E.J. Brill.

Kuhn, T. (1970) *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Leach, E. (1954) *Political Systems of Highland Burma*. London: Athlone Press.

Lenin, V. (1970) *What is to be Done?* Moscow: Progress Publishers.

Lévi-Strauss, C. (1962) *The Savage Mind*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson.

MacKnight, C. (1975) The emergence of civilization in south Celebes and elsewhere. In *Precolonial state Systems in Southeast Asia* (eds) A. Reid and L. Castles. Kuala Lumpur.

Maeda, N. (1984) Traditionality in Bugis society. In *Transformations of the Agricultural Landscape in Indonesia*. Kyoto: Center for Southeast Asian Studies.

Milner, A. (1983) Islam and the Muslim State. In (ed) M. Hooker *Islam in Southeast Asia*. Leiden: E.J. Brill.

---- (1986) Rethinking Islamic fundamentalism in Malaysia. In *Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs* 20(2): 48-75.

Noer, D. (1973) *The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia, 1900-1942*. Singapore: Oxford University Press.

Pelras, C. (1981) Célèbes-sud avant l'Islam. *Archipel* 21: 153-184.

(1985) Religion, tradition and the dynamics of Islamization in South Sulawesi. *Archipel* 29: 107-136.

Reid, A. (1981) A great seventeenth century Indonesian family. *Masyarakat Indonesia* 8 (1): 1-28.

---- (1983) The rise of Makassar. *Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs* 17: 117-160.

Schärer, H. (1963) *Ngaju Religion*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

Scott, J. (1985) *Weapons of the Weak*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Sturtevant, (1976) *Popular Uprisings in the Philippines*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Tambiah, S. (1970) *Buddhism and the Spirit Cults in Northeast Thailand*. Cambridge: University Press.

Trimingham, J. (1971) *The Sufi Orders in Islam*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Weber, M. (1963) *The Sociology of Religion*. Boston: Beacon Press.

Woodward, M. (1989) *Islam in Java*. Tucson: University of Arizona Press.