ISLAMIC MODELS OF SOCIAL JUSTICE IN SOUTH SULAWESI, INDONESIA*

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Abstract: Social justice requires a constant negotiation of the balance between the domestic domain of kinship and marriage, the cosmological domain of human relations with the nonhuman world, the political domain of power and authority, and the religious domain of human relations with the transcendental world of divinity. The domestic and cosmological domains are governed by symbolic schemes that draw on local sources of concrete experience, while the political and religious domains are governed by symbolic schemes that draw on abstract symbolic schemes that were often developed in remote times and places. In this paper I outline the way Makassar conceptions of social justice have changed as the relationship between these domains have undergone a series of transformations due to events such as religious conversion, colonial occupation, national liberation, and economic globalization. The paper outlines nine successive models of social justice, each of which was dominant for about two or three generations. All of these models remain available to social actors in the present through a vibrant heritage of oral, ritual, and textual traditions. Social actors draw on these models to evaluate the justice of current social arrangements and to imagine alternatives to them.

Keywords*: Islam, justice, cosmology, politics, colonialism*

Introduction

When I began research in the village of Ara, South Sulawesi in 1988, I encountered a number of competing models concerning the correct relationship between the Islamic religion

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and social justice. These models emerged during different conjunctures in the history of Indonesia, but they remained current and available to social actors in the late twentieth century because they were transmitted through a set of vibrant oral, ritual, and textual traditions. What constituted social justice in each case depended on the changing relationships among the domestic, cosmological, political, and religious domains of human experience (Gibson 2013).

The domestic domain was organized in terms of ranked noble and commoner houses; the cosmological domain was organized in terms of human relationships with nonhumans beings that inhabited the Upper, the Middle and the Lower World; the political domain was a hybrid of traditional kingship, charismatic mysticism, and bureaucratic colonialism; the religious domain encompassed all the variants of Sunni Islam found around the Indian Ocean from the sixteenth century on. In some models the symbolic systems that governed each domain coincided, in some they were complementary, and in some they were antagonistic. This paper is based on thirty years of research on the ever-changing relationships among these domains of experience and on the implications for local conceptions of social justice and political action (Gibson 2005, 2007).

1. 1605-1667 The Sultan as Perfect Man

The oldest Islamic model of social justice in Makassar derived from the absolute monarchies established in Monsoon Asia during the sixteenth century. In the Makassar version of this model, the political ruler, or Sultan, also served as the apex of the religious domain, as an exemplar of the Perfect Man; of the local cosmological domain, as the descendant of celestial beings that founded the first pre-Islamic kingdoms; and of the domestic domain, through his polygamous marriages with the daughters of his vassals. In this model, the social hierarchies that governed the four domains of experience were in perfect alignment with one another.



Figure 1. Cities of Asia.



Figure 2. Southwest Sulawesi and the Java Sea.

The origins of the conversion of Indonesian rulers to Islam can be traced back to the Mongol sack of Baghdad in the thirteenth century. This catastrophic event shifted the center of gravity of the Islamic world south into the Indian Ocean basin, where a network of Islamic port cities developed. Relations between these port cities were regulated by harbormasters, bearing a title derived from the Persian *Shah Bandar*. The harbormasters served as intermediaries between visiting ship captains and the local ruler; collected harbor fees; and arbitrated disputes between the members of different ethnic groups living in the city. They were often of foreign origin and fluent in the languages such as Arabic, Persian, Gujarati and Malay that were spoken in ports all around the Indian Ocean (Resink 1968: 48-51).

The Portuguese attempt to impose a trade monopoly in the Indian Ocean in the sixteenth century disrupted these Islamic networks. The Portuguese conquest of Malacca in 1511 caused a wave of Muslim Malays to seek refuge in other coastal states throughout Southeast Asia. Among them was the Makassar state of Gowa, which became a rival entrepôt to Malacca in the 1530s by establishing a safe harbor for merchants from many nations, both Southeast Asian and European. The port gave the rulers of Gowa access to a greatly expanded network of overseas markets as well as to modern weaponry, which they used to conquer all the other kingdoms on the peninsula. By 1605, Gowa was the undisputed master of South Sulawesi and was poised to expand its hegemony over all of eastern Indonesia. It was at this moment that the king finally decided to convert to Islam and join the commonwealth ruled by the *sharia* that stretched all the way across the Indian Ocean to Mecca (Manyambeang and Mone 1979).

The three *sheikhs* from Sumatra who are credited with the conversion of South Sulawesi to Islam brought with them the mystical doctrines of Hamzah Fansuri of Sumatra and of the Mughal Emperor Akbar of India (Braginsky 1999; Richards 1993). These doctrines enabled the

traditional rulers of South Sulawesi to portray themselves as the charismatic heirs of the Prophet Muhammad and of the Perfect Men who succeeded him as the mystical axes around which creation revolved. Tradition holds that they achieved their first success with the ruler of Luwu', whose royal house enjoyed the highest rank in the area. Sultan Abdullah of Tallo' was next, and he proved instrumental in the conversion of all the other rulers of South Sulawesi to Islam (Matthes [1885] 1943). He did so both through the threat of force and by providing a model for how hereditary rulers could claim the charismatic authority of Islam without abandoning the traditional authority they derived from indigenous royal origin myths and rituals (Jones 1979). Following his lead, local rulers continued to be installed on the sacred rock where the founding royal ancestors had first descended from the Upper World, but they did so while swearing an oath on the Koran.

Following the conversion of the local aristocracy throughout South Sulawesi, traditional rituals of homage to the founding royal ancestors, who were believed to have descended from the sky, were preserved alongside a new set of rituals of homage performed at the tombs of Islamic *sheikhs*, mystics who had achieved union with the Godhead before their deaths. The annual pilgrimage to the summit of Mount Bawakaraeng stood at the apex of this syncretic system. Before the conversion of the kings, Bawakaraeng was regarded as the abode of the Great Lord, Karaeng Lowe, a version of the Hindu god Shiva. During the seventeenth century, Bawakaraeng was reinterpreted as both the site of a local manifestation of the Kaba in Mecca and as the local abode of Abd al-Qadir Jilani (1077-1166 CE), who founded of one of the most important Sufi mystical brotherhoods. It thus became a site where Muslims could fulfill both the obligatory ritual practice of the *hajj* and pursue the optional mystical practices of the Qadiriyya Sufi order (Gibson 2007: 211).

The net result of this model of Islam was to reinforce the role of the royal court as the center of the domestic, cosmological, political and religious domains. It enabled noble houses everywhere to continue practice the hierarchical life cycle rituals that reproduced their privileged relationship with the royal ancestor spirits while also observing the Islamic rituals that recognized the fundamental equality of all souls at birth and death, and throughout the daily, monthly, and annual cycles of prayer, fasting, and pilgrimage (Gibson 1994: 189-195).

2. 1667-1714 The Sufi Master as Warrior

During the seventeenth century, the Dutch East India Company (VOC) gradually established its hegemony over all of Indonesia. Political power shifted from the sultans to foreign merchants who lacked any legitimate authority, who did not share the Islamic religion, and who would not marry local women. Sufi sheikhs who acquired their authority from global networks of mystical brotherhoods and schools of legal thought gained prestige that rivaled that of the weakened royal houses, with whom they began to intermarry. At the turn of the eighteenth century, sheikhs were often able to unite warriors from many different sultanates to fight holy wars against the VOC. Memories of the exploits of these sheikhs were preserved in the form of hagiographies known as *riwayat*. In this model, the religious domain was distinct from but complementary with the political domain, and sheikhs were able to acquire social status by marrying into noble houses.

Soon after the conversion of the royal courts, young men from all over South Sulawesi began traveling to Mecca to acquire religious knowledge from a source that was absolutely autonomous from the local social and political hierarchy. The piety of the "neo-Sufi" *sheikhs* they encountered in the Holy Land laid particular stress on the universal norms laid out in the *sharia* law and in spiritual lineages that transcended all local traditions (Rizvi 1965, 1975, 1978,

1983). Cosmopolitan *ulama* like the Hadrami-Gujarati scholar Nur al-Din al-Raniri (d.1658) traveled in the opposite direction and undertook the great task of translating the scriptures into regional languages like Malay (al-Attas 1986). Others undertook the next step of translating these texts into local languages like Makassar and Bugis. These translations eventually providing at least a few literate inhabitants of most villages in South Sulawesi with access to cosmopolitan religious knowledge that was not controlled by the royal courts (Cense 1950).

In the 1640s, the king of Bone, La Madarammeng, challenged the hegemony Gowa by appropriating the cosmopolitan doctrines of the *ulama* and *sheikhs* of the Arabian Sea and attempting to enforce them in his kingdom. He prohibited the enslavement of those not born into slavery, outlawed the priests of the pre-Islamic royal cult, and destroyed non-Islamic shrines (Andaya 1981: 39; Pelras 1996: 142; Mattulada 1976:55). La Ma'darammeng was defeated by the armies of Gowa in the short run, but the sharia-minded model of Islam he advocated triumphed when his heir, Arung Palakka, formed an alliance with the VOC to make Bone the hegemonic power in South Sulawesi (Andaya 1981).

This model of Islam was propagated at the village level by *kali* (Arabic *qadi*), those with expertise in both the external practices of Islam, *sharia* law, and in the internal practices of mysticism, *tarekat*. Lineages of *kali* whose authority rested on documented chains of master-pupil transmission stretching back to the original authors of sacred texts and the founders of Sufi brotherhoods across the Indian Ocean to the holy land of Mecca and Medina asserted religious authority all over the peninsula. Religious authority was thus dissociated from political authority, and a complementary opposition developed between the local ruler, *karaeng*, and his council of political advisors, the *hadat*, on the one hand, and the *kali* and his council of religious experts, the *sarat*, on the other

At the village level, certain parts of the rituals surrounding birth, marriage and death continued to be performed primarily by female *sanro*, experts in local domestic and cosmological rituals; while other parts were taken over by the male *kali*, experts in cosmopolitan religious rituals. These rituals also served as the chief occasions on which taxes and fees were paid both to the *karaeng* and *hadat*, and to the *kali* and *sarat*. The payment of tribute to both political rulers and religious authorities was embedded in and naturalized by the performance of the life cycle rituals that were central to the reproduction of domestic groups.

The most elaborate portrayal of the purely religious power and authority of an Islamic master is contained in a narrative account of the life of Sheikh Yusuf al-Maqasari, the *Riwaya' Sehe Yusupu* (1626-1699; Nurdin Daeng Magassing [1933] 1981). According to this account, Yusuf was fathered by a mysterious stranger who impregnated a village woman before she was taken as a secondary wife by the Sultan of Gowa. According to some, this stranger was in fact the immortal Prophet Khidr. Yusuf was born on the same day as Daeng Nisanga, who was the daughter of the Sultan by the highest ranking of his wives, making them twins of a sort. In the pre-Islamic mythology of Southeast Asia, opposite sex twins symbolize primordial cosmic totality and are irresistibly drawn to one another after birth. Yusuf was thus impelled to ask the Sultan (his step father) for Daeng Nisanga's hand in marriage. His request was contemptuously rejected because the low social rank of his mother made him unworthy of marriage to a princess.

We know from independent sources that Yusuf departed from Makassar in 1645 to perform the *hajj,* stopping in Java and Gujarat on the way. He spent over twenty years in the Holy Land, where he became a great scholar and mystic (Heer 1979:13-15). Yusuf finally returned to the East Indies in about 1670 and became the religious advisor to the Sultan of Banten in west Java. When Banten was attacked by the Dutch East India Company in 1682,

Yusuf fled with the Sultan into the countryside and fought with him against the VOC for almost a year. Yusuf was captured in 1683 and exiled to the VOC colony in Sri Lanka. He spent his time there composing numerous works on mysticism (Azra 2004; Voorhoeve 1980). As his fame grew, the royal family of Gowa began to petition the Dutch for his return, but they considered him so dangerous that in 1693 they sent him further away to their colony in Cape Town, South Africa, where he died in 1699.

The royal family of Gowa petitioned to have his body repatriated so that it could be buried. The Dutch finally relented and in 1705 his body was returned. According to the popular narrative of his life, Yusuf then returned to life and finally married his "twin", Daeng Nisanga, impregnating her and founding a lineage of mystics in Gowa. Indeed, the narrative claims that he had been buried and resurrected three times before, in Java, Sri Lanka, and South Africa, accounting for the fact that there tombs in all four places which are visited by devotees asking for his intercession (Zwemmer 1925). Sheikh Yusuf and Daeng Nisanga were buried alongside each other at the edge of the royal cemetery of Gowa. Sultan Abd al-Jalil (r. 1677-1709) inaugurated the practice of making annual visits to the tomb of Sheikh Yusuf, symbolically marking the subordination of political to religious authority (Cense 1950). The incorporation of Yusuf's body into the royal cemetery marked the domestication of the cosmopolitan charismatic authority of the *sheikhs* by the regional traditional authority of the kings.

The branch of the Khalwatiyya mystical order founded by Shaikh Yusuf is still in existence and continues to be restricted to Makassar nobles of high rank (van Bruinessen 1995). Although their numbers are few, they exercise a disproportionate, if dwindling, social influence. To this day, newlyweds visit the tomb of Yusuf and Daeng Nisanga to acquire the blessings that flow from their bodies and so ensure the fertility of their union. In this way, every husband is

associated with the charismatic power of the *sheikh*, every wife is associated with the traditional power of the princess, and their union is associated with the blessings that flow through the tomb.

3. 1714-1776 The Individual Martyr as Folk Hero

While exercising its hegemony largely through unequal treaties imposed on ostensibly independent sultanates, the VOC also acquired many of its own territories in which it imposed direct rule through a bureaucracy of governors, residents, and senior merchants. In these areas, royal houses were reduced to the domestic function of heading the local social hierarchy. The only form of political resistance left to those who were humiliated by Company officials was to declare a personal *jihad* and court death by martyrdom in battle. Memories of these rebels against the Company were preserved in the form of heroic epics, which were often sung to entertain guests at weddings. The heroes of the epics, *sinrili'*, condensed within a single figure symbolic elements that derived from local domestic and cosmological structures as well as cosmopolitan political and religious ones. In these directly ruled areas, the domestic, cosmological, political and religious domains constituted separate and antagonistic hierarchies.

The most famous of the heroic epics commemorating an act of individual martyrdom was the *Sinrili' Datu Museng* (Matthes 1860: 529-563; Gibson 2007: 102-105).[1] It tells the story of a poor man who was raised by a mysterious stranger. As a child, he exhibited the miraculous ability to memorize the Koran in three days and was invited by the Sultan of Sumbawa to tutor his daughter, Maipa Deapati. The couple fell in love, but the sultan rejected Datu Museng's proposal. Vowing to return and claim Maipa when he had mastered esoteric knowledge, Datu

[1] This epic was made into an Indonesian motion picture under the title "Maipa Deapati and Datu Museng", directed by Syahrir Arsyad Dini, and released in January 2018.

Museng sailed for the holy land, where he spent seven years in Mecca and seven years in Medina. Upon his return, he eloped with Maipa with the sultan's armies in hot pursuit. Using the invulnerability magic he had acquired on his travels, he easily defeated the army and the sultan pretended to accept the marriage. Secretly however, the Sultan forged a letter ostensibly from the Dutch governor of Makassar inviting Datu Museng to VOC headquarters. The couple agreed to go despite a foreboding that the trip would not end well. During the crossing of the ocean, they vowed to one another that they would seek a perfect mystical union with one another beyond the grave. Upon their arrival, the Dutch governor was smitten with Maipa's beauty and demanded that Datu Museng immediately surrender his wife and his weapons. Datu Museng prepared for battle and single handedly killed scores of VOC soldiers. In the end, the couple fulfilled their pact. Datu Museng cut Maipa's throat, threw away the amulets that made him invulnerable, and allowed a Muslim soldier employed by the VOC to kill him on strand by the edge of the sea. Although he was buried where he fell, and Maipa was buried on a hill, over the course of seven days, the tombs of Datu Museng and Maipa Deapati miraculously moved together. Today they are situated on what was once the boundary between the Dutch settlement of Fort Rotterdam and the kingdom of Gowa, and at the boundary between the land and the sea. It continues to serve as a source of divine blessings.

The story of the *Sinrili' Datu Museng* operates on many levels. It serves as a retelling of traditional Austronesian myths about the reunion of twins who are separated at birth; as an oral history of an instance of popular resistance to the depredations of the bureaucratic VOC; as an allegory of the mystical path to union with the Godhead; and as a charter for the complex institution of marriage. It portrays the world as divided into three mutually antagonistic spheres centered on different places: a local social hierarchy centered on a royal court that has lost its

political autonomy, a cosmopolitan religious hierarchy centered on a distant holy land, and a global political hierarchy centered on the VOC headquarters in Batavia. It links the locally generated motivation of young men to marry above their station to the religiously generated motivation of young men to acquire esoteric Islamic knowledge (*ilmu*) in Mecca, and the cosmopolitan knowledge so acquired to the ability to resist the military power of European colonialism.

The conviction that esoteric knowledge can overcome raw military force is rooted in a number of concrete ritual techniques. Preindustrial techniques of warfare rely on mastering the fear of death in hand-to-hand combat. The spiritual austerities taught by the Sufi orders induce otherworldly state of consciousnesses that renders the mystic relatively indifferent to life in this world. Training in the martial arts (*sila'*) induces a related state of heightened awareness that enables a fighter to parry blows with uncanny speed and accuracy. Finally, combat itself induces an altered state of consciousness. Those who fought in the Darul Islam rebellion in the 1950s unscathed, told me that their survival was due to their mastery of esoteric knowledge of the sort used by Sheikh Yusuf and Datu Museng, and that their example served as a source of inspiration in their struggle for social justice.

As in the case of Sheikh Yusuf and Daeng Nisanga, the joint tombs of Datu Museng and Maipa Deapati remain as concrete residues that were created when the cosmopolitan peregrinations of the men brought them home to reunite with their royal wives in death. Their charismatic transcendence of local social and political hierarchies in life enables their remains to serve as eternal channels for divine blessings outside of normal temporality. Unlike Sheikh Yusuf, Datu Museng was completely unmoored from the domestic, political and religious hierarchies of his time.

4. 1776-1824 The King as Equal Ally of the Company

With the onset of inter-imperialist wars between the Netherlands, Britain and France at the end of the eighteenth century, local kings in South Sulawesi were able to reassert their autonomy and to expand their power and influence over Company territories. In particular, the royal court of Bone became a center of Islamic learning and of reformed branches of the Sufi brotherhoods such as the Sammaniyya. A heroic epic called the *Sinrili' Tallumbatua*, the Epic of the Three Boats, portrays the struggle of a virtuous young noble, Andi' Patunru, to defeat his father, the arrogant Sultan of Gowa, and free his people from tyranny. This epic is a popular reinterpretation of a historic sequence of events in which a young Bugis noble from Bone known as Arung Palakka allied with the VOC to defeat Sultan Hasan al-Din of Gowa. It ends with the solemn signing of the Treaty of Bungaya which recognizes Gowa, Bone and the VOC as allies and equals. The epic became popular among the Bugis and Makassar masses in the areas that continued to be ruled by the Sultans of Gowa and Bone after the VOC had established its hegemony over maritime trade (Andaya 1979: 365-366; Siradjuddin Bantang 1982; Gibson 2007: 130-131).

The most powerful of local ruler in the late eighteenth century was Sultan Ahmad al-Salih of Bone (r. 1776-1812), who astutely took advantage of the chaos caused throughout the European colonies by the French revolution to expand his control over the vassals of the VOC and to assert his claim to the throne of Gowa itself. It is in light of this claim that the portrayal of Arung Palakka as the estranged son of Sultan of Gowa in the Epic of the Three Boats makes sense. In this epic, a soothsayer tells the Sultan of Gowa that there is a child in the womb of a woman in his kingdom who will one day bring about his downfall. Not realizing that the woman is his own chief wife, sister of the Sultan of Bone, the Sultan of Gowa orders that all other

pregnant women be killed. Andi' Patunru is born and grows up in the royal court until his is fifteen years of age, when his prowess at a sporting contest finally leads the king to identify his own son as his nemesis. Andi' Patunru flees and embarks on a long series of adventures in South Sulawesi before he reaches the boat-building villages of Ara and Bira. They build him three boats to take him and his entourage to Butun and then Java, where he offers his services to the VOC. Their combined forces return and defeat Gowa. The Sultan of Gowa admits the error of his ways and signs the Treaty of Bungaya, in which Gowa, Bone and the VOC recognize one another as equal siblings.

Ahmad al-Salih enhanced his religious authority by patronizing a circle of Islamic scholars who translated Islamic works from Arabic and Malay into Bugis, including many by Sheikh Yusuf, and by his initiation into the reformed version of the Khalwatiyya Sufi Order founded by Muhammad al-Samman (d. 1775; van Bruinessen 1991).

5. 1824-1870 The Mystical Brotherhood as Popular Movement

Following the victory of Britain over both the Netherlands and France, a modern colonial state was established in the Netherlands East Indies in 1824. Over the next fifty years, unprecedented amounts of profit were extracted from the colony under a system of forced cash crop production known as the Culture System. During this period, local rulers who reached an accommodation with the colonial government came to be seen as part of a system of illegitimate exploitation. Sufi mystical orders that were once centered on the royal court were taken over by populist sheikhs who recruited members from more popular social orders.

The power of Bone was broken by a series of wars conducted by the Government of the Netherlands East Indies in 1824, 1859, and 1905 (Gibson 2007: 125, 140, 143). As these wars gradually undermined the ability of the royal court to serve as a center for Islamic learning, the

sheikhs of the Sammaniyya turned the brotherhood into an institution for the transmission of religious knowledge that was independent of the state. The spread of popular mysticism was thus correlated with the growing power of the secular colonial state. It was only in light of this newly developed peaceful coexistence between a privatized sphere of religion and a secularized state that the seventeenth century alliance between Arung Palakka and the VOC could be reinterpreted as legitimate. Arung Palakka could then be portrayed in the *Sinrili' Tallumbatua* as a pious wanderer not unlike Shaikh Yusuf, and he too could be buried near the royal cemetery of Gowa alongside his royal Gowanese wife, Daeng Talele.

During the nineteenth century, the continuing vitality of Islamic institutions in South Sulawesi rested on the "customary payments" that were made gave to local *kalis* and *imams* in return for their services during calendrical and life cycle rituals. A central part of the services they provided was the recitation of the *Maulid al-Nabi* written by Jaffar al-Barzanji (d. 1764). This work encouraged every individual to measure his or her life against that of the prophet, and to contemplate their ultimate fate on Judgment Day. Because of the way they were linked to emotionally charged experiences like birth, marriage, death, and collective chanting sessions, the explicit religious doctrines they contained acquired a deeper inner resonance. Local social hierarchies and regional political authorities played no role in these religious scriptures. As long as the local religious leaders were left alone, they tended to adopt a quietist attitude toward social and political issues.

6. 1870-1931 The Pilgrim as Pan-Islamic Reformer

In the 1870s, liberal economic policies replaced in the Culture System in the East Indies. Beginning in the 1880s in South Sulawesi, profits from copra production and cheaper travel by steamship enabled growing numbers of pilgrims to perform the hajj. Many hajjis came into

contact in the Middle East with new ideas about what constituted orthodox Islam. Upon their return to the Indies, they attacked many existing social, political and religious practices as deviant and idolatrous. The colonial state often viewed these reformers as allies in its campaign to eliminate feudal rulers and liberalize the colonial economy (Heersink 1999).

The peaceful coexistence of separate social, political and religious hierarchies was destroyed in the late nineteenth century. The colonial state made a tactical political alliance with ambitious men of low social status to undermine the traditional authority of local political rulers. The state sought to implement a new form of rational-bureaucratic authority at the local level by appointing salaried agents who could implement policies that aimed at improving the roads, controlling epidemics and enforcing the law. The local leaders who put themselves forward as capable of doing so claimed a new form of charismatic authority that was at odds with the traditional cult of the royal ancestor cults. In the village of Ara, a man called Haji Gama accepted his role as a dependent agent of the colonial bureaucracy, but he also claimed an autonomous kind of charismatic authority that derived from his mastery of mystical techniques (*tapa*); from his administration of the *sharia*; from his patronage of the cult of the village *sheikh*; and from his performance of the *hajj* at the end of his life.

Haji Gama's fierce critique of the royal ancestor cults helped to solidify a breach between male and female forms of religious practice in Ara. His political and religious prestige grew so great during the 1920s and 1930s that his descendants were able to marry into the royal house of Tanaberu, and so to acquire a measure of traditional authority. Two of his grandsons went on to acquire a large measure of bureaucratic authority by obtaining advanced credentials in the state school system, followed by appointment to high office in the provincial government. The traditional and bureaucratic authority acquired by this branch of the family began to overshadow

the charismatic authority of Haji Gama (Gibson 2007: 143-160).

Haji Gama's nephew, Muhammad Idris, turned against the sort of collaboration with the Dutch colonial state practiced by his uncle. Beginning in 1952, he spent ten years fighting alongside the leader of the Darul Islam rebellion, Kahar Muzakkar, to establish the Republic of Indonesia as an Islamic state. But despite the hostility of this movement to all forms of veneration of Islamic sheikhs, Muhammad Idris insisted that his miraculous survival during a decade of guerilla warfare, was due to the *ilmu*, esoteric knowledge he had acquired from a book of incantations. This book that had been passed down within a local lineage founded by a student of Nur al-Din al-Raniri in the seventeenth century.

7. 1931-1965 The Muslim Modernist as Militant Nationalist

The introduction of formal schooling, print technology, and vernacular religious texts contributed to the development of a modernist form of Islam that was egalitarian, anti-mystical, and anti-colonial. Fearing the revolutionary implications of pan-Islamic ideas, the colonial state attempted to revive moribund feudal practices. Stimulated by the Japanese defeat of the Dutch colonial state and the war for national independence, the Darul Islam movement called for the new republic to be based on a strict interpretation of sharia law. It dominated parts of South Sulawesi from 1952 to 1965 when it was finally suppressed.

The complementarity of traditional social hierarchy, colonial bureaucracy and the cosmopolitan Islam of the late nineteenth century *hajjis* broke down in the 1920s as formal schooling began to create a cadre of Indonesians who were exposed to the global ideologies of nationalism, socialism and Islamic modernism. In the face of rising demands for democratic self-governance and the collapse of the market in tropical exports during the great depression, the colonial state began lose its claim to rational-bureaucratic authority. It was forced to resort to

increasing levels of political repression to maintain control over the Netherlands East Indies. It reversed its hostile attitude toward the rituals and beliefs that maintained the traditional authority of local royal houses. Government functionaries were instructed to collect, preserve, codify and implement authentic rituals to select and install hereditary rulers.

Islamic modernists continued to critique these traditional rituals, but they also expanded their critique to many Islamic practices they regarded as "innovations", meaning that they had no foundation in the core scriptures of Islam. Foremost among these were the practices of visiting the tombs of *sheikhs* like Yusuf, Datu Museng and Bakka' Tera' to obtain blessings; standing during the recitation of the Maulid of Barzanji to acknowledge the presence of the spirit of the Prophet; and the collective chanting of phrases in remembrance of Allah. These practices were all condemned of *shirk*, associating human creatures with God. During the 1930s, modernists called for the abolition of these rituals, and of the *pangadakang*, the customary payments villagers made to hereditary political and religious leaders at every major life cycle ritual. This call was strongly resisted by both traditional and colonial authorities, for it threatened to destabilize the complementary relationships between the social, religious and political hierarchies that had developed during the nineteenth century.

During the early 1940s, many educated Indonesians received further military training from the Japanese that introduced them to new models of nationalism and of bureaucratic statism. They refused to accept the return of any form of Dutch authority after the war was over. In South Sulawesi, many of the Islamic modernists who fought against the return of the secular colonial state in the late 1940s continued to fight against the imposition of a secular nation state in the 1950s. They believed that the *sharia* law could provide a unified set of principles to govern conduct in all three spheres of life, if only it were correctly interpreted and applied. This

meant that one had to abandon the principle of *taklid*, the unquestioning acceptance of traditional interpretations, and to apply individual reasoning anew to the core Islamic scriptures. In the view of the Islamic revolutionaries of this generation, there would be no need to maintain the distinction between the spheres of social hierarchy, religion and the state once one eliminated the feudal rituals that reproduced the social hierarchy, the polytheistic practices that had crept into traditional Islam, and the secular principles that the Dutch had introduced into the legal system (Harvey 1974).

Many educated youths like Muhammad Idris and his friend Abdul Hakim were committed to the creation of a unified social, political and religious order in their youth, but later came to accept the ineluctable pluralism and complexity of human experience and symbolic knowledge. They were especially sensitive to the differences between religious, scientific and aesthetic knowledge. They were able to read and reflect on Islamic scriptures and commentaries in the original Arabic and in Malay and Makassar translations. They were accomplished schoolteachers who were able to comprehend mathematical and scientific texts and teach them to their students. Finally, they had both mastered traditional Makassar art forms such as music, dance and painting (Gibson 2007: 175-180, 203-205).

Despite their opposition to traditional Sufi brotherhoods, most modernists did not abandon the pursuit of the esoteric knowledge that came from mystical experience. They did eliminate all public, collective forms of mystical practice. For them, mysticism became an interiorized private quest based on silent prayer, meditation and spiritual discipline. These practices often yielded mystical visions that allowed an individual to obtain *ilmu* from beings such as the spirits of *shaikhs*, *jinn*, *malaikat* (angels), or directly from God, without having to rely on imperfect human masters. During the 1980s, *ilmu* obtained in this way enabled a number

of highly educated and highly placed civil servants I knew to treat a range of physical and spiritual diseases.

8. 1965-1998 The President as Promoter of Official Religion

The New Order regime of President Suharto annihilated the Communist Party and required adherence to one of the six official religions. It also closely monitored Islamic organizations for any signs of radicalism and imposed an official form of Islam in the public schools that ended up creating a standardized form of Indonesian Islam. Suharto presented himself as the heir to royal, mystical, populist, nationalist, and military traditions, but as his regime lost legitimacy in the 1990s, he increasingly identified himself with the reactionary form of Islam promoted by the state of Saudi Arabia.

During the 1970s and 1980s, Suharto consolidated his personal control over the civil, police and military bureaucracies. He also tried to acquire a combination of traditional, charismatic and bureaucratic authority by combining elements from the Austronesian, Indic, Islamic and Dutch pasts to create a uniform national culture. At the end of the 1980s, villagers in South Sulawesi were still rather skeptical of Suharto's religious piety, which privileged traditional Javanese mysticism over cosmopolitan Islam. Villagers were very aware of the fact that the Cold War was in its final throes, and that the *mujahidin* of Afghanistan had played a key role in the demise of atheistic socialism (Gibson 2007: 192-203).

The Cold War was the first truly global war since it spread to every corner of Africa, Asia and Latin America. Its end was marked by the demise of Marxism as a global ideology of resistance to Euro-American capitalism, and by the emergence of a globalized Islamist ideology that preached resistance to neo-colonialism. The foundations of this movement were laid during the 1970s and 1980s as rising oil revenues enabled the Saudi regime to subsidize the teaching of

Wahhabi doctrines in mosques and *madrassas* around the world. Saudi prestige had grown so great by the 1990s that Suharto himself sought the blessings of King Fahd and formed an alliance with Islamist generals sympathetic to Wahhabi teachings.

In 2000, my friends in Ara seemed persuaded of the sincerity of Suharto's "Islamic turn". They had supported his chosen successor, Habibie, in the national elections of 1999. They were unperturbed, however, when the party Suharto had created, Golkar, faded into oblivion in the 2000s and happily switched their support to General Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, in part because his running mate, Jusuf Kalla, was a favorite son from South Sulawesi and had a solid reputation as an Islamic modernist.

9. 1998-2019: From democratic reformation to sharia law

The restoration of electoral democracy in 1998 and the decentralization of political power in 2000 enabled an ever more vigorous debate about the relationship between social justice and *sharia* law. The provinces of Aceh and South Sulawesi were the strongest advocates of codifying and enforcing sharia law, and within the latter province the regency of Bulukumba, in which Ara is located, led the way. Between 1995-2005, the Bupati of Bulukumba made it mandatory for schoolgirls to wear headscarves, for students and local bureaucrats to learn the Koran, for all Muslims to pay alms, *zakat*, *infaq*, and *sadaqah* (Buehler 2008).

After the fall of Suharto in 1998, renewed enthusiasm for the implementation of *sharia* law spread through South Sulawesi, and received its strongest expression in the regency to which Ara belongs, Bulukumba. The Bupati of Bulukumba from 1995 to 2005, Patabai Pabokori, made it mandatory for schoolgirls to wear headscarves, for students and local bureaucrats to learn the Koran, for all Muslims to pay alms (*zakat*, *infaq*, and *sadaqah*). Patabai used part of the proceeds to fund lascar Jundullah, a paramilitary organization devoted to sharia enforcement

(Buehler 2008, 2016: 155). Former Darul Islam militants in Ara strongly supported these measures. Although Patabai Pabokori was a Bugis originally from Bone, they supported him over the local Makassar candidate in the 2000 elections.

In a survey of 1,000 members of the general Muslim public in eight provinces across Indonesia conducted in 2004, Robert Hefner and his colleagues found that over 70% of their respondents believed that the governance of the nation should be based on the Koran and Sunna, and that the state should enforce the obligation to implement *sharia* for all Muslims. But they also found that over 70% of their Indonesian respondents also believed that democracy was the best form of government for their nation and an even higher proportion believed in such liberal values as equality before the law, freedom of association, freedom of the press, and contested elections. What is more, political parties who make the actual implementation of *sharia* a priority have fared quite poorly in recent elections (Hefner 2009).

These two views can be reconciled once one realizes that acknowledges the fact that for most contemporary Muslims, there is no contradiction between human and divine law. Western secular attitudes developed at a time when the main threat to democracy came from absolute monarchs who claimed to rule by divine right and the blessing of the Pope of the Roman Catholic Church, so that in the West democracy appears to be the exact opposite of theocracy. But Islam has only ever recognized the consensus of the community of the faithful as the ultimate authority in matters of religion; it has not had any equivalent of the Roman Catholic hierarchy. And over the past few centuries, the main threat to self-determination for many of the world's peoples has come not from their own political rulers but from foreign colonial rulers who denied the validity of their religious beliefs. It should therefore come as no surprise that for many Muslims democratic self-determination should be seen as fully compatible with divine

law. It should be noted, however, that the process of achieving consensus within the community of the faithful over just how to interpret and implement the *sharia* is complex and protracted, and never more so than in a rapidly changing world. It is for this reason that political parties that claim to have already determined how the sharia should be applied in the immediate future have done quite poorly not just in Indonesia but throughout the Islamic world (Kurzman and Naqvi 2010).

Conclusion

The symbolic schemes that govern the religious domain in Islam are acquired both through the study of texts such as the Koran and the Hadith, and through constant ritual practice, which is best understood as a kind of apprenticeship whereby abstract knowledge is embodied and made concrete. Five public ritual acts are enjoined on all believers by the Koran: the confession of the faith, the five daily prayers, the annual observance of the month of fasting, the payment of alms, and the pilgrimage to Mecca. The *hadith* that recount the sayings and practices of the Prophet provide a guide for how to conduct innumerable details of daily life including hygiene, diet and etiquette. For those who are able to perform the rites of the *hajj*, the entire Koranic text comes alive in a new way, since the worshippers is able to tread the same ground and see the same sites as the prophet. The Koran is filled with eschatological passages reminding sinners of the torments of the grave and of the pleasures and torments that will be meted out on Judgment Day. When read out during funeral rituals, these passages are meant to evoke a visceral fear of dying in a state of sin, and to encourage people to continually step back from the passions of daily life and look to the implications of their actions for their place in the afterlife.

Religious piety encourages the development of a sacred self that is not always easy to reconcile with the parts of the self that develop through interactions with one's immediate

relatives, with the nonhuman beings who share one's immediate world, or with those that exercise legitimate power. Adhering to a world religion creates numerous occasions where conflicts arise with one's competing moral commitments in other domains (Kierkegaard [1843] 1968). The pursuit of social justice in any complex society requires the deliberate cultivation of an ethical self with the capacity to deliberate on how to balance one's obligations in the different domains of experience. While the truths of religion may be eternal, the way they are lived and the demands that they make on social actors who seek justice are subject to all the mutability and uncertainty caused by the fact that must be implemented in a world where domestic, cosmological and political relationships are in constant flux.

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