CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION: GEOGRAPHIES OF KNOWLEDGE AND ARCHIPELAGIC BELONGING

Intertidal History begins and ends in the 1950s. Yet what it shows about littoral society and the maritime world of the 1950s takes on particular salience in light of new information the book presents concerning the role of Southeast Asian maritime people during the seventeenth-century spice wars. At that time, important polities such as Makassar made alliances with Southeast Asia's so-called sea people, who played a pivotal role in efforts to oppose European domination of the spice trade. Often considered stateless pirates and nomads, sea people were in fact part of a vibrant socially complex world in which polities of maritime-oriented Southeast Asians maintained alliances with regional states, and at times sea people held prominent rank in them. Their knowledge, skills, and networks benefitted their allies, who were tied to them through webs of kinship and shared interests that crossed both waters and ethnicity. Drawing on underutilized Southeast Asian and European sources, *Intertidal History* illustrates a new view of the region's maritime past, one that contributes to the revision of a world history narrative in which the spice wars are portrayed as a conflict between competing European mercantile empires. Yet the book does more than help reframe that Eurocentric narrative. It shows how social and political connections along and between the region's coasts changed over time, by revealing maritime-oriented people's participation in the dynamics of trade, war, and kinship. Demonstrating that littoral society was not just based in cities, this work alters our understanding of the littoral and its place in the region's past, helping to conceptually integrate the archipelago within wider frameworks of Asian maritime history along with the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea.

Chapter two looks at the northern east-west route across the archipelago, and at Makassar's hinterseas, delving into the historical background of seventeenth century maritime networks. While subsequent chapters consider the significance of enduring dynamics in the archipelagic world, in this book I primarily approach maritime history via the strands of the networks that people made. The point is not just to see the networks' connected elements, but also to understand what those connections were made of and how they worked. Intersecting maritime networks formed nodes, and tugging gently at them shows how networks fit together in archipelagic space, which was not two-dimensional. At once ecologically and historically made, it was also a social and political space. What can be discovered about this archipelagic past depends on the use of some mixed methodology, and, as with all history, on the point of view of the sources used and how the historian handles them. The key here is not to go to sea from the land, for if one does that one will always return to it. Instead one must launch, as people did, from the littoral itself.



Indonesian archipelago; map by Bill Nelson

CAPTURE, CONNECTION, AND FOLLOWINGS

When Lawi was taken in 1954 from her coastal village in the Straits of Tiworo, Indonesia was barely a nation. Although Lawi, too, was quite young, she had her eye on a man named Umar. She had been promised to him, and while no formal gift exchange—no deal-sealing—had yet taken place between their families, her relatives had already begun to gather the quantities of rice that would be needed for a wedding. Then the rebels came for her.[1] Lawi was Sama, an ethnic group often referred to as "sea people," usually called "Bajo" by others. She was "captured" (taken against her will) in order to be married to a regiment commander in the Darul Islam rebellion, which was then spreading throughout most of south and southeast Sulawesi.

Darul Islam, or "DI-TII," the common acronym that includes its armed wing, the Indonesian Islamic Army (Tentara Islam Indonesia), was just one of many groups that struggled over the new nation's future during the early post-independence period. The Bugis dominated the Sulawesi branch of DI-TII, which had two other main branches and smaller offshoots elsewhere in the country. Jufri Tambora, the regiment commander to whom Lawi was wed, was ethnically Bugis. Lawi's capture and marriage to Jufri came as an unwelcome development in the predominantly Sama Tiworo Straits. After she was taken, two rebel men dared to visit her village once again, apparently to persuade relatives to join her at their base in the hills. They compounded the offense of her capture by attempting to extort money from her father, who had been away at the time she was taken, on a trading trip to Lombok with his youngest son, Buraéra. When the two rebels returned, recognition of them by Lawi's relatives led to retaliation against them.

While Lawi's kin were angered and distressed about her capture, it also put them in the difficult position of having to suppress knowledge of her whereabouts. When her captors permitted her a visit to her natal village, people even felt compelled to turn her away because they could not afford to have it appear, in the eyes of the TNI (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, Indonesian National Army), that they were siding with the rebels. Convincing the TNI of their allegiance to the nation was a matter of collective survival for Lawi's neighbors and relatives, and among wider networks of Sama kin. The ramifications of her capture, therefore, played out both at the level of intergroup relations and in the wider struggle of post-colonial politics. At the same time, intergroup relations and their part in the broader maelstrom of the early post-colonial period unfolded between littorals. That is, they took place between land and sea, directly involving the maritime-oriented Sama people of Tiworo and the surrounding region.

Lawi's spouse, Jufri, knew a great deal about how maritime trade worked. During the Second World War, before he became a Regiment Commander, he had been an informant for the occupying Japanese, filling them in on who was spying for the Dutch, the previous colonial overlords. The trust he gained as an informant earned him a position as harbormaster (*syahbandar*) for Binsen Ongkōkai, the

[1] Author's interview with Habiba, June 27, 2011, Raha, Southeast Sulawesi. Lawi was also called "Haji Lawi," using the local, nongender specific title for one who has done the *haj* (rather than "*hajjah*"). Habiba is Lawi's sister-in-law. She mentioned the rice gathering and that the gift exchange had not yet taken place. Lawi mentioned the prospective groom, Umar, in Sama, also called Ummareng (the /e/ is an unstressed schwa), Haji Subaeda's son. Lawi said in 2011 that the rebels had shot him. Author's interviews with Haji Lawi, May 4, 2000, and June 22, 2011, Wawo, North Kolaka.

Japanese Tramp Shipping Transport Company, in the town of Kolaka, on the Gulf of Boné's east coast. He managed the paperwork for "tramp" freighters, cargo boats that had no fixed schedule. The paperwork included permits to sail, as well as bills of lading. Common in the world of shipping even today, bills of lading serve both as a receipt for goods delivered to carriers and as a description of the goods, as well as evidence of title to them. They show that a shipper is not carrying contraband. Jufri's position as the enforcer of rules about shipping papers taught him many things. He not only learned who carried what cargo under which terms, but also came to understand that notions of legitimate trade were flexible under wartime interpretations of legality. One thing Jufri's experience drove home was the importance of having the right papers, which seemed to confer legitimacy not only to shippers, but also to the governing body that recognized their documents. Later, during the Darul Islam years, this lesson came into play when his sister, Sitti Hami, ran a smuggling ring for DI-TII, issuing papers under its authority, even as smugglers also carried counterfeit passes in case they were stopped by the other side in the conflict. Jufri, in his administrative role over mariners at Kolaka's harbor during the Japanese occupation, kept an eye out for paperwork that came up short. If and when it did, the potential for lucrative gain, or for brokering knowledge about smuggling opportunities, would have been obvious to him. In effect, the job as harbormaster under the Japanese gave him a deep understanding of how smuggling worked in practice. All he lacked were the nautical skills, the distant clandestine connections, and the *savoir faire* to pull it off. For these he would need real mariners with experience.[2]

He obtained the allegiance of his most trusted smuggler during the Darul Islam rebellion through his marital connection with the Sama. While most of Lawi's relatives kept quiet about her link with the rebels, her brother, Buraéra, who had been captured by the rebels on a separate occasion, eventually managed to take advantage of his new kin connection as the regiment commander's brother-in-law. In a bid to extricate himself from a combat position under Jufri's nephew, Buraéra offered his services as a smuggler for the rebellion. A Sama man with a special set of nautical skills, he drew on the experience and knowledge he had gained as a young mariner on trading ventures across the archipelago with his father. Jufri derived benefits from Buraéra's skills, knowledge, and networks. Buraéra, in turn, eventually became the regiment commander's trusted adjutant.[3]

While discussing the clandestine maritime trade of the 1950s with me, Jufri, then in his dotage, raised the topic of his personal relation to Sama people, namely, his marriage to Lawi. He said he had married a Sama woman from the *raja* class, in other words, a woman from a high status lineage, and he noted that it had caused some fear. That he drew a link between clandestine trade or smuggling on the one hand, and his marriage to Lawi on the other, indicated that in his mind the two were related. His comment about fear in the same breath made me think that the manner

[2] Author's interviews with Jufri, March 5 and 6, 2000, Lambai, North Kolaka. He said it was the "Binsen Ongkōkai," which would be "Tramp Steamer Transportation Company." (*Binsen* would be 便船 = "available steamer," i.e., "tramp steamer," freighters without set schedules.) Wartime Japanese firms operating in southern Borneo included the Kasen (river) Ongkōkai (transport company). See: Ooi Keat Gin, *The Japanese Occupation of Borneo*, 1941–1945 (London and New York: Routledge 2011), 77.

[3] Author's interviews with Haji Buraéra March 5 and 6, 2000, Rantéangin and Wawo, North Kolaka; and Sitti Hami, March 6, 2000, Wawo, North Kolaka.

in which their kinship connection was brought about also mattered. Fear of him and for Lawi, he implied, helped motivate the compliance of her Sama kin, even though there had been some retaliation. It was via kinship and fear that Jufri endeavored to create, and to some degree succeeded in creating, a path to gain followers with specialized nautical skills, from whose networks he could benefit. Without this kin connection, Jufri may have wound up commandeering their boats anyway, as he did on occasion, simply for a show of strength. However, had it not been for Jufri's union with Lawi, it is unlikely that her brother Buraéra would have become a smuggler for the rebellion. Their marriage provided Buraéra a way to improve his circumstances, and concern for his sister's well-being kept him from absconding. Jufri cemented Buraéra's loyalty with the position of adjutant, and, to hear Buraéra tell it, with fear as well.[4]

These events during the 1950s provide rich material for exploring the politics that took shape around the need for seafaring skills, nautical manpower, and specialized social knowledge in the maritime world. When set alongside this book's examination of the seventeenth-century archipelago, the 1950s material suggests the durability of a politics in which forging social connections with maritime people conferred nautical advantages. In this archipelagic environment, cultivating such connections opened up, or reinforced, access to the intangible yet invaluable assets of maritime people's skills and networks. Since maritime people usually inhabited the littoral, often in places distant from land-based powers and in ecological zones that made it hard for others to reach them, they were able to maintain a measure of maneuverability independent of established polities on land. If powers based primarily on land wished to benefit from maritime skills and networks, it behooved them to form compelling links with maritime people.

For Lawi and Buraéra, whose stories I return to in chapter five, capture, kinship, fear, and conferral of rank were political tools that made and maintained their connections with Bugis leaders during the Darul Islam rebellion. Yet these methods of gaining nautical advantage were not a new part of intergroup dynamics in the archipelagic world. During the seventeenth century, as this work shows, the bestowal of rank, both by the Gowa court at Makassar, and subsequently by the Bugis realm of Boné, also cemented the loyalty of maritime-oriented people who possessed both nautical and martial skills. Rank was conferred on people viewed as having, or having the potential, to garner followings. Likewise, during the seventeenth century, capture had an impact on followings that was not simply about the acquisition of dependent labor. For instance, the capture of women led to new, subordinate kin connections, yet it also sundered existing ties of foes, thereby weakening the longstanding friendships and relations they maintained with maritime allies and their networks.

Tiworo's ties with Makassar endured just this sort of blow. Closely allied with Makassar, the most powerful port polity in the central and eastern archipelago, Tiworo's people suffered the capture of three hundred women and children, which sealed its military defeat in 1655. Although this large scale capture did not prevent Tiworo's rejuvenation over the next decade, the redistribution of Tiworo's women and children to Makassar's enemies not only wrested them from where they lived, but also removed them from Makassar's political orbit and made them, however

[4] Jufri interview, March 6, 2000; and Haji Buraéra interviews.

reluctantly, into "followers" of its foes. Such capture and redistribution of victims among foes was a tool of politics and a means of domination.

Whether used to forge or to rupture connections, the capture of women, in particular, was never simply neutral. Its salience is evident in how Sama capture narratives got taken up and adapted to new contexts, in literary-historical texts from southern Sulawesi (Celebes) that euphemized capture and effectively erased it. To understand the cultural history of this process requires a look at how particular kinds of writing, especially those focused on particular lineages, such as genealogical narratives, related to the social contexts of their production and transmission. Decisions about how to represent elite kin connections, and why it mattered to show, or to obfuscate, the ways they came about, were inseparable both from genre expectations, and, more broadly, from the relation of writing to societal structures. Chapters four and five, respectively, address these qualitative dimensions of capture, representation, and intergroup connection through the analysis of locally produced manuscripts and the examination of events at the local scale. Yet, maritime people's networks and links with others have also made their impact felt on a global stage.

Intertidal History shows that networks of maritime people played a vital role, until now virtually invisible, in opposing European efforts to control the seventeenth-century spice trade. By giving concrete shape to the much talked about, but less well understood, place of the sea and those who lived by its tides in the past, my research alters what once seemed a familiar story in world history. Scholarship on the region had already shown that it was only possible to sustain a neat narrative about mercantile competition and conflict among European powers by disregarding their need to ally themselves with Southeast Asians in order to achieve their ends. *Intertidal History* shows how Southeast Asian powers, which had their own aims and agendas, themselves relied on alliances and partnerships with regional maritime people. It thereby opens a window on the dynamics of politics, trade, littoral society, and military cooperation in the maritime world of island Southeast Asia.

In revealing how maritime-oriented people contributed to wider historical dynamics, the book furthermore enters ongoing conversations about maritime history. *Intertidal History* takes maritime history's focus on the sea and turns it toward the dynamics of densely archipelagic regions, with their interlinked seas, clusters and chains of islands, bustling ports, and havens off the beaten track. While the word "intertidal" refers to the littoral, its use in these pages also signals what connects sites along a shore, as well as points between disparate coasts. *Intertidal History* intervenes in maritime history debates in three ways. First, with respect to littoral societies, it offers a view in which their locus did not radiate from urban centers, but instead encompassed complex webs that also contained vital nonurban hubs of maritime activity. Second, the book helps to bring the archipelagic region within wider frameworks of Asian maritime history, by shifting the focus from a largely ocean-crossings approach that basically became tri-coastal: East Africa, the South Asian coast, and a bit of Southeast Asia, and also by peering south and east beyond the porous edge of the South China Sea, to a realm not just of goods but of accomplished mariners, as well. Finally, with its emphasis on the relation between archipelagic geography and the social forms of politics, my findings offer analytical

approaches to oceanic history analogous to those that "Zomia" has opened for mainland Southeast Asia.[5]

While the region's maritime people have often been depicted as "stateless," comparison of the intertidal concept with Zomia is not meant to suggest that my book argues that maritime people were defined by techniques and geographies merely of avoiding the state.[6] Nor does it go the opposite direction, overextending its reach by beefing up claims about "states" constituted by maritime people's networks where, indeed, more modest and diffuse political configurations existed. Instead, much as Zomia represents an upland space of interaction not delineated by state-formation, the "intertidal" focuses attention on spaces of littoral and maritime interaction.

Intertidal History argues that while maritime-oriented people used distance and connection strategically, the value of both their nautical skills and their networks made land-based polities seek them out as partners, clients, and dependents. Their connections with others in this archipelagic geography show that maritime people operated interstitially between states, sometimes on their behalf, and at times as part of the inner circle at their highest echelons. What connected maritime people with others, as well as how these connections were broken and new ties established, constituted tools of politics through which people exercised power in archipelagic interactions.

A focus on the networks and connections of maritime-oriented Southeast Asians represents but one way to come at the long unfolding historiographic shift away from European expansionist approaches in the writing of maritime history. This shift, which accompanied the rise in transnational perspectives and world history, initially led, in maritime history, to studies of separate ocean basins. The attention to ocean basins seemed to leave the archipelago in an awkward place, as though, unlike them, it had no obvious political or natural boundaries with which scholars could work.[7] Elucidating how the archipelago and those in its littorals were part of interlinked maritime worlds not only integrates its history with that of other parts of Asia and the globe, but also provides a small corrective to the predominant focus on outsiders and sojourners in Southeast Asia's maritime history. *Intertidal History*'s approach to the region navigates its past through a focus on the maritime networks of Southeast Asians. This breaks with the the false dichotomy of inward- and outward-looking analysis, showing how archipelagic dynamics interfaced with the cross-currents of history at different scales.

The focus on archipelagic networks also helps to expose how kinship politics supported the political and military roles played by maritime-oriented people, particularly the Sama, the most numerous and widespread of Southeast Asia's so-called sea people. Marriage politics among elite lineages have long-standing precedents across the region and even interregionally. That they served a diplomatic function is nothing new. However, such practices were also important to mobilizing

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[5] See: Willem van Schendel, "Geographies of Knowing, Geographies of Ignorance: Jumping Scale in Southeast Asia," *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 20 (2002): 647–68; and James Scott, *The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009).

[6] On such depiction as "stateless," see, for example, Anthony Reid, *Charting the Shape of Early Modern Southeast Asia* (Singapore: ISEAS, 2000), 4.

[7] Jennifer L. Gaynor, "Ages of sail, ocean basins, and Southeast Asia," *Journal of World History* 24, 2 (2013): 309-333.

maritime power in archipelagic history. Networks of kin related by marriage supported interethnic alliances, such as those the Sama had with Gowa in Makassar and later with the Bugis realm of Boné. Such intergroup kin connections undergirded the ties land-based elites had with maritime leaders capable of mobilizing nautically skilled followings.

Capture was also part of kinship politics, whether it led to new alliances, ruptured old ones, or forestalled future ties. Unions resulting from capture and those resulting from negotiated marriages registered their significance in relation to each other, as part of practices that produced and reproduced social hierarchy in these interlinked stratified societies. The sense that capture made, in other words, relied in part on how it differed from other ways to make kinship and alliances. Marriage, which united not just two individuals, but rather different kin groups brought public recognition—through negotiation, gift exchange, and celebration—to claims about status and the parity of different lineages. Capture, in sharp contrast, breached the respect and expectations manifest in such marital procedures.

Shared practices of cultural production, particularly oral and written knowledge about the past, conferred a status-corroborating authority that intertwined with the kinship and status system pervading much of south and southeast Sulawesi, as well as its offshore regions. Surviving written materials from Sulawesi convey social distinctions, points of view, spheres of meaning, and, indeed, facts, many of which visiting European observers found insignificant or simply missed. Hence, these Southeast Asian sources, both published and in manuscript, help to explain and illustrate the social and political character of intertidal connections.

Perhaps one of the greatest surprises the Southeast Asian sources yield is that the Sama were not, as is generally thought, peripheral to regional states. Makassar's court diaries and chronicles demonstrate that during the seventeenth century, prominent Sama men and women were included in the writings of Makassar's royal inner circle. Sama people held office as harbormaster or chief-of-port (*sabannaraq*, cf. Malay *syahbandar*), a high-ranking position in Makassar's political structure, and Sama people also led naval endeavors. Rare Bugis-language manuscripts similarly describe multiple and complex links through politics and kinship among regional Sama people and the rulers of the Bugis realm of Boné.

The two known examples of these Bugis-language manuscripts about the Sama past adapt, in their opening sections, a widespread story from Sama oral traditions. Compared with the documentary register of the rest of their contents, this initial section employs a narrative structure and it has a legend-like feel that makes it reminiscent of Homeric references in the start of some works on Greek history. In its varied oral versions, the story typically tells of a high status Sama woman, the daughter of a Sama leader, who gets relocated among ethnic others as the result of capture. However, in the Bugis manuscripts' adaptations of this Sama story, the narrative portrays her relocation as an accident. There is no mistaking that this is a literary device, since a well-known event from Bugis myth sets her accidental relocation in motion. The narrative also sets the tone for what follows in the rest of the texts, much of which is not in a particularly narrative form, providing an interpretive context that lays down certain points as presumptions for the audience's understanding of information in subsequent sections.

Who, exactly, this female Sama figure in the narratives purportedly represents remains hazy in one of these manuscripts, and is hard to pin down historically, due to the use of pseudonyms and the lack of clearly datable events. Yet, the other

version ascribes her a specific place in a genealogy and makes the claim that she was a forebear of the famous Bugis leader Arung Palakka. During the late 1660s, Arung Palakka helped the VOC (Vereenigde Geoctroyeerde Oost-Indische Compagnie, United Dutch East India Company) defeat Makassar, and on his way to doing so, incorporated people from the maritime hub of Tiworo into the leadership under him. It is certainly possible, perhaps even likely, that the ascription of such a relationship between the story's female Sama protagonist and Arung Palakka is apocryphal. Yet, whether or not the kin connection is true, the story's use of a narrative device to depict as accidental what appears as capture in numerous similar Sama tales, cries out for analytical attention. What made this genre-crossing, interethnic adaptation possible historically, and what explains the need to euphemize "capture"?

Attention to these questions deepens our comprehension of capture in the region. This is important because the role of capture has pertinence for our understanding of slavery, dependency, and followings in Southeast Asian history. Most attention to capture in this period has focused on captives' sale and use as dependent labor, primarily in urban centers like Batavia (present-day Jakarta). Considerably less is known about other forms of dependency, outside of cities and colonial cultures. Capture was not only a means to acquire dependent labor. It was also used to increase followings. Particularly when it involved elite women, capture provided a way either to make or to break intergroup connections, and, as such, formed a part of political conduct.

Intertidal History treats the capture of elite women as a phenomenon from that midtemporal scale, concerning persistence and change in social institutions, that Fernand Braudel described between the history of events and the effects of geography on the *longue durée*. While the latter exerts obvious influence on the concept of "intertidal history," the middle temporal scale breathes life into the study of capture. Hard to investigate, the capture of high status women, like smuggling, erases traces of itself in the historical record. *Intertidal History* turns to a recent, more accessible example as an opportunity to think comparatively and over the long term about the capture of elite women in Tiworo's past.

This brings into a single analytical field a number of seventeenth-century captures from Tiworo, and the capture of a single Sama woman from Tiworo in the 1950s. It sets the causes of silences about the latter alongside the reasons for capture's effacement from the Sama narrative in Bugis-language manuscripts. It takes this story in Bugis-language manuscript inherited through a Sama lineage and its exhortation to remember descent from a maternal Sama line, and juxtaposes it with how the childless Bugis sister-in-law of the Sama woman captured in the Darul Islam rebellion took and raised her daughter, enlisting others in the project of hiding her true maternal Sama parentage.

Historically, the capture of elite women was not unique to the Sama. However, as a practice that could make or break connections, capture acquired particular salience in the archipelagic world due to the importance of followings in this context. We know from the archaeological record that capture has an extremely long history in the region, since raiding was endemic to island Southeast Asia, predating both European and Chinese travel to and involvement in the region.[8] Raiding could

[8] Laura Lee Junker, *Raiding, Trading and Feasting: The Political Economy of Philippine Chiefdoms* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1999).

increase followings directly through capture, as well as potentially, through reproductive labor or by drawing in people through networks of new kin ties.

Historians of Southeast Asia generally concur on the importance of followings in regional dynamics, and have explained this at the theoretical level with reference to the relative abundance of land. The idea is that the relative abundance of land made labor relatively scarce, hence highly valued. This proposition has been used to explain the demand for manpower and the prevalence of debt bondage and other forms of voluntary and involuntary servile dependency in the region's early modern urban centers. As Anthony Reid has emphasized for the region's cities, manpower, not fixed capital, was the principal asset to be protected, and the fundamental aim of warfare in the region was to increase the availability of workers.[9]

However, in the intensely maritime-oriented zones of the region, among its littoral society, land was a relatively unimportant factor in the significance of followings. Consider that since at least the seventeenth century, maritime-oriented people in the region built houses on stilts in the intertidal zone, rather than on land, and sometimes lived on boats. Moreover, as outlined in the following chapter, like many other regional ethnic names that derive from references to the environments in which people lived, the ethnic name "Bajo," applied to regional sea people, can be traced to the "shallows." The populace in this littoral environment does not become tied to land as it would with settled agriculture. Thus, relations of debt and dependency were not primarily grounded in land ownership and rents, or their inheritance. Instead, the conduct of politics and economy in this context entailed expending considerable energy on the ability to muster people.

The need to muster followings was not unique to coastal states of the region. However, the relative insignificance of land throws into stark relief how the creation and disruption of connections made it possible to forge or fracture followings. As Kenneth Hall explains, the key to a center's authority over manpower was the ability to form personal alliances with locally based elites. Rulers fragmented potential enemies by reaching agreements with leaders of local population centers, turning them from potential opponents into subordinate allies. In return for their patronage of the state's monarch they enjoyed enhanced status in the eyes of their own followers. Allied populations received protection of the state's armies, as well as the symbolic benefits of a state's ritual cults, and they shared in successful states' prosperity.[10]

Within maritime-oriented spheres, primarily land-based polities like Makassar needed followings with nautical skills and networks to gain commercial, political, and military advantage. They secured these followings through various means, such as by gaining people's loyalty and obligation through the conferral of rank, forming kinship ties, amassing dependents, and fostering markets. While capture provided a route to gather subordinates and create dependent kin, at times it also severed the ties of foes and their allies, fragmenting them. Whatever means were used to achieve followings, connections with maritime people were desirable for the skills and knowledge they provided, along with the people-mobilizing potential of their maritime networks.

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[9] Anthony Reid, "The Structure of Cities in Southeast Asia, Fifteenth to Seventeenth Centuries," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 11, 2 (1980): 243.

[10] Kenneth R. Hall, *A History of Early Southeast Asia: Maritime Trade and Societal Development, 100–1500* (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2011), 14.

TIWORO

This is the first study to look at Tiworo's place in history. However, this is not simply a work about Tiworo. Drawing on rarely accessed archives of the VOC, this book shows how maritime people were involved in events of the latter half of the seventeenth century. It taps cartographic materials and the writings of various European observers—Dutch, English, Portuguese, and Spanish—to sketch aspects of the archipelagic world's historical background during the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. Southeast Asian sources offer further evidence of maritime people's connections to one another and to others, especially in and around Sulawesi (Celebes), in subsequent eras. These Southeast Asian sources, both published and in manuscript, also help to illustrate the social and political significance of these links. A closer look at the dynamics of the 1950s, touched on at the beginning of this chapter, draws both on interviews with those present at events, as well as on scant but relevant archival materials from the post-independence period, when the Dutch were already gone.

Located in what is now Southeast Sulawesi, the Straits of Tiworo comprise the northern margins of Muna Island, the waters between this large island and the peninsular "mainland," as well as the peninsula's opposite coast. Covering about 876 square miles (2,270 square kilometers), its shores embrace reefs, shoals, small islands, mangrove stands, and sources of fresh water. Regarded by the Dutch as a subordinate ally of Makassar, Tiworo served as a nonurban maritime hub vital to Makassar's endeavors in the seventeenth-century spice trade. The role its maritime-oriented people played led the VOC to target Tiworo twice in what are conventionally taken to be different wars: The Great Ambon War of the mid-1650s and the Makassar War of the latter 1660s.

Defeated in the first conflict, over the following decade Tiworo bounced back and its people resumed their nautical pursuits and assistance to Makassar. Both of these wars ultimately had to do with control of the spice trade. However, control of spices was not the sole motivating factor, for Makassar's Sultan Hasanuddin invoked Tiworo's first defeat in 1655 as a reason for its campaign of re-expansion in the eastern archipelago during the period between the wars. This campaign to reassert Makassar's power in the waters and islands east of Celebes revived Tiworo's role as a naval staging area and as a haven for fleets sailing under Makassar.

After Tiworo's second defeat in 1667, sixty of its men were incorporated with high-ranking positions in an elite Guard of Prime Commanders under Makassar's Bugis foe, Arung Palakka of Boné, the VOC's principal ally in the Makassar War. This outcome contrasts sharply with the aftermath of Tiworo's first defeat a dozen years earlier, when, in addition to some two hundred men killed, three hundred of its women and children were captured and granted to the VOC's allies as spoils of war. Although markedly different outcomes, both this "transfer" of the dependents of the vanquished and the incorporation of former foes at the forefront of Boné's armed fighting force, represent approaches to remaking the connections between maritime people and other ethnic groups—an important feature of the archipelago's social and political history.

Nevertheless, Tiworo went from infamy to obscurity. "That renowned realm Tiworo, which since the old days has been a nasty pirate's nest," held its notorious reputation well into the first quarter of the eighteenth century. At least, such was the view of its nautical character in François Valentijn's *Oud en Nieuw Oost Indiën*

(Old and New East Indies).[11] This scornful depiction can be traced to Admiral Cornelis Speelman's extensive notes, or *Notities*, compiled in 1669 after his forces defeated Makassar with the help of Bugis allies. Speelman singled out the straits as "*dat leelijcke roofnest Tiboore*"—that nasty pirate's nest Tiworo.[12]

Given the strength of Speelman's characterization and its prominent placement on the opening page of Speelman's narrative, one wonders about the lack of subsequent commentary, aside from Valentijn's remark, about this "nasty pirate's nest." Although the aphorism that history is written by the victors holds some truth, other factors help account for why Tiworo slipped through the historiographic cracks. For one thing, the sources use variant spellings, as well as entirely different place names to refer to Tiworo. For another, its inclusion under different subregions in emergent administrative practice resulted in references to it scattered across the topological structure of subsequent archival organization. Both of these factors complicate the task of historical research.

Larger methodological issues also play a role, such as a predominant focus on states in the writing of Southeast Asian history. Yet, was Tiworo a state? States in Southeast Asian history have garnered much attention for how they often do not fit with analysts' expectations. This applies especially, but not only, to the island and peninsular world in the pre-seventeenth-century period, whose states were less influenced by Indian models than were the agrarian states of the mainland.[13] States tended to be weakly integrated and often not bound territorially. For instance, early "amorphous coastal polities" had restricted centers and extended peripheries.[14] Java's coastal enclaves would reach a threshold beyond which they separated from the main body of a state to become the foci of different smaller sorts of "states." Even in agrarian Java, with its greater human density than the rest of the archipelagic world, the population growth and increases in wealth and trade that accompanied state formation did not go hand in hand with urbanization.[15] Scholarship on regional states often seeks to explain why a high degree of centralization was not possible. This has reframed the standard for judging the development of Southeast Asian states on their own terms: instead of political centralization, the standard is cultural integration.[16] What one commonly calls

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[11] François Valentijn, *Oud en nieuw Oost-Indiën,* v. I (Dordrecht: J. Van Bram, 1724), 222.

[12] Cornelis Speelman, "Notitie dienende voor eenen corten tijt, en tot naeder last van de Hooge Regeringe op Batavia, tot naerrichtinge voor den ondercoopman Jan van Opijnen bij provisie gestelt, tot Opperhooft en Commandant int Casteel Rotterdam op Maccassar, en van den Capitain Jan France als hooft over de melitie mitsgaders die van den Raede," VOC 1276 (1669), p. 684v. Also see Cornelis Speelman, "Notitie … ," typescript held by KITLV, Leiden, D H 802. The Dutch and their allies had to make one final push against Makassar in 1669. For more information on Speelman's manuscript, see J. Noorduyn, ed., "De Handelsrelaties van het Makassaarse Rijk Volgens de 'Notitie' van Cornelis Speelman uit 1670," *Nederlandse Historische Bronnen* vol. 3 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1983), 1–3, 97–123.

[13] Jan Wisseman-Christie, "Trade and Early State Formation in Maritime Southeast Asia: Kedah and Srivijaya," *Jebat* 13 (1984/85): 44. See also Jan Wisseman-Christie, "State Formation in Early Maritime Southeast Asia: A Consideration of the Theories and the Data," *BKI* 151, 2 (1995): 235–88.

[14] Pierre-Yves Manguin, "The Amorphous Nature of Coastal Polities in Insular Southeast Asia: Restricted Centres, Extended Peripheries," *Moussons* 5 (2002): 73–99.

[15] Jan Wisseman-Christie, "States without Cities: Demographic Trends in Early Java," *Indonesia* 52 (October 1991): 23–40, esp. 24, 40.

[16] See: Hall, *A History of Early Southeast Asia,* 2; and Tony Day, *Fluid Iron: State formation in*

"kingdoms" may be understood as cultural and economic communities infused by networks of kinship.[17] This reframing has certain analytical advantages, since regional historiography has sometimes obscured the importance of kinship, as well as gender, in practice.[18] Yet at the same time, it begs the question of culture and its relation to politics. Many would say that conflict and competition lie at the heart of politics. However, anthropologists over the last three decades have reconceptualized culture as having at its heart not shared consensus but conflict. Cultural integration as a standard for judging the development of Southeast Asian states on their own terms is all well and good, as long as it does not sweep conflict under the rug. With accumulated research refining our understanding of states in the region, we gain a picture less focused on how they did not measure up to external standards, and more interest in, as well as a better sense of, how they actually worked.

Tiworo clearly had social hierarchy and leadership, a degree of autonomy, as well as substantive forts. Yet although those who lived there formed a polity of sorts, which is to say they had political organization and were collectively viewed as a substantive player, during the seventeenth century Tiworo was not the apex of a complex political structure. Nor did it have an entrepôt to which others flocked to buy goods. Nevertheless, many goods were indeed stored at, and moved through, Tiworo in its capacity as a staging area. This "realm," to adopt a term pragmatically, formed part of larger, flexible, segmentary political structures, with Makassar and then later with Boné, which were as much about lineage and alliances as they were about location.[19] Tiworo drew the interest of the VOC when it impinged on Dutch commercial agendas and consequently became a target of attack. Yet it was not big enough, and not perceived as having instrumental value to the Dutch, to attract much of their attention beyond this. Even as Tiworo shifted between the orbit of different political centers over time, as with other places in the region's history, when defeated, members of its ruling lineage were able to pick up and move. While this enabled them to put down their anchors elsewhere and forge new alliances, in later years, their descendants maintained ties with Boné, despite shifting among different locations at some distance away from it.

Received geographies form another factor that helped to render Tiworo and the networks of which it was a part historically inconspicuous. In this regard, the "oceanic turn" in the humanities usefully highlights how much historical knowledge has been organized according to places on land. Cartographic representations of political space mirror a misconception of the seas and shoals as uninhabited and uninhabitable: what is wet appears as "negative space," to borrow from the world of art, an area of shadows in-between the depicted figures. Maritime history sometimes challenges, and sometimes reinforces, this framework. When the maritime itself

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Southeast Asia (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press: 2002).

[17] Barbara Watson Andaya, *To Live as Brothers: Southeast Sumatra in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1993), 213.

[18] See: Tony Day, "Ties that (Un)Bind: Families and States in Premodern Southeast Asia," *Journal of Asian Studies* 55, 2 (1996); Day, *Fluid Iron*; and Barbara Watson Andaya, *The Flaming Womb: Repositioning Women in Early Modern Southeast Asia* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2006).

[19] Similarly, Thomas Keifer discusses how segmentary factions based on friendship and kinship lay at the heart of the Tausug-dominated Sulu Sultanate. It likewise relied on close alliances with maritime-oriented people. See Thomas Keifer, "The Sulu Sultanate: Problems in the Analysis of a Segmentary State," *Borneo Research Bulletin* 3, 2 (December 1971): 46–51.

forms an organizing concept, but still remains merely a space to be crossed, only, as it were, to get to the other side, the story of what happens in that space gets lost.[20]

Given this tendency to associate presence with land and absence with the sea, it comes as little surprise to find that later sources sometimes, without reference to the straits and those who lived there, locate Tiworo in the northwest region of Muna Island. The name "Muna" did not yet apply to the whole island in the seventeenth century, which period sources instead usually called Pangesane, or, in Speelman's prose, Pantsiano. Here wound a river, a source of fresh water whose channels through the mangroves provided fleets protection from enemies. Beyond its banks lay dry ground where forts had been constructed. Yet, although boats hid up these channels when under siege, this small river alone did not accommodate the regular comings and goings of Tiworo's vessels, as this was just Tiworo's landward southern margin. Other villages considered part of Tiworo were primarily found not further inland on Muna, but were located in and along the straits themselves, the main focus of the activities of Tiworo's inhabitants. Hence, in 1655, on board the yacht *Dromedaris* at Batoij, Arnold de Vlaming wrote to Governor Jacob Hustaert and the council in the Moluccas to report that, "We have fought the enemy's villages and the fortress at Tibore situated in the Straits of Pangesane," that is, in the Straits of Tiworo.[21] When later references to the historical realm of "Tiworo" simply assimilate it discursively to the large island of Muna, this effectively deletes the "Straits" from the geography of historical interactions and underwrites an amnesia about Tiworo's historically maritime-oriented population.

The knowledge that Tiworo's people were allied with Makassar and that Tiworo provided a haven for its fleets, served as a naval staging area, and was attacked for these reasons, sheds new light on regional maritime history. Certain details about events also make it possible to contrast Admiral Speelman's characterization of Tiworo with Sultan Hasanuddin's statement rationalizing his campaign of re-expansion by a need to avenge it. Without understanding details of the events, the geography, and Tiworo's role, it would not be possible to grasp that when Sultan Hasanuddin spoke of avenging "Pancana" (Pangesane/Pantsiano), he referred,

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[20] A rather more mundane factor may also contribute to why Tiworo itself could escape the notice of readers or translators of Southeast Asian sources from Sulawesi. Readers and speakers of Indonesian (and Malay) who are able to read Bugis or Makassar language materials (a fairly rare occurrence), yet are unfamiliar with the place Tiworo (these days it seems only Sama people know of it), are likely to mistake the name for a direction: "east" or possibly "south." In European sources, Tiworo appears under the variations "Tioro," "Tibore," Tiboore," and "Tivora," which suggests an association with or derivation from the Makassar term *timboroq*. Cognate with the Malay/Indonesian term *timor* (east), *timboroq* is sometimes translated as "east," sometimes as "south," and appears to derive from the Proto-Malayo-Polynesian term for the southeast monsoon. On this derivation of the Makassar term *timboroq*, see Horst Liebner, "Indigenous Concepts of Orientation of South Sulawesian Sailors," *BKI* 161, 2 (2005): 269–317, especially pp. 272–75, and 300–1, notes 26 and 27. Winds are named for the direction from which they come, while ocean currents are named for the direction in which they flow. It seems likely that the place name "Tiworo" derived either from a Makassar reference to the location of its close subordinate ally toward the east, or from a cognate Austronesian or early Sama term referring to the southeast monsoon, with its ability to carry one back to Tiworo from areas east and south (e.g., Banda, Timor, Australia).

[21] Arnold de Vlaming and Willem Maetsuyker, Letter to Governor Jacob Hustaert and the Council in Molucco, with the Yacht *Dromedaris*, on February 2, written from Batoij, signed on the chaloup *Sumatra*, lying at anchor off the coast of Celebes opposite Chassea island, 1655, VOC 1211 book 2, p. 97. Batoij is presumably Batoei, in Central Sulawesi.

without doubt, not to the whole of Muna Island, but specifically to the Straits of Tiworo. This clarification, elaborated in chapter three, exposes that, like Admiral Speelman, he considered Tiworo and its people important historical actors in the seascape of seventeenth-century conflicts.

In later centuries, Tiworo was subject to changing maritime geographies of power, reflected in cartographic knowledge. While Speelman launched an early modern image of the Straits of Tiworo as notorious, the view of it as a place that harbored threats had completely changed by the nineteenth century, when warnings about its nonhuman navigational dangers supplanted its reputation for infamy. Cartographic history shows that while Europeans had no knowledge of Tiworo and precious little of Celebes in the sixteenth century, geographic knowledge of the straits was strongest in the maps and charts that followed on the heels of the seventeenth-century conflicts over spices. However, by the late eighteenth century, Tiworo seemed to hover, invisible, just beyond the edges of better known and more commonly represented waters, such as the Straits of Buton, which flowed by Tiworo's eastern entrance.

In the late-nineteenth century, Tiworo was portrayed as a place whose perilous waters were unknown to Europeans, a view that kept most outsiders away and minimized close scrutiny. While its physical geography, a zone of protected waters with two points of egress, made evasion and flight more viable options for its residents than, for instance, a location in the interior of a bay where the chances of getting cornered were higher, the lack of reliable knowledge about it in charts and navigation guides also produced incidental benefits for Tiworo's inhabitants. Habits of disregard during the late-nineteenth and early twentieth century *pax Neerlandica* bolstered the security that the straits provided to those who wished to keep would-be overlords at arm's length, and for those who engaged in unofficial trade.

Europeans knew precious little of Celebes in the early sixteenth century: only the very northern tip of Celebes, but none of the rest, appears in a map of 1537.[22] Cartographic knowledge expanded over the course of the sixteenth century, yet even as late as 1580, knowledge of the areas near Tiworo was restricted merely to the existence of Kabaena, which sits before the southwestern mouth of the straits. It appears as "Coboina" in Fernão Vaz Dourado's Atlas of 1580, but is absent from his earlier works.[23] This suggests, however, that the Portuguese, or some pilot they employed, likely had knowledge of the Tiworo Straits, since it sits so close to Kabaena. Dutch knowledge of the waters around nearby Buton date to Jan Corneliszoon May, who first surveyed the area in 1599, as noted in the journal of Jacob van Heemskeerk, with whom he sailed. May returned to the Indies in 1614 as a shipmaster with Joris van Speilbergen, and drew the map of Buton inset in plate 19 of *The East and West Indian Mirror*, the narrative about that voyage. He took careful soundings of the Buton Straits and also sailed by Kabaena and Kaledupa. Yet, although he drew the eastern mouth of the Tiworo Straits, the rest of it remained unrepresented.[24]

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[22] Anonymous (but ascribed to Gaspar Viegas), "Atlas of Twenty-Four Charts," Archivio Stato, Firenze, Plate 52 D, in Armando Cortesão and Avelino Teixeira da Mota, *Portugaliae Monumenta Cartographica* (Lisbon: Coimbra University Press, 1960), hereafter *PMC*.

[23] Fernão Vaz Dourado, Atlas of 1580, http://www.wdl.org/en/item/8918/view/1/40/, accessed March 29, 2014.

[24] Joris van Speilbergen, *The East and West Indian Mirror, Being an Account of Joris van Speilbergen's Voyage Round the World (1614–1617), and the Australian Navigations of Jacob Le Maire*, translated,



The central and eastern archipelago, from southern Sulawesi (Celebes) and Flores in the west, to the Tanimbar and Kei Islands in the east. From the Blaeu–van der Hem Atlas, 1665–1668. Source: Austrian National Library

Tiworo makes its first cartographic appearance in the stunning Blaeu–Van der Hem Atlas in the mid-seventeenth century. Curiously, the name "Tivora" is found not on Muna at all, but, rather, in the east hook of the southeastern peninsula. Nearby, as noted in one of Admiral Arnold de Vlaming's reports, the map shows a "*waterplaets,*" a source of fresh water across from the island of Wowoni, information as dear to mariners as knowledge of hidden shoals and pirate haunts.[25] François Valentijn's eighteenth-century "Map [or chart] of the Governorship of the Moluccas" still presents the shapes of Muna (Pangesane) and the straits in a distorted manner. Yet here, with "Tibore" placed at Muna's north end, the map represents Tiworo closer to its actual location, along with the straits' many islands and depth soundings for its waters.

Despite all this eighteenth-century detail, late nineteenth-century piloting directions warn mariners off Tiworo for its dangerous and, it appears, supposedly

with notes, and an introduction by J. A. J. Villiers (London: Hakluyt Society, 1906), pp. xvi, xxvii–xxviii, xxx, xxxv–xxxvi, and the note by May accompanying plate 19 (between pages 128 and 129). Heemskerk would go on to play a pivotal role in the establishment of the VOC in Asia, not to mention providing key components of Hugo de Groot's *De Jure Praedae*. See: Peter Borschberg, "The Seizure of the Santa Catarina Revisited: The Portuguese Empire in Asia, VOC Politics and the Origins of the Dutch-Johor Alliance, 1602–c.1616," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 31, 1 (2002): 31–62; Martine Julia van Ittersum, "Hugo Grotius in Context: Van Heemskerck's Capture of the Santa Catarina and Its Justification in De Jure Praedae (1604–1606)," *Asian Journal of Social Science* 31, 3 (2003): 511–48.

[25] "Map of the Southern Part of Celebes, Ceram and Timor," *Atlas Blaeu–van der Hem* (artist: Johannes Vingboons) (Vienna: Austrian National Library, 1665–1668). This "*waterplaets*" is noted by Admiral Arnold de Vlaming, inter alia, in VOC 1211 1656 book 2, p. 101.

uncharted waters. An 1878 guide for navigating the Indies, which credits the Rajah Sir James Brooke's single voyage around the island of Celebes with delineating the Gulf of Boné's extensive coasts, cautions: "Tioro [sic] Strait is intricate and unknown to European navigators. The shoals and islands are very numerous, and there are no inducements for taking it, especially in a large vessel."[26] No mincing words here: "no inducements" means "keep out."



Southern Celebes detail (see upper left quadrant of map on previous page).
The name "Tivora" can be seen, written upside down, in the upper right corner of this image.
From the Blaeu–van der Hem Atlas, 1665–1668. Source: Austrian National Library

One needed reliable local knowledge or very good pilots, whether published or living, to navigate the Tiworo Straits. In fact, Brooke had had a pilot, and he was Sama. For his survey of the Gulf of Boné in 1840, conducted before he became the "White Rajah" in Borneo, Brooke had sent to Bajoé, the Sama settlement at Boné's harbor, expressly for a Sama pilot, whose name, unfortunately, we never learn. Although their journey round the gulf ended very close to Tiworo, the Sama pilot never took Brooke there, thus keeping Tiworo off of Brooke's otherwise remarkably well-delineated charts.[27] Whether it was intentional on the part of the pilot to keep knowledge of Tiworo from Brooke we will never know. But there is no doubt that a Sama pilot who knew his way around this area would have known Tiworo, for Sama people lived there at the time, a point noted by J. N. Vosmaer the previous decade.

While Brooke hoped to learn more about local politics in Celebes, to gauge the extent and depth of Dutch colonial rule there, and to survey coasts poorly known to the British, Vosmaer aimed to do something more ambitious and also similar, in its anti-piracy zeal, to what Brooke later attempted in Borneo. With the reluctant approval of the Dutch, Vosmaer sought to establish a trading post in Kendari Bay

[26] Alexander G. Findlay, *A Directory for the Navigation of the Indian Archpelago, China, and Japan*, second edition (London: Richard Holmes Laurie, 1878), vi, 815.

[27] Sir James Brooke and Captain Rodney Mundy, *Narrative of Events in Borneo and Celebes, down to the Occupation of Labuan: From the Journals of James Brooke, Esq., Rajah of Sarawak, and Governor of Labuan*, vol. 1 (London: John Murray, 1848): 150–51.



The Governorship of the Moluccas and adjacent islands, including an inset of South Sulawesi, with Buton, Bau-Bau, and Buru. Visible in the main map (bottom left) and the inset (top center) is "Tibore," at the northern end of Muna (Pangesane). From François Valentijn, *Oud en Nieuw Oost Indiën* (1724–1726), plate 37, reproduced in Johannes van Keulen, *De Grote Lichtende Zeefakkel* (1753) vol. 6, map 154. Source: Het Scheepvaartmuseum, the National Maritime Museum, Amsterdam

and to make honest mariners out of coastal raiders, particularly the Tobelo, whose raids had been depopulating the shores of eastern Celebes. Although Vosmaer did not set himself up as "rajah" as Brooke later did in Borneo, his efforts did result in drawing him in to local political dynamics.[28] The Sama in Celebes at this point were not the main focus of colonial concerns about "piracy" or raiding. Nevertheless, as gatherers of *trepang* (sea cucumbers), they held the key to the trade in this and other lucrative maritime commodities like tortoiseshell, and therefore Vosmaer needed them. Many of the Sama involved with Vosmaer's trading post came from the Straits of Tiworo. This is evident from the path laid down by his predecessor, Arung Baku; from remarks about the ethnicity of migrants to Kendari Bay; and from the name of its largest settlement.

[28] See: J. N. Vosmaer, "Korte Beschrijving van het Zuid-oostelijk Schiereiland van Celebes, in het bijzonder van de Vosmaers-Baai of van Kendari; verrijkt met eenige Berigten omtrent den stam der Orang Badjos, en meer andere aanteekeningen," *VBG* 17 (1839): 110; and Esther Velthoen, "Pirates in the Periphery: Eastern Sulawesi 1820–1905," in *Pirates, Ports, and Coasts in Asia: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives*, ed. John Kleinen and Manon Osseweijer (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2012), 206–9.

Vosmaer's success, albeit limited, came partly from following in the footsteps of a man known to the Dutch as Aru (or Arung) Baku (in Dutch: "Aroe Bakoe"), who most scholars call "Arung Bakung."[29] Vosmaer described "Aroe Bakoe" as a restless or seditious (*woelziek*) Boné prince, who brought upon himself the disfavor of his lord (athough he does not specify who that was), for which reason he made a timely departure from his homeland. Guided by coincidence, he visited the Laiwui coast, where, tired of wandering, he settled on the Sampara river in the region adjacent to Lepo Lepo. After spending a number of years there he left, and by marrying a "princess from Tiworo," the administration of that district fell into his hands. Although he lived in undisturbed tranquility, after a few years he got involved in an effort to make himself—which is to say himself and Tiworo—independent of Buton, which, since the end of the Makassar War, had periodically asserted claims to Tiworo that the Dutch eventually recognized in the early nineteenth century. Vosmaer relates that Arung Bakung was persuaded to exert independence from Buton by a "troublemaker" from Makassar named Sarib Alie, popularly known as Tuwanna I Dondang (probably from Sama: (*ahaq*) *toa*, "parent," meaning here "the father of I Dondang"), who had ambitions of his own on Muna.[30]

Originally from Labakkang, an area opposite many offshore islands north of Makassar, Tuwanna I Dondang estimated that the latter would help in a simultaneous attack on Muna. Arung Bakung eventually found him to be greatly inferior to the leading chiefs of the Magindanao pirates with whom he was said to be closely related by blood. Saddling himself with troubles by the methods he used on Muna, Tuwanna I Dondang was compelled to leave there, yet, returning to Tiworo, found it was also unsafe for him overnight, and thus he went back to Makassar. Arung Bakung, deprived of further help in his bid for independence from Buton, decided to leave Tiworo and, at the invitation of the Konawi prince in Laiwui, set out for Kendari Bay with a number of his most trusted people and about twenty boats of the Sama, who were united with Tiworo, thus putting distance between themselves and Buton. Their presence at Kendari Bay, which they reached in 1823 or early in 1824, drew other Sama people, and the Dutch war with Boné in 1824-25 drove many more Sama there from Bajoé. Traders from Makassar and a swarm of Bugis boats followed, seeking the products the Sama brought in, while people from other coastal towns and islands found a market for their produce there. Unexpectedly, in the middle of 1830 Arung Bakung left Kendari Bay, and the traders

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[29] The title *Aru* or *Arung* usually appears with the name of a place. Hence "Arung Palakka" is the Arung of Palakka, and although only one is particularly famous, historically there have been many of them. In Bugis, with its consonant gemination, this is pronounced "Aruppalaka" (or with a glottal stop: "Aruq Palakka"). The "Arung of Baku" or "Arung of Bakung" would have undergone similar morphophonological changes among native speakers of Bugis. It would be helpful to know whether it was "Baku" or "Bakung" in order to narrow down the place to which the name refers. There is a Baku with a nearby "Tanjung Baku" (Baku Point) north of Palu on the west coast of Sulawesi; another Tanjung Baku sits south of Palu; a Baku lies not far from the coast near Wotu in the north end of the Gulf of Boné; and an offshore "Boné Baku" a few kilometers west of Makassar. One reason why so many coastal spots share this name may be its resemblance to cognate terms for "mangrove" in the region (Bugis: *bakko*, Makassar: *bangko*; Indonesian: *bakau*. A place named Bakung lies near Bulu Ponre in the landlocked interior of Boné. Another Bakung is found on the coast of Central Sulawesi very close to Batui, across from the Banggai Islands.

[30] Vosmaer, *Korte Beschrijving*, 129–31.

and Sama people followed suit, leaving only the saddest traces of its former prosperity.[31]

The following year, Vosmaer stepped into the place that Arung Bakung had occupied, minus the marriage to a Tiworo princess. Vosmaer got caught up in contests over the allegiances of the region's maritime populations and in the dynamics of competing claims over Kendari Bay, now called "Vosmaer's Bay."[32] Vosmaer's Bay and the protection provided by its temporary battery drew people from many different ethnic groups, including several families of Sama who erected houses there. The place again took on an air of life and prosperity and its largest settlement was called "Kampong Tiworo,"—Tiworo village, suggesting the importance of Tiworo to its migrants.[33]

Genealogical evidence from Sama sources in and beyond Tiworo suggest that this "Bugis prince," Arung Bakung, may not have been entirely Bugis, and if he came from Boné, he probably did not come across the Gulf of Boné to Tiworo on his own. Bugis language manuscripts about the Sama past, discussed in chapter four, strongly suggest that whoever Arung Bakung was, he probably was not simply Bugis. Like Sarib Alie, also known as "Tuwanna I Dondang," many people of the time were known by personal names in one ethnic context, and by different names, or titles that functioned as names, in another, and this was apparently the case for Arung Bakung. Such practices were also reflected in Sama genealogical memory and in the Bugis-language manuscripts concerned with the Sama past. The genealogical and political continuities of particular Sama lineages and their relations with Boné elites form the main focus of these manuscripts. They show that Sama people of high status lineages (*lolo*) maintained ties with and over Bajoé, in subservience to Boné.

The older, more detailed of these two manuscripts dates from the late nineteenth or early twentieth century, surviving by virtue of a recopying tradition of textual transmission in which new information was often added to the final section of a text over subsequent eras, as with south Sulawesi court diaries or chronicles. Among other things, it describes how, during the early nineteenth century, elder Sama relatives came together from scattered settlements along Sulawesi's east coast to choose a successor and install him as "the Lolo" (not just any *lolo*) in Kendari, as well as over Bajoé. In other words, they met to choose a paramount chief from among a chiefly lineage that was geographically dispersed. They chose a man named, in Sama, To Palettéi, or just Palettéi, yet he was also called Puwang Baringeng. Notwithstanding the Bugis honorific title, *puwang*, often used to address those with the title *Aru* or *Arung*, the Sama people who chose To Palettéi to be the next Lolo additionally addressed him as "my grandson," a genealogical relation, not just a polite term of reference. They told him, "You are the one to uphold the grandeur [protect the jewels/virtue] of Bajoé, to succeed the Lolo who died" (*Iko na Puwang Baringeng pallaq i arajanna tanaé ri Bajoé sulléi Lolo mallinrunggé*.)

Although in the Bugis language context *Aru lolo* means a "crown prince" or "viceroy" who rules on behalf of a sovereign (cf. Ind./Malay *raja muda*), among Sama

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[31] Ibid., 131–34.

[32] See: Ibid., 129–33; A. Ligtvoet, "Beschrijving en Geschiedenis van Boeton," *BKI* II (1878): 88–89; and Velthoen, "Pirates in the Periphery." On the treaty history regarding Buton's claims to Tiworo, see chapter three in this book.

[33] Coenraad Jacob Temminck, *Coup-d'oeil général sur les possessions néerlandaises dans l'Inde archipélagique*, vol III (Leiden: A. Arnz, 1846–1849), 70–71.

people in the Sulawesi region, in Sama social contexts, "*lolo*" is both a Sama title and a term of reference that applies exclusively to individuals with descent through an elite Sama lineage. Palettéi thus had high-status Sama descent. He may well also have had elite or "aristocratic" Bugis descent. In choosing him to be the Lolo of the Sama, his relatives also chose him to be the Aru lolo or viceroy over the Sama "at Bajoé" and dispersed in networks of related kin.

What makes it extremely likely that Palettéi was, in fact, Arung Bakung is not the vaguely similar sounding pseudonym (Baringeng) coupled with the indications of ascribed high status. Rather, what clinches it is that his authority was bestowed by his Sama relatives while he lived among the Sama in Kendari, which created a formal connection to Boné. Moreover, there is the timing. In other words, although Palettéi was based in Kendari, he is said formally to have become the Lolo of Bajoé (in Boné), during the reign of the Boné ruler posthumously named Matinroé ri Laleng Bata, who ruled from 1812 to 1823.[34] The timing is crucial. Arung Bakung, according to Vosmaer, already long married to "a Princess of Tiworo," and having some authority over its governance, reached Kendari Bay with his Tiworo Sama followers in 1823 or early 1824, and left it in 1830, which, shortly thereafter, created Vosmaer's opportunity.

The point here is not only that European sources, like all sources, reveal partial perspectives, but rather to elucidate the view from Tiworo and regional Sama, along with their role in the politics between different coasts. Arung Bakung's marriage to a Tiworo "princess," whose name (like that of Brooke's pilot) we never learn from Dutch sources, had a variety of consequences relevant to my main argument. It provided him with a following in Tiworo and, combined with his selection as Lolo, a political connection to the Sama on coasts throughout the area. He was then able to benefit from the presence, abilities, and networks of Sama people when they relocated to Kendari Bay. The migration of substantive numbers of Sama from Tiworo to Kendari Bay was motivated not just by commercial interests, but by political ones as well, namely, to put distance between, on the one hand, Arung Bakung and his Sama followers, and on the other, Buton with its newly recognized claims over Tiworo. The kin connection between the Tiworo princess and Arung Bakung/To Palettéi maintained the longstanding ties between members of high-status Sama lineages in Tiworo, and the authority that emanated from Boné through Bajoé, serving as a bulwark against Buton. Buton's claims may have been recognized by the Dutch, but obviously did not hold much water with the Sama in Tiworo, who left. During this part of the early nineteenth century, at a time when more territorial structures of governance were gaining greater traction, such ties still provided an effective way to mobilize followings and, thus, to gain political power.

This sort of migration was neither a diaspora, a label applied with greater accuracy to people presumed to have a collective homeland, nor was it the mobility of wandering sea gypsies, an image that took on particular salience for the Bajo with

[34] *LB Lemobajo*, 92–93, 130–31, the Bugis language manuscript discussed above and in chapter four, photocopied with its inheritor's permission, photocopy in possession of the author. Apparently the original manuscript is now in tatters and exists only in fragments elsewhere. The full list of titles and names for the Bugis ruler of Boné mentioned here is: La Mappatunru To Appatunru' Paduka Sri Sultan Muhammad Ismail Muhtajuddin [Matinroé-ri Laleng-bata] (1812–1823). Puwang Baringeng was also called "La Palettéi." "*Puhawang*" is an old Austronesian term meaning "shipmaster." Personal communication with Pierre-Yves Manguin, July 17, 2015.

the *pax Neerlandica*, when mobile seafaring populations no longer posed a threat to colonial power.

MARITIME PEOPLE

The Sama—the most numerous and widely dispersed of the region's sea people—were not known to come from any specific region, nor was any particular domain their taken-for-granted homeland. Hence, although scattered throughout much of archipelagic Southeast Asia, no singular place has provided them a reference point for diaspora. Similarly, no place name presupposes their relation to it in the way, for instance, one says Filipinos are from the Philippines and the French from France, regardless of histories of nation and subject formation. While no toponym stands in to signify their origin or sense of belonging, a wealth of evidence nonetheless illustrates that Bajo or Sama people have attached themselves to many places, where some anchored and others indeed settled. This dispersion of maritime-oriented settlements includes some long-standing places, such as the Sama settlement of Bajoé. Chapter four touches on how, during times of conflict, Sama people fled Bajoé, and while some later returned, others moved on, yet maintained allegiances to it.

Bajoé, which literally means "the Bajo" in the language of the locally dominant Bugis, was both the primary harbor for the Bugis realm of Boné and a settlement populated largely by maritime-oriented Sama people, familiar to Europeans by a host of similar sounding names: Bajow, Badjow, *Badjau*, Badjoo, *Badjos*, *Badjoers*, *baJuũs*, *baJus*, and the like.[35] As mentioned above, Brooke had sent "to Bajuè for a Bajow pilot" to guide him on his survey of the Gulf of Boné. When he first anchored off Bajoé in January 1840, near scattered shoals and amidst reefs topped with fishing stakes, he estimated—excluding boats—that it contained from 150 to 180 houses.[36] But Bajoé had been an even larger, bustling and multiethnic settlement early in the previous century.

Such settlements and their position in wider networks have often been overshadowed by outsiders' interest in Sama mobility and talk of them as nomadic or sea gypsies. For instance, while Brooke waited in Bajoé's offing for a reply to the message he had sent the ruler of Boné a few miles inland, a party of Bajo (i.e., Sama) people came aboard his vessel. The Bajo, he noted, "have no country, live in boats,

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[35] For "Bajow," see Brooke, *Narrative*, inter alia 151, 163; for "Badjow," see Sir James Brooke and Henry Keppel, *The Expedition to Borneo of Her Majesty's Ship Dido for the Suppression of Piracy with Extracts from the Journal of James Brooke*, third Edition (London: Chapman and Hall, 1847), 126, 149, 199; for "*Badjau,*" see H. von Dewall, "Aantekeningen omtrent de Noordoostkust van Borneo" (Medegedeeld door J. Hageman, Jcz.) *TBG* 4 (1855): 446–47; for "Badjoo" (adjective), "Oran Badjoo," and "Badjoos" (plural), see Thomas Forrest, *A Voyage to New Guinea and the Moluccas, 1774–1776* (London, New York, Melbourne, and Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1969 [1780]), inter alia 372–73; for "Badjos," see Speelman, "Notitie," VOC 1276 (1669), ff. 871v; 865r–865v; for "Badjoers," see Speelman, "Notitie," f. 706v; for "*BaJuũs,*" see Tomé Pires, *The Suma Oriental of Tomé Pires, an Account of the East, from the Red Sea to Japan, Written in Malacca and India in 1512–1515; and The Book of Francisco Rodrigues, Rutter of a Voyage in the Red Sea, Nautical Rules, Almanack, and Maps, Written and Drawn in the East before 1515*, trans. Armando Cortesão (London: The Hakluyt Society, 1944), 467; and for "*baJus,*" see Pires, *Suma Oriental*, 400. This list of variations on the name is not exhaustive.

[36] Brooke first mentions "Bajuè" on page 33; see: Brooke, *Narrative*, 36, 135, 151; and Findlay, *Directory for the Navigation*, 815.

[and] carry on a trade in tortoise-shell, *bêche de mer* [sea cucumber]," and other marine goods. He could tell they spoke a language distinct from Bugis and Malay, and although they possessed no writing system of their own, they claimed to have books in the Bugis syllabary. Brooke hoped to see more of these Bajo people and, along with a vocabulary of their language, to "get some of their books," which were rumored to contain laws (*ondang-ondang*).[37] He wrote,

> It would be curious to obtain the maritime code of a maritime people—without a country, whose home is their *prahu* [boat], and whose livelihood is gained by collecting the produce of the sea and shores of distant islands. We may presume that laws made to suit such a state of society would be peculiar.[38]

Peculiar, indeed. So strong was the notion of them as nomadic or sea gypsies that Brooke's musings about them contradicted what he himself reported he saw. Brooke had sent "to Bajuè for a Bajow pilot," estimated the size of the settlement there, and explicitly noted the Bajo villages (*kampung*) on his month-long survey around the Gulf of Boné. Even so, his statement that the Bajo "have no country" glided all too easily into an image of them as always at sea. The Bajo in his eyes were so marked by the maritime and the "lack" of a homeland that he talked about them as though they lived only on boats.[39] In this, as in his use of them as pilots, he was not alone.

This discursive sleight of hand was not unique to the nineteenth century. Francisco Combés during the seventeenth century had a similarly uncanny way of disregarding evidence of settled life in the littoral even as he made a record of it. Combés described people in Mindanao, Jolo, and Baslian (in the southern Philippines) as "Lutao," since

> Lutao means, in those languages, "he who swims and goes floating over the water." Such is the nature of these people that they know no other house than the ship. In the villages which they have formed they well show the inclination

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[37] Brooke, *Narrative*, 45–46.

[38] Ibid., 151–52. The "laws" he heard about likely refer to a Bugis commercial and maritime code often called the Amanna Gappa after the notable said to have set it down in 1676 (hijra 1087), although, as J. Noorduyn pointed out, his role as *Matoa* in Makassar did not begin until 1697. See "The Wajorese Merchants' Community in Makassar," *BKI* 156, 3 (2000): 476. C. C. Macknight and Mukhlis call the Amanna Gappa "a commercial and maritime code" in "A Bugis Manuscript about Praus," *Archipel* 18, 1 (1979): 272. On the position of the *matoa* of the Wajo community in Makassar, and on Amanna Gappa in particular, see Noorduyn, "The Wajorese Merchants' Community," 490–96.

[39] Brooke, *Narrative*, 150–51. It is interesting to note that for the east coast of the Gulf of Boné, Brooke divides the Menkoka people into coastal and interior groups, and remarks that: "The former have in some measure been *civilised* by their intercourse with the Bugis and Bajow people, and have nominally adopted the religion of Islam, without, however, rejecting their own barbarous customs and habits" (his emphasis; ibid., 163). What is striking about this is not the nineteenth-century European propensity to rank social taxonomies along a scale of civilizational attainment, but rather the inclusion of the Bajo among those with a civilizing effect. This contrasts sharply with later discourses that primitivize the Bajo. See Jennifer L. Gaynor, "Maritime Ideologies and Ethnic Anomalies: Sea Space and the Structure of Subalternity in the Southeast Asian Littoral," in *Seascapes: Maritime Histories, Littoral Cultures, and Transoceanic Exchanges,* ed. Jerry H. Bentley, Renate Bridenthal, and Kären Wigen (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2001), 62–63.

> with which they were born; for they are so fond of living on the sea that their houses are built in it, in places which the low tide leaves exposed … When it is high tide the houses are very far from the shore, and the water in between is so deep that brigs and craft of heavier tonnage can sail there.[40]

Similar to Brooke's assertion that the Bajos' "home is their *prahu*," Combés stated they "know no other house than the ship," yet in his next breath he described the villages they made by building houses in the littoral.

The question is not whether the region's maritime people brought their families on boats and lived there with them. They did. Evidence for this exists.[41] In the early sixteenth century, Tomé Pires, a Portuguese apothecary who recorded his observations about the region, noted that maritime people of the central archipelago (BaJuũs/Celates) differed from others both by their distinct language and by the practice of bringing women on board their boats.[42] Yet even though this made them unique, he did not leave the impression that on-board living was all they knew. He characterized Celates in the western archipelago as "men who go out pillaging in their boats and fish, and are sometimes on land and sometimes at sea, of whom there are a large number in our time."[43] A century later, boat-dwelling gets more heavily emphasized while interaction with the land begins to drop away in descriptions. Passing through the Straits of Malacca, Pieter Floris wrote: "… the Salettes … for the mooste parte keepe in the prawes with their wyves and children, living chiefly by fishing."[44]

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[40] Francisco Combés, S. J., *Historia de las islas de Mindanao, Iolo, y sus adyacentes* (Madrid, 1667), reprint issued (Madrid, 1897) by Pablo Pastells, S. J., and W. E. Retana, in Emma Helen Blair and James Alexander Robertson, eds., *The Philippine Islands, 1493–1898* (hereafter BR), vol. 40 (1906), 99–182, esp. 104, http://www.gutenberg.org/files/30253/30253-h/30253-h.htm#pb104; page image at http://quod.lib.umich.edu/p/philamer/afk2830.0001.040/108?rgn=full+text;view =image;q1=blair, accessed May 5, 2013. Technically, Philippine languages include all the languages of the Philippines and northern Sulawesi, but do not include Sama/Bajo or what linguists call Samalan languages; see: Robert Blust, "The Greater Central Philippines Hypothesis," *Oceanic Linguistics* 30: 73–129; Robert Blust, "The Linguistic Macrohistory of the Philippines: Some Speculations," in *Current Issues in Philippine Linguistics and Anthropology: Parangal Kay Lawrence A. Reid,* ed. Hsiu-Chuan Liao and Carl R. Galvez Rubino (Manila: Linguistic Society of the Philippines and SIL Philippines, 2005), 31–68; and, on the linguistic position of Samalan, see pp. 41–53. Cognates in other Philippine languages north of this area do, indeed, mean "float" (e.g., Tagalog *lítaw,* "float"). From the verb *lítaw* one can form a stative adjective, *lutaw,* "in the state of floating," and, since an adjective can be used like a noun, it could be used to form a noun meaning "the floating (things)" (John Wolff, personal communication, February 9, 2014). In contemporary Sama (Southeast Sulawesi), the verb root for "float" is *lantuh* or *lantoh*; "floating" is *palantuh* or *palantoh* (Kamaruddin Thamzibar, personal communication, February 26, 2014).

[41] It is also clear that colonial powers later made efforts to settle them on land. James F. Warren, "The North Borneo Chartered Company's Administration of the Bajau, 1878–1909: The Pacification of a Maritime, Nomadic People" (master's thesis, Ohio University Center for International Studies, 1971).

[42] Pires, *Suma Oriental,* 226–27. See the next chapter for specifics on how Pires actually used the terms *BaJuũs* and *Celates*. Although we have come, through various secondary sources, to view these terms as applying to groups in different parts of the archipelago, a careful look at Pires shows that he himself did not draw this distinction, quite the contrary, in fact.

[43] Ibid., 232–38.

[44] Peter [Pieter Willemsz] Floris, *Peter Floris: His Voyage to the East Indies in the* Globe*, 1611–1615, the Contemporary Translation of his Journal,* ed. W. H. Moreland (London: Hakluyt Society, 1934), 102.

Semporna Islands, Malaysia, 2009. Photo credit: Timothy Allen

The issue is not whether people really lived in boats, but rather the view that boat-dwelling was the *sine qua non* for a collectivity. Instead of noticing a range of dwelling practices that, subject to circumstance and historical change, people engaged in to pursue lives in the littoral and in relation with the sea, boat-dwelling came to be seen as a trait characteristic of sea people. Taken as a defining trait, boat-dwelling held a curious ideological power that obfuscated contradicting evidence that the very same groups of people also led settled lives in the littoral. Viewed as the quintessential feature of who they were, its "decrease," both real and imagined, was then read through the lens of nostalgia. Instead of historical change, this primitivized image of sea people substituted a set of evolutionary assumptions in which sea nomads came to be seen as either threatened with disappearance, or subject to existence as a kind of fallen version of their former selves. A late-twentieth-century example illustrates this well:

> It is obvious that many rather important places have been inhabited by Bajos [*sic*] for many decades. It is to be expected that the trend of becoming more sedentary, caused by intermixing with other tribes, interference of the government, new fishing devices, and more modernized living, will continue. These de-isolational influences will increase the disintegration of both Sama culture and the Sama language.[45]

[45] Jilis A. J. Verheijen, SVD, *The Sama/Bajau Language in the Lesser Sunda Islands*, Pacific Linguistics, Series D, No. 70, Materials in Languages of Indonesia, No. 32 (Canberra: Department of Linguistics, Research School of Pacific Studies, The Australian National University, 1986), 30. Subsequent chapters will make it clear that Sama cooperation with Makassar in campaigns across the Java Sea to the Lesser Sundas took place in the seventeenth

"Becoming more sedentary," "mixing," "modernized," "de-isolational," and "disintegration" are terms that portray people with an idealized past: nomadic, unmixed, not-modern, and isolated, and who now, supposedly, would come apart, despite centuries of social reproduction in dispersed communities of the archipelago. While addressing such discourse is not my main aim, readers will find in these pages ample means to counter this modern myth.

The focus here is primarily on the central archipelago, yet maritime-oriented people were also important to polities in other parts of island and peninsular Southeast Asia. For instance, to the north of Makassar, sea people in the southern Philippines were under Brunei's influence during the sixteenth century. Spanish relations with Manila and Sulu played a role in loosening this connection, yet sea people in this region remained subject to Brunei until near the end of the seventeenth century.[46]

During much of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, southern Philippines sea people were instead subject to the Sulu Sultanate. Among them, the Balangingi Sama and also the Iranun made raids across the archipelago. James Warren has argued that these raids provided slave labor for the procurement of marine and jungle products valuable to the China market. These products were traded for arms from European "country traders" (i.e., those who sought profits within Asia), who then exchanged them for tea. While Warren's work is extensively researched, reservations have been expressed about the tenuous basis for demonstrating that people who were taken in raids then participated in such goods-procurement as slave labor. In his explanation, the exchange of marine and jungle products, especially *trepang*, funded not only the purchase of firearms, but also enabled Tausug *datus* (aristocrats) to profit and display their resulting wealth. However, an alternative proposition points out that such patrons may instead have been interested in subjugating and humbling other human beings, as well as increasing their followings, which would, in and of itself, have marked their status and prestige.[47]

Regarding the Balangingi Sama, Warren makes a case for "ethnogenesis," since through their fearsome actions they distinguished themselves to such a degree that others wound up perceiving them as an ethnic group *sui generis*. Yet, as Charles O. Frake rightly pointed out, fellow speakers of what linguists call Samalan dialects continued to see the Balangingi as just another group of Sama.[48] This is an important point, for it means that what appeared to be ethnic differences from one

century. The history presents a very different picture than this nostalgic portrayal of potential linguistic and cultural death.

[46] D. E. Brown, "Brunei and the Bajau," *Borneo Research Bulletin* 3, 2 (December 1971): 55–58.

[47] James Warren, *The Sulu Zone, 1768–1898: The Dynamics of External Trade, Slavery, and Ethnicity in the Transformation of a Southeast Asian Maritime State* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2007). Warren's explanation is analyzed in greater detail in: Heather Sutherland, "*The Sulu Zone* Revisited," *Journal of Asian Studies* 35, 1 (2004): 133–57; David Henley, "Review of James Warren, *The Sulu Zone*: The World Capitalist Economy and the Historical Imagination" *Bijdragen tot de Taal- Land- en Volkenkunde* 156, 4 (2000): 834–38; and Jennifer L. Gaynor, "Piracy in the Offing: The Law of Lands and the Limits of Sovereignty at Sea," *Anthropological Quarterly* 85, 3 (2012): 840–44.

[48] Charles O. Frake, "The Genesis of Kinds of People in the Sulu Archipelago," in *Language and Cultural Description: Essays by Charles O. Frake*, selected and intro. Anwar S. Dil (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1980), 311–32.

set of external perspectives did not always map onto how such distinctions were made in local social practice. Since Europeans sometimes ethnicized functional differences, and, without realizing it, lumped Sama people into groups at both ends of the piracy–nomad continuum, such classifications of Southeast Asian maritime people provide a cautionary tale about the limits of reading colonial sources against the grain.[49] Nevertheless, the archipelagic environment did put a premium on the abilities of maritime-oriented populations, and the usefulness of their skills was nothing new.

Southeast Asians with specialized nautical skills played a role in the trade, defense, and political legitimacy of regional coastal polities from the seventh to the nineteenth century. These included: Srivijaya, Champa, Majapahit, Brunei, Melaka, Johor, Makassar, and Sulu, as well as a host of lesser realms such as Patani, Banjarmasin, Bima, Boné, Buton, Ternate, Tidore, and Jailolo. Srivijaya, long unknown, and initially a mystery due both to its dispersed hub-and-spoke spatial structure and lack of durable remains, was prominent from the seventh to thirteenth centuries, as attested in foreign sources. It was based in southern Sumatra at the western end of what is now Indonesia. Champa, about which more is discovered every year, began around the same time along the central coast of what is now Vietnam, and reached its height in the ninth and tenth centuries. Majapahit, on the island of Java, rose from the end of the thirteenth century (c. 1293) and was in decline about 1500, around the same time as Melaka. Melaka, established circa 1400, lasted under Southeast Asian rule until 1511, when the Portuguese took it over, a situation that contributed to the rise of Johor. Johor flourished through alliances, particularly with the VOC, and saw its height in the latter sixteenth and much of the seventeenth century. Makassar, on the southwestern peninsula of Sulawesi, gained particular prominence during the sixteenth and first three-quarters of the seventeenth century, until its defeat by the VOC and its allies. Sulu, as mentioned above, gained importance during the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

In most cases, it remains unknown how and why sea people shifted their allegiance from one center to another.[50] In this book I show how just such a process of allegiance shifting, from Makassar to Boné, took place for people from Tiworo. Boné may have had connections with the Sama before this, but it is clear that the advent and rapid expansion of the Sama settlement, Bajoé, followed the incorporation of dozens of Tiworo's men into Boné's sphere during the Makassar War. Bajoé's recent beginnings and impressive growth were noted by a Bugis trader who informed the Dutch in 1714 that a settlement had been established on the southern hook of Palette in Boné for the "Turijeners and Bajorese," Dutch renderings of Makassar and Bugis language terms for the Sama.[51] According to the report, the landward part was known as Cellu and the seaward part as Bajoé. Although the settlement was for the Sama, it drew many different sorts of people. It

[49] See, especially, Frake on "the pirate tribes" and other labels (ibid., 323–25). See also James Francis Warren, *Iranun and Balangingi: Globalization, Maritime Raiding and the Birth of Ethnicity* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2002).

[50] Brown makes this a central and unanswerable question in his brief piece on Brunei and the Bajau.

[51] "Turijeners" comes from *turijéqnéq*, formed by *tu* + *ri* + *jéqnéq*: people + on + water. *Turijéqnéq* is a synonym for *Bayo*, the Makassar equivalent of "Bajo."

had grown so much that "at present a great confluence of people had come to settle there, holding markets daily where all manner of nations come to do business, such as those from Johor, China, Malay, Wajo', Seram, Tambukko, Menado, Mandar, etc."[52]

Hence, in the early eighteenth century, the Bugis realm of Boné was fortunate to have at Bajoé a vibrant multiethnic market. Yet, Bajoé has also always been known as a Bajo place, and one cannot account for its advent and growth without acknowledging its predominantly Sama population and the complex networks of trade, kinship, and politics in which they participated. Littoral society at Bajoé, networked with other Sama and non-Sama communities, grew into a vibrant market town as a result of Sama relocation there.

While some Sama relocation and trade may have shifted to Boné as a result of Makassar's defeat, the latter alone does not account for Bajoé's growth, since Makassar neither stopped being an important center of trade, nor did the Sama cease to play an important commercial and military role there. Commercially, for instance, Makassar's tortoiseshell trade, in which the Chinese were crucial, increased during the early eighteenth century, in parallel with a China-focused boom in the *trepang* industry. Both appear to have been supplied by the Sama.[53] Militarily, although Makassar existed under a treaty regime that stripped its dual realms, Gowa and Talloq, of much power since its fall in 1669, Sama in the early eighteenth century remained a vital force for Makassar. One Dutch official remarked in 1733 that the Sama were the "muscles and sinews" of Gowa.[54] This rare glimpse of the position of Sama people in eighteenth-century Makassar is but a shadow of the role they played in, and in relation to, Makassar during the seventeenth century.

Usually conceived as peripheral to regional land-based states, maritime people, and particularly the Sama, were vital to Makassar's trade, its expansion to the south and east, and its support of those in the Moluccas who fought against the VOC. Their connections with Boné underwrote Bajoé's prosperity and Boné's political expansion in eastern Sulawesi. These aspects of the region's maritime past surfaced as a result of examining the dynamics and significance of connections that ran along and between the archipelago's littorals.

ITINERARY

The preceding pages set this study of the archipelago's maritime-oriented people in comparative and historical context with respect to works on Southeast Asia and

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[52] Makassar to Batavia, September 23, 1714, VOC 1853, p. 103; Leonard Andaya, "Historical Links between Aquatic Populations and the Coastal Peoples of the Malay World and Celebes," in *Historia: Essays in Commemoration of the 25th Anniversary of the Department of History, University of Malaya,* ed. Muhammad Abu Bakar, Amarjit Kaur, and Abdullah Zakaria Ghazali (Kuala Lumpur: The Malaysian Historical Society, 1984), 42. I have redone the translation. Bajoé appears on a "Map of Lands in the Northern Part of the Gulf of Bone," J. M. Aubert, 1752, NA Leupe collection 1298.

[53] See: Heather Sutherland, "Trepang and Wangkang: The China Trade of Eighteenth-Century Makassar c. 1720s–1840s," *BKI* 156, 3 (2000): 451–72; Heather Sutherland, "A Sino-Indonesian Commodity Chain: The Trade in Tortoiseshell in the Late Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries," in *Chinese Circulations: Capital, Commodities, and Networks in Southeast Asia,* ed. Eric Tagliacozzo and Wen-Chin Chang (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2011), 172–99.

[54] Makassar to Batavia, May 21, 1733, VOC 2285, p. 119; L. Andaya, "Historical Links," 39.

maritime history. Intertidal history, a notion anchored in the sources, provides a way to think about the geography of interactions in the region's maritime past. It supports my main argument about the vital role that maritime people played in trade and war, particularly during the seventeenth century. Others forged connections with them in order to gain followings and to benefit from their skills, knowledge, and networks. The foregoing sections also introduced Tiworo, along with the historiographic challenges it presents, and discussed historical approaches to the region's maritime people, particularly the Sama.

Chapter two lays out the historical background for understanding the place of maritime people, particularly in archipelagic networks connected to Makassar, in order to illustrate precedents for Tiworo's place in the seventeenth-century nexus. An important ligament of these networks was the east–west route along the northern littoral of the Java, Flores, and Banda Seas. Along this route lay communities of mariners and boat builders. Knowledge of the northern littoral route remains underemphasized in the literature because Europeans and Javanese followed the southern littoral along the north Java coast to reach Moluccan spices. The northern littoral provided a more direct route to Malacca from Banda and the Moluccas, and also gave on arteries that led northward to the South China Sea. Both the vibrant port of Makassar, as well and the Straits of Tiworo, lay along this route. Makassar was a market for Chinese and Indian goods, a major rice exporter, and the main transshipment point for spices between the eastern and western archipelago. In addition, it attracted many different Europeans, including the Portuguese, whose principal haven it became after the Dutch took Malacca in 1641.

The early sixteenth-century Portuguese observer, Tomé Pires, described "the islands of Makassar" as an enormous swath of the central archipelago, raising questions about Makassar's relationship with this region's coasts and offshore areas. Sama who lived in the islands to the north of Makassar supplied it with valuable marine produce. During the seventeenth century they had politically subordinate ties with Makassar, and sources suggest these ties existed at least a century earlier. In addition to such tribute and trade with what one might call its hinterseas, seventeenth-century ties among Sama and Makassar elites in the port itself ran deep socially and politically, with the presence of Sama men and women in Makassar's royal inner circle, and top Sama leaders (*papuq*) who held the office of Makassar's harbormaster.[55] Vital to its defense and the projection of Makassar's power overseas, such figures of Sama leadership also co-commanded naval expeditions under Makassar's authority, indicating that Sama followers manned the fleets. Chapter two also explains how outsider's names for regional sea people derived from terms that referenced the ecological environments they inhabited. This included not only terms from Philippine and Malay languages, but also Iberian ones, suggesting that sustained interactions took place between sixteenth-century Iberian and Southeast Asian mariners.

Chapter three examines the attacks on Tiworo by the VOC and its allies in two seventeenth-century wars over the spice trade. Tiworo turns out to have been a key ally of Makassar in both the Great Ambon War and in the lead-up to the Makassar War. Its ruling family was tight with Makassar's ruler, and its people were

[55] On positions and titles in Makassar, see William P. Cummings, "Introduction," in Cummings, ed. and trans., *A Chain of Kings: The Makassarese Chronicles of Gowa and Tallok*, (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2007), 5–6.

demonstrably maritime oriented. Tiworo offered strategic advantages. During the Great Ambon War, it served as a staging area, with its boats transporting goods, supplies, and fighters to sites of conflict four hundred miles away. It also provided a haven for its own boats along with others sailing under Makassar. After its first defeat in 1655, three hundred of its women and children were captured and bestowed on the VOC's allies. The attack on Tiworo in 1655 became a rationale for Makassar's expansionary expeditions in the 1660s. This campaign of re-expansion bolstered Tiworo's rebound from its defeat in the Great Ambon War.

In conjunction with the Makassar War, Tiworo's forts were again razed and its settlements burned in 1667. However, this time Tiworo's "exquisite boats" were not destroyed. Instead, Arung Palakka, the VOC's principal ally, assumed control of them, prohibiting their acquisition by the VOC. At the same time, before he and his men set off with the VOC's forces to defeat Makasssar, Arung Palakka put together a "guard of prime commanders" from sixty of his own bonded men and sixty handpicked men from Tiworo, providing them each with firearms. He thus effectively severed the alliance of Tiworo's people with Makassar, and integrated these men from Tiworo into his own force with rank and responsibility. Although, as noted above, Admiral Cornelis Speelman, who led the VOC's forces, vilified Tiworo as a "nasty pirates' nest," the actions of his ally Arung Palakka bespoke a rather different disposition. Female kin of these sixty men of rank would not, as happened in 1655, be taken captive and distributed as spoils. On the contrary, the unmarried among them were likely candidates for negotiated marriages with Bugis matches, recognizing their status and cementing the loyalty of these handpicked mariners.

Although the VOC sources do not mention such unions, evidence of marital and other political connections between generations of Boné (i.e., Bugis) and Sama lineages are the focus of two rare Bugis-language manuscripts about the Sama past, considered in chapter four. One of these manuscripts was unearthed in a Dutch archive, while the other was inherited by a Sama woman. While in the latter manuscript the absence of dates and the use of titles rather than personal names present certain challenges, the former ascribes a partly Sama lineage to Arung Palakka. It claims he descended from the female Sama protagonist in the manuscripts' initial story. In this narrative about the daughter of a Sama *papuq,* her boat lands accidentally on the shores of Makassar and she marries into the royal line. The story, it is argued, reworks a widespread tale from Sama oral tradition, with versions set in diverse locations, about the capture of an elite daughter by ethnic others and her relocation among them. The capture so evident in those versions was effaced in the story's adaptation to Bugis-language manuscripts, which emphasize descent from this female Sama ancestress.

The effacement of capture in narrative, accomplished through the use of a literary device that euphemized an unsavory topic, brought the story in line with Bugis writing conventions that aimed to boost status. What made possible this capture-effacing adaptation of the story about a Sama woman's maritime relocation was a history in which Boné incorporated people from Tiworo into the ranks of its elites, and hence into its sphere of politics. This initial story in these manuscripts both orients the reader and is followed by less narratively driven writing about the Sama past and connections with Boné. Rather than see these cultural products as an effort to absorb and erase the differences between Bugis and Sama, such manuscripts, disseminated among branches of a high-status Sama lineage, served

instead as a means to make a genealogically relevant history, and as a vehicle to express the mutual identification of their interests.

Chapter five examines the capture of a Sama woman from Tiworo, Hajjah Lawi, whom I introduced earlier. Lawi's capture and marriage to a Bugis regiment commander in the 1950s Darul Islam rebellion, and the capture of her brother, who became a smuggler for DI-TII, present an opportunity to examine in depth the qualitative dimensions of a land-based power's efforts to gain access to maritime people. That this example comes from a recent era underscores the durability both of capture as a tool of intergroup politics, and of efforts to access followings among people with skills, knowledge, and networks in the maritime world. Why Lawi was taken, what motivated her capture, emerged spontaneously in interviews with the commander to whom she had been wed. Interviews with Lawi herself, and with those who recalled events of the time, offer perspectives that other sources cannot, namely, a keen sense of the stakes involved. When juxtaposed with archival material from the time, they provide a sense of how little it seems the government knew about these events, and how strongly its agents imposed upon them a nationalist interpretation. Analysis of what participants recalled detail the wedding ceremony's curious letter-of-the-law legitimacy (conducted with the presence of guns), her family's retaliation, the structure of silences regarding her fate and that of her offspring, as well as how circumstances led to her brother's becoming a smuggler and the commander's adjutant.

In addition to the importance of access to maritime networks, this illustration of how Lawi's union to Jufri came about, and its ramifications, brings out the vulnerability of her capacity to reproduce socially. One can see this especially in how Lawi's first daughter was taken by the DI-TII regiment commander's sister and misled about her maternal parentage. This daughter's belated discovery of her Sama mother and maternal kin helps to underscore why, in an inherited story about Sama interethnic unions, passed down orally as well as in writing, the main figure exhorts her progeny to remember their Sama matriline. Such counsel echoes metaleptically beyond the boundaries of the narrative, among the audience of putative descendants. The Sama lineage in interethnic unions may be deemphasized or submerged in some social contexts, but when descendants do recall it, they engage in a practice of social reproduction. Foregrounding the importance of descent in the representation of the past, genealogical narratives provide a structure, a way to write and tell about the past, that is not centered on land. A portable past, this way of making "history" suits the ethos of movable polities, lineage-based elites, and networks of interaction in the maritime world.