A. Reid
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ANTHONY REID

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> They [the Makassarese] are heathen, but a very good people to deal withal and to live by: and which hold good right and justice, and order after their manner (Hugh Frayne, 1610, in *LREIC* 1:71).
>
> Il n'y a point de peuples dans les Indes, je ne scay pas même s'il y en a en Europe, qui naissent avec de plus grand dispositions que les Macaçarois, pour réussir dans les Arts, dans les Sciences et dans les Armes (Gervaise 1688:121).

Introduction

The world knows South Sulawesi for some remarkable successes in dealing with the challenges of capitalism and imperialism in the past.[1] For a half-century before 1660 Makassar heroically defended the principles of freedom of the seas against the monopolistic designs of the Dutch United East-Indies Company (VOC), and in the process became one of the great Asian trading cities. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries small-scale Bugis maritime traders represented the most spirited indigenous economic response to the inexorable rise of European and Chinese domination of Southeast Asian trade. In our own day there continue to be signs that South Sulawesi has something uniquely valuable to offer Indonesia in its struggle for modernization. Spontaneous Bugis migrants have been much more successful than the enormously expensive transmigration programmes in exploiting new economic frontiers in Irian, Maluku, Central Sulawesi, Kalimantan, Sumatra, and even Malaysia, and their exodus has given the Bugis homeland the lowest population growth of any area outside Java (below 1% p.a. for all the

1 I wish to thank the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, Paris, at whose facilities this paper was written, and Greg Acciaioli, Campbell Macknight, and Christian Pelras, for their assistance.

Bugis *kabupaten* between the 1971 and 1980 censuses). Torajans have adapted their traditions of craftsmanship so well to the machine age that they now virtually monopolize the business of motor workshops in eastern Indonesia.

Before we hail South Sulawesi as the key to the future, however, some less comfortable facts need to be recorded. For all its entrepreneurial tradition, the province remains below the Indonesian average in per capita income: in particular, the descendants of those Makassarese who defied the VOC in the seventeenth century have become among the poorest of Indonesians in the twentieth. Despite a few stars, like the former Minister of Research and Technology, and third president of the Republic Professor Habibie, the educational record of the region is not distinguished – its literacy was below even the abysmal Indonesian average at the 1920 and 1930 censuses, and it did not produce its first university graduate until after 1945. The frequency of its wars against the Dutch and later against the Indonesian government not only prevented the development of economic infrastructure, but also reinforced a backward looking social conservatism. Going further back to the eighteenth century, the same region that produced those doughty mariners provided Batavia with most of its slaves. No region of Indonesia, or indeed of Southeast Asia, had in fact a stricter conception of social hierarchy, from heaven-descended aristocrats to abject slaves.

I recall my own surprise and frustration in rummaging through the ethnographic literature on South Sulawesi in an attempt to find some clues to the peculiar enterprise and energy of those warriors, seafarers, traders, and migrants of the past. From the pioneers Blok, Matthes, and Kooreman, through Friedericy and Chabot to such contemporary anthropologists as Gilbert Hamonic and Shelly Errington, and the larger number of students of Toraja, one finds an emphasis on elaborate mythology, sharp social hierarchy, complex ritual and magic, and a medieval sense of honour, but, with the exception of recent work by Susan Millar, Jacqueline Lineton, and Christian Pelras, very little which could explain the exploits of South Sulawesi's sons outside their region. I think I was not alone in my bewilderment. There are some profound contradictions in the picture we have of this region. Can it be at once marked by slavery and by a love of freedom; by a strict sense of hierarchy and a spirit of individual enterprise; by a tenacious clinging to old beliefs and rituals and openness to change? There are undoubtedly enough paradoxes here to make the study of South Sulawesi important both in itself and for what it can tell us about the profoundest questions of freedom, equality, and change.

One period of extraordinary change in South Sulawesi – the rise of the city and state of Makassar before 1660 – sheds some light on the features of this evolving cultural tradition which may have enabled the Makassarese to respond positively to the challenges of growth.

Openness

Indonesian history abounds with cases of states rising to a brief splendour before being replaced by some other centre. In a region exposed to the fickle fortunes of international trade, and the depredations of maritime warfare, change was in the nature of things. Even in this context the rise of Makassar was exceptionally rapid. Until the last quarter of the sixteenth century, no trading centre in Sulawesi had ever played an important international role. The main trading route to the spices of the Moluccas went further south, via the Nusa Tenggara chain. The area of the present city of Makassar contained the two royal citadels of Goa and Talloq, but no commercial community to speak of until a group of Malay traders made it their centre in the middle of the sixteenth century. From the beginning of the seventeenth century Makassar discovered its commercial vocation as a base for all those seeking to evade the VOC's attempts to monopolize the Moluccan spice trade. Portuguese began to frequent the city in the first decade of the century, and made it their principal Southeast Asian base after the fall of Malacca in 1641, so that 'there was a great town of them there' (Cummins 1962, I:113). The English established a factory in 1613, and developed a special relationship in the 1630s as suppliers of arms and ammunition, as well as Indian cloth. The Danes followed in 1618, Frenchmen from St. Malo arrived in 1622, Chinese traders began to frequent the city in 1619, and in the 1650s there was even a permanent agent of the south Indian state of Golconda in the city. In addition to the staple trade supplying spices to European, Indian, and Chinese buyers, Makassar became one of those Southeast Asian entrepôts at which Chinese goods and Mexican silver could be exchanged for each other and for Indian cloth. Spanish Manila first sent ships to Makassar in 1615, but this lifeline became critical to Manila after 1642, when Spanish-Portuguese hostilities stopped any direct trade to Manila from Macao while the Ming collapse interrupted the flow of Chinese vessels from Fujian. Of all ship arrivals in the port of Manila in the period 1641-1667, over 11% (or 42 ships) had sailed from Makassar (calculated from table in Chaunu 1960:148-73).

The phenomenal growth in the population of Makassar is one index of the challenge to create new forms of political and social organization. Exact population figures are scarce. Gervaise (1688:118), whose information all derived from Makassarese refugees two decades after the fall of the city, is hardly reliable in claiming that 'in making a count they found, within the walls and in the villages contiguous to them' 160,000 men capable of bearing arms – that is a population over 400,000. But George Cockayne was a witness to the mustering of 36,000 fighting men at 24 hours' notice in 1615, when the city was at an early stage in its growth (Cockayne 1615 in LREIC, III:151-2). A year earlier 1260 houses had been burned in one crowded quarter of the

city,[2] suggesting that the total number of houses spread along the coast must have been at least five times that number. By 1636 Makassar was certainly a large and crowded city, and paid the price in a severe epidemic (loosely called 'plague' in both English and Makassarese sources) in which 60,000 people were reported by Malay traders to have died in 40 days.[3] An indirect index of the growth of the city was its need for rice. When English and Dutch traders began to visit Makassar, it was to load rice for the Moluccas, and the quantities they took suggest the total rice exports supplied by the Maros region around 1610 cannot have been less than 1000 tonnes a year – say, enough to feed 6,000 people.[4] This surplus disappeared during the 1620s, and in the 1650s the city was dependent on rice imports from as far afield as Bima, where 40 Makassarese vessels were loading in 1654 (Coolhaas 1964:747).

Finally, in its physical extent the city at its peak stretched along the beach ridges that support present-day Makassar, all the way from Ujung Tana in the north through Sombaopu fort to Panakukang in the south – a distance of over 10 kilometres. Even if the villages that made up the city seldom extended more than one kilometre inland, and the density of housing was no greater than the ten houses per acre on the block of land the English bought in 1613 (Foster 1905:293), that would imply a total of about 25,000 houses. It therefore seems reasonable to conclude that Makassar grew from a population of only a few thousand in the 1590s to about 25,000 in 1615 and 100,000 at its peak in 1640-1660. This would have made it one of the six biggest cities in Southeast Asia, and as big as many European capitals.

Of course, this expansion was accompanied by numerous military and diplomatic victories, which rendered not only the whole of South Sulawesi, but also parts of Central and Southeast Sulawesi, Sumbawa, Lombok, and Timor dependent on Makassar. I prefer to focus, however, on the unusual aptitude of Makassarese leadership for adopting new ideas and technologies, without which its other successes would have been impossible. Let us first look at the evidence for this openness, and then consider what cultural traits may have made it possible.

In the first place there was an even-handed and generous welcome to foreign traders from all quarters. Although the young king Ala'uddin and his great mentor and chancellor Matoaya had made clear their personal preferences by adopting Islam in 1605, their openness towards Europeans was legendary: 'It is a very pleasant and fruitful countrye', wrote Foster (1905:294-5), 'and the kindest people in all the Indias to strangers [...]. The King is very affable and true-harted towards Christians.' Indeed he was. Ala'uddin

2 IOL, G/10/1:5.
3 Presidency Bantam 1636, IOL G/10/1:-73; also Ligtvoet 1880:96.
4 Staverton 1618, IOL G/10/1:19.

appears in fact to have included a Portuguese mestiza among his forty wives, and sired from her a son, Francisco Mendes, who was a good Christian and 'Portuguese secretary' to the two subsequent kings (Reid 1981:18). In the 1640s and 1650s there were churches operated by the Franciscans, the Jesuits, and the Dominicans in Makassar, as well as the main church of the Diocese of Malacca (forced to leave that city in 1641 by the notably less tolerant Dutch). When Sultan Hasanuddin finally closed the Jesuit and Dominican churches in 1657-1658, rivalry between Catholic orders was the main reason, not Muslim intolerance (Cummins 1962, I:114-5).

The quarrels among Portuguese, Dutch, and English made this open-door policy difficult to sustain. The brief period (1607-1615) when the VOC maintained a factory in Makassar was marked by constant Dutch demands that Portuguese trade be ended, to which the ruler regularly replied 'My country stands open to all nations, and what I have is for you people as well as for the Portuguese' (cited in Stapel 1922:11-2). It was in answer to such demands that Sultan Ala'uddin made his famous declaration:

> God made the land and the sea; the land he divided among men and the sea he gave in common. It has never been heard that anyone should be forbidden to sail the seas. (Stapel 1922:14.)

Nevertheless, Dutch complaints continued about Iberian 'arrogance' in the city. In 1615 the VOC factor Abraham Sterck poisoned Dutch-Makassarese relations by leaving the city abruptly on a Dutch ship and killing some Makassarese aristocrats who were on board as part of his abortive attempt to extract his capital.

In 1627 the Directors of the English Company were pressing for tougher measures against the Portuguese, but as the local English factors pointed out:

> the King requires that both [English and Portuguese] may be alike free in the port of Makassar, but as loath to displease either, and his affection is very constant to the English, so as no politic prince in Europe could do more, but his country cannot be supplied without the Portugals, so the best we can expect is to stand in equal balance, and that neither shall annoy the other in the king's havens, but from the coast of Celebes do the best against each other (Hawley 1627, in Sainsbury 1884:368).

This open-door policy could be seen as no more than a pragmatic recognition of the needs of Makassar's trade. It was accompanied, however, by a unique readiness to adopt new ideas whenever they were perceived as useful. The way in which the chronicles of Goa and Talloq were written imply that their authors had no doubt about the concept of progress. Makassar proceeded from one advance to another, not only in terms of conquests but in terms of technical and intellectual innovations. Thus, one king's reign (Tumapaqrisiq

Kallona, 1511-48) saw the code of laws, and the writing system; his son's reign witnessed the first use of bricks, brick walls around the major forts, the making of gunpowder, the metallurgy of gold alloys, the introduction of a system of weights and scales, and the mobilization of various craftsmen into service guilds. Under the next major ruler, Tunijalloq (1566-90), court writers were appointed and the recording of history began, as well as the making of keris and the first diplomatic relations overseas. The short unhappy reign which followed (Tunipasulu, 1590-93) was noted for the first use in war of guns, armour and long swords (Wolhoff and Abdurrahim 1960:18, 25-6, 50-1, 55).

The next two reigns were the glorious ones in which coinage was minted, a navy was developed of swift galleys and sailing vessels, a rice surplus was mobilized, Islam was adopted, and contacts with the rest of the world multiplied. In this period, between 1600 and 1654, there are abundant Western sources which also testify to the restless curiosity of the Makassarese élite. In 1615 George Cockayne (in *LREIC* III:150) complained that he was 'called every day to see the King, or else he comes to our house to have me resolve him as well as I can of such questions as he doth propound to me'. In the 1640s the dominating figure in government was the chancellor, Pattingalloang, famous for his great library of Portuguese, Spanish, and other books. Where other rulers asked foreign merchants to bring them strange animals and rich cloths, Pattingalloang made it clear that he required the latest in western knowledge – books, maps, globes, and even a Galilean telescope he purchased from England. When a man of real learning arrived in the city, like the French Jesuit Alexandre de Rhodes, Pattingalloang was quick to seek out all he knew of mathematics and astronomy. The Jesuit noted:

> I found him very wise and very rational, and except for his bad religion [Islam], a very honest man. He knew all our mysteries very well, had read with interest all the histories of our European kings. Our books were always in his hands, and particularly those which treated of mathematics, in which he was very well versed; he had such a passion for every aspect of this science that he worked at it day and night. (Gourdin 1884:278.)

Pattingalloang was strikingly similar to some of his great contemporaries of the European Renaissance in being a man of ideas as well as action, fascinated by the advances in every branch of knowledge, whether practical or arcane. Even his potential adversaries of the VOC conceded that here was 'a man of great knowledge, science, and understanding' (Coolhaas 1964:49-8).

Among the most impressive signs of the seventeenth century 'Makassar enlightenment' were: the translations into Makassarese of technical treatises on gunnery and related subjects from Spanish, Portuguese, Turkish, and Malay authorities; the beginning of a tradition of map-making, later con-

tinued by Bugis seafarers; the introduction, unique in Southeast Asia, of court diaries recording in a matter-of-fact way the major political and military events, as well as the births, marriages, and deaths of the court circle; and the development of a fine tradition of historical writing (Reid 1981:22-3). If one of the key features of an 'Open Society' is historical writing concerned to preserve past events rather than to construct a state mythology, to portray the dealings between states rather than asserting the superiority of one of them, to record the disasters as well as the triumphs, then the chronicles of Goa and of Talloq get high marks. They seldom failed to record some negative fact about each ruler, as well as his achievements. The chronicler of Goa explained that he undertook his task,

> only so that these kings are not forgotten by their children, grandchildren and descendants, for there are two dangers of ignorance: either that we think ourselves great lords, or that others may take us for people of no consequence (Wolhoff and Abdurrahim 1960:9).

If this is a 'success story' in the modernization of a culture and the growth of a state, to what should it be attributed? Undoubtedly, Makassar had some good fortune in its location, and was exceptionally fortunate in two successive chancellors of genius – Karaeng Matoaya of Talloq and his son Pattingalloang. But such fortune does not come out of a clear blue sky. If we search for clues to Makassar's rapid development in what little we know about its political institutions and values, we are drawn back to some of those puzzling features of South Sulawesi more generally – hierarchy, enterprise, slavery, freedom.

Success in the maritime world of Southeast Asia required a capacity to attract trade and traders, who were always likely to move elsewhere if conditions did not suit them. Makassar, like Malacca, Johor, Patani, and many other Southeast Asian entrepôts of the period, had few products of its own to attract trade. It had a better environment to offer than other ports for the exchange of Moluccan spices, Indian cloth, Chinese metalwork and silks, Spanish-American silver, and Sumatran or Bornean pepper. What the traders who brought these goods required was security of life and property, on the one hand, and freedom of commercial and personal exchange, on the other. These two advantages were not easy to find together. The most powerful rulers, such as Sultan Iskandar Muda in Aceh or Sultan Agung and his successors in Mataram, saw no reason to tolerate wealthy citizens of potentially independent minds, and were apt to confiscate the goods of merchants or even take their lives when it suited them. They sought to monopolize what trade there was with foreign merchants, and the consequent dearth of local dealers in the market eventually made trade unattractive even for the big foreign traders (the English and Dutch companies and the Gujeratis) who were

relatively immune from confiscation. The commercial climate was more attractive in the absence of a strong ruler – the situation in Aceh and Patani during their long periods of female rule, and in Banten during the minority of Sultan Abdul Kadir around 1600. In such places merchants had the freedom they needed, but they had to defend that freedom with their own arms in conditions which often bordered on anarchy. Edmund Scott's account of his three years in Banten gives a vivid picture of the problems of living in an atmosphere of constant 'murther, theft, warres, fire and treason' (Scott 1943:105). It might not be too much to say that the most important constraint on the development of an indigenous Southeast Asian capitalism before the rise of the colonial empires (and perhaps even after their fall) was the difficulty of offering commerce both security and freedom. How did the traditions of South Sulawesi address this problem?

Pluralism

Fragmentation of power has been the rule rather than the exception in Indonesian history. This is a very different thing, however, from acceptance of the appropriateness of a multiplicity of sovereign and equal states. Merle Ricklefs (1974) has well shown, for example, the gulf between an ideology of unity in Java and the reality of division. The political myths of Java, as of Minangkabau or Aceh or Malacca-Johor, are descended from a single magical source of power and legitimacy. The power of one Javanese king was always a potential threat to another. The Giyanti Treaty of 1755, by which Surakarta and Jogjakarta recognized each other's legitimate existence, could only have been imposed by the Dutch. It created serious ideological problems for Javanese kings and chroniclers.

The Indic concept of *cakravartin* (world-ruler) appears never to have taken root in South Sulawesi. The chronicles and myths of the region show that the origin of its states was rooted in an animist culture still in full vigour. Power originated in the upperworld of the gods, not in a world-conquering Alexander or Indra, and it descended to earth in a multiplicity of places: Luwuq, Boné, Soppéng, and Pammana (Wajoq) among the Bugis; Goa, Bajeng (Polombangkeng), Galesong, and Onto (Bantaeng) among the Makassarese. All claimed that their dynasties originated in a heaven-descended *tomanurung* who found the magical objects which became the regalia of the state, had children by a local earthling, and then disappeared back to the upperworld. Only the descendants of these *tomanurung* had the right to rule, though in terms of one interpretation proposed by Kooreman (1883) it was really the regalia (*kalompoang* or *arajang*) which carried the power of sovereignty and from which the ruler drew his strength (Lion Cachet 1949; Pelras 1971; Goed-

hart 1929). Although there was a little Javanese influence at the time of state formation, and certainly Malayo-Muslim influence thereafter, states in South Sulawesi essentially formed endogenously and developed their own sense of their independent worth.

Of course, it was possible for one state to conquer and absorb others by marrying into its royal family and seizing its regalia. The Goa-Talloq state usually called Makassar did absorb the smaller states in the areas we now call Takalar and Maros in the sixteenth century and the whole Makassarese-speaking area by its seventeenth-century peak. We cannot rule out the possibility that Makassar might eventually have made South Sulawesi a single state with one dominant ruling dynasty had not the Dutch-Bugis conquest interrupted the process of centralization. The adoption of Islam by the Makassarese ruling circle in 1605 might logically be interpreted (see Andaya 1984) as a conscious attempt by rulers to break free of the constraints imposed by a multiplicity of small communities all sanctified by their own *arajang* and their own revered customary laws. Milner (1983) has recently reminded us how successfully Malay culture, through which Islam came to Makassar, adapted a Persian concept of kingship and the Sufi ideal of the 'Perfect Man' to make Islam (despite itself) serve Indic ideals of kingship. It would have to be conceded that having imposed Islam successfully on the whole of South Sulawesi at the point of a sword, Makassar did become at least the *primus inter pares* of the region.

By the time of the fall of Makassar in 1669, however, the Malayo-Muslim style of kingship seemed very far from replacing the Sulawesi one. Even as late as the 1880s, according to Kooreman (1883:177), 'the Makassarese and Bugis in reality worship their regalia much more than Allah and his Prophet'. The 'war of Islam' whereby Karaeng Matoaya imposed Islam on the Bugis states ended in an extraordinarily mild settlement, whereby each state retained its autonomy in return for a nominal acceptance of Islam. The leading Islamic offices in all the states were kept in the hands of Bugis-Makassarese nobles, so that the potential for Islam to change the adat was minimized. Even at its height Makassar did not put its own sons on the thrones of conquered Bugis states. The Goa chronicle quoted Karaeng Pattingalloang on this very point after Boné had been conquered in 1643 and its ruler had fled: 'It is the custom (*adaq*) that if we choose a raja, the Boné people are not involved, and if Boné chooses a raja, we in turn are not involved' (Wolhoff and Abdurrahim 1960:71; also Reid 1981:25-6). Even more striking evidence of the persistence of this acceptance of local autonomy is the extraordinarily detailed 'Notitie' of 1670 in which Cornelis Speelman, the conquerer of Makassar and one of the most brilliant servants of the VOC, tried to set out for his successors the extent and the limits of the rights to which the Company had become heir by right of conquest. He warned that although

the complexity of relationships was almost impossible for the Dutch to understand, the inhabitants themselves were the best guide to the rights of each state. 'The kings of Talloq and Goa', he went on, 'cannot make one false step once outside their own gates' (Speelman, 1670, I:28).

Although the autonomy of Makassarese local communities appears to have been less secure against the growing power of the Sultanate than that of Bugis states, even in the heartland there were some remarkable examples of pluralism. The most important was that of Talloq, only 10 km from the Goa capital. It differed from the other petty dynasties of the area which were being conquered or conciliated by Goa in the early sixteenth century chiefly in that it was able to offer the rising new state a port, some commercial connections, and an extremely able dynasty. The second recorded ruler of Talloq, according to the chronicles, made a solemn compact with King Tumapaqrisiq Kallona of Goa (1512-48), and thenceforth the two kingdoms were as one. I have argued elsewhere that this remarkable partnership of two almost-equal dynasties would not have survived the growing power of Goa had three successive members of the Talloq family not been of such ability that they could take control of affairs at moments of crisis and impose their dualistic view of the state (Reid 1981:3-8, 1983:134-7). Nevertheless, custom was on their side in insisting on the separate role of the Talloq dynasty within the Makassarese state, while the respect of Goa for other traditional autonomous realms must have been strengthened by the vitality of this one. The chronicles of Goa and Talloq frequently drew the historical lesson that those who broke the solemn oaths binding these two dynasties in partnership were necessarily cursed by God.

Contracts

Closely related to this pluralistic assumption was the readiness of Bugis and Makassarese communities to regulate their affairs by contracts between two parties, each recognizing the other's rights. Larger political units were built up through such contracts more often than through simple conquest. Christian Pelras describes as follows the case of Wajoq, which he sees as having preserved early traditions better than other Bugis states:

> Wajoq gives the impression of a federation of domains each endowed with its own government. The ties which bind each of them to the mother-domain have been established bilaterally, by alliance or by subjection, and the texts conserved in the historical chronicles define their reciprocal obligations. (Pelras 1971:172.)

One such contract which has been preserved is that between the 'federal' ruler of Wajoq and one of its constituent states, Bélawa:

> I seek protection from you, but I will conduct my own affairs, I will preserve my manners, I will maintain my custom (*adeq*); only if I need it will I appeal to your advice (cited in Pelras 1971:173-4).

When a Bugis ruler was enthroned, the rituals themselves embodied many of these contracts and thus renewed the rights and duties of ruler and people. One of the Bugis adages, often repeated during such rituals of enthronement, establishes a hierarchy of sources of authority, in which that of the ruler (*arung*) is always at the bottom. A version of this famous saying preserved in Wajoq has been translated by Pelras (1971:174) as follows:

> One may contest the decision of the ruler, but not that of the council (or of custom, *adeq*);
> One may contest the decision of the council, but not that of the elders (*anang*);
> One may contest the decision of the elders, but not that of a mutual agreement (*apadaéloreng* – from the base *pada éloq* = wanting the same).[5]

The highest authority, in other words, resides in contractual arrangements, beside which the decree of a ruler was of little weight. The relations between fully independent states naturally took on the same contractual flavour, where rulers undertook mutual agreements which were recorded in the chronicles. The famous Tellumpoccoé Alliance of 1582 between Boné, Soppéng, and Wajoq was such an agreement.

The terms most used for these contracts made clear that they rested on supernaturally sanctioned oaths. Most frequent in the chronicles are the Makassarese terms *maqulukana* (Bugis *makkuluada*) and *sitalliq* (Bugis *sitelliq*) meaning, respectively 'to give one's word of honour' and 'to swear a mutual oath by the two parties' (Matthes 1874:366; Andaya 1981:107-8). The force of the contracts came from the pre-Islamic belief that the actions of the dead could affect the living. The oaths, and accompanying curses on any who broke them, were sworn before the one God (Déwata Séuaé) in the implied presence of the ancestors, and were equally binding on descendants yet unborn. If such oaths were broken, the guilty parties could expect to be struck by illness, death, or misfortune. Contracts were therefore not entered into or broken lightly.

Such contracts were often between unequal but autonomous parties usually characterized in the prologue to a contract as the elder and younger siblings. As Andaya (1981:111-2) has pointed out, even the most unequal contracts between a conqueror and a conquered state, referred to as 'slave' (*ata*),

[5] Another version, recorded by Azhary Basar (1981) in Rappang, has as the last line: *Pura taro maranang, teppura taro sara*, which he glosses as 'the decision of the people may be changed, but not that of religion'.

retained the autonomy of the two parties. The Torajans conquered by Arung Palakka were told:

> Keep the land which is your land, the rocks which are your rocks [...] the *adat* [custom] which is your *adat*, and the *bicara* [legal system] which is your *bicara* (cited in Andaya 1981:112).

The most solemn treaties, however, were between two parties who recognized each other as equals in every respect. In this case the prologue would make that very clear, in terms such as:

> We are brothers [or sisters], equally great, with none above and none below. We are slaves only to the *Déwata*. We will not force one to submit to the other. We will talk together with arms swinging freely, equal in walking, equal in sitting. (cited in Andaya 1981:10-9.)

The classic case of a solemn contract (*sitalliq*) in the Goa chronicle is that between Goa and Talloq, reportedly taking place early in the sixteenth century. Each of the rulers, as well as their leading supporters, took the oath that 'anyone who brought animosity between Goa and Talloq would be cursed by God (Wolhoff and Abdurrahim 1960:21). There is another example later when King Tunijalloq had conquered Maros, but made a contract with its ruler that as long as the king's descendants ruled in Goa, Maros' descendants would hold the office of *tumailalang* (Wolhoff and Abdurrahim 1960:52).

Such habits proved useful in dealing with foreign traders. The chronicles record a similar solemn agreement between King Tunipalangga (1548-66) and the representative of the Malay traders who came to make their base in Makassar during his reign. The Malays were promised that their compounds would not be entered by Makassarese, and their family and property would not be subjected to certain Makassarese laws. In effect, the Malays obtained a degree of extraterritoriality, though they were forbidden to go to the extent of executing a criminal without royal assent (Wolhoff and Abdurrahim 1960:27-8). European traders, in turn, found that in Makassar they could rely on agreements which outlasted the whims of kings, and even the kings themselves. The India Office Library retains the text of one such 'Articles of Agreement between the kings of Goa and Tallo and the English Company, anno 1624'. The English, like the Malays, were forbidden to execute anyone in Makassar, to build a fort or stone house (mindful of the Dutch in Batavia), or to buy any Muslim slaves. In return, the English enjoyed trade free of any customs duty.[6] In subsequent years it was the English who were accused of breaking the treaty, not Makassar.

6 IOL, G/10/1:35-6.

Slavery and freedom

Toward the end of the eighteenth century the Bugis began to enjoy a reputation as the most freedom-loving of Asians. Beginning with Thomas Forrest (1792:74-5), it was particularly English disciples of Hobbes and Locke who tended to find in Bugis institutions an echo of their own. As James Brooke put it:

> amid all the nations of the East – amid all the people professing the Mahometan religion, from Turkey to China – the Bugis *alone* have arrived at the threshold of recognised rights, and have *alone* emancipated themselves from the fetters of despotism (Mundy 1848, I:65-6).

The numerous provisions which subordinated royal power to that of councils, and instituted the elective principle for many offices, have been recognized by modern scholars as making that reputation not undeserved – especially in the case of Wajoq.

At the same time as such pronouncements were being made, these same freedom-loving Bugis were exporting about 3,000 of their less fortunate subjects each year to the slave markets of Batavia (Sutherland 1983:270). In Wajoq itself Brooke concluded that all productive work was performed by slaves (Mundy 1848, I:64-5). The contradiction would seem outrageous did we not know exactly the same paradox from ancient Athens and from the Thirteen Colonies at the time of the Declaration of Independence. In fact freedom as a personal, individual right could not have been conceived without slavery. When the Bugis of Wajoq proudly proclaimed '*maradeka to Wajoq, adeqna mi napopuang* – free are the people of Wajoq, their only master is *adat*' (Pelras 1971:174-5), they knew exactly what was meant – that they were not the *ata*, slaves, of anyone – not of Boné, or of the Dutch, or of their own *arung*. They were literally freemen. Moreover, as an English envoy to Jefferson's America argued to explain why the love of freedom and equality was strongest precisely among slave-owners of the southern states,

> they can profess an unbounded love of liberty and of democracy in consequence of the mass of the people, who in other countries might become mobs, being there nearly altogether composed of their negro slaves (cited in Morgan 1975:380).

Because in Wajoq (as in fifth century BC Athens) the distinction between slave and non-slave came to be seen as the most fundamental of the many gradations in the hierarchy of status, it was Wajoq that developed the clearest idea of freedom in Indonesia.

In a state as strong as Makassar became, slavery was necessarily less dominant a factor. It has been shown for Burma and Siam that the strongest kings maximized the number of their direct subjects owing corvée at the expense

of 'private' bondage to aristocrats (Lieberman 1984; Rabibhadana 1969:24-39). Makassar at its seventeenth century height similarly marked the lowest ebb of private slavery in South Sulawesi. Bugis-Makassarese slaves were not exported in this period, and Gervaise (1688:162) was told slaves were less common in Makassar than in the neighbouring states. This centralization of labour obligations towards the sovereigns was probably the reason that the Goa chronicle, in the curious judgement it gave on each king, noted that the two rulers who presided over Makassar's heyday, Ala'uddin and Mohammad Said, were beloved by the people, but the princes and the great men of the realm preferred the previous king Tunijalloq (Wolhoff and Abdurrahim 1960:61, 69-70).

If Wajoq was at one end of the South Sulawesi spectrum – a 'republican' constitution dominated by a slave-owning gentry – seventeenth century Makassar must have represented the opposite extreme of political organization. Yet, Wajoq and Makassar remained recognizably part of the same cultural continuum, in which the rights of aristocrats, and their control over their own bondsmen, could not be overridden by *raison d'état*. Gervaise (1688:171-3) was astonished at how fiercely the Makassarese stood on their pride: 'One cannot believe how jealous they are of their status [...]. The Nobility are prouder in Makassar than in any other part of the world.' To possess slaves (*nya ata*) was a synonym for a man of quality, and even those that had few would hire more when they had to appear publicly to ensure that their following was commensurate with their status – 'you shall never see the great lords go to court without a guard of fifty, sixty or fourscore horsemen, well armed' (Gervaise 1688:162-3). No concessions were made to anyone who inadvertently offended against the honour or prerogatives of another, 'for they assert, that a man is not a man, who does not think of what he does' (Gervaise 1688:172).

In Makassar, as in Wajoq, the ruling class was composed of individuals proud of their status, conscious of their rights and their obligations, and able to act and think as free men.

The labour system

Labour in Makassar was performed by *ata*, as part of an obligation to a lord, not in return for a wage. Gervaise's Makassarese informants claimed that freemen 'believed it was not fitting, once one had taken the path of bearing arms, to cultivate the ground, or exercise any craft' (Gervaise 1688:141), and Admiral Speelman similarly believed it was the aim of all Makassarese to own a slave 'in order to be free from labour themselves' (Speelman 1670, III:67).

Because private slavery was only one among many forms of obligation in Makassar, however, *ata* cannot simply be translated as slave. Still less can Makassar be considered to have had a slave mode of production. There was an association between *ata* and obligatory labour, but *ata* was an expression of a relationship rather than the definition of a status or class. Thus, a bondsman owing corvée to the king, a serf labouring for his lord, a retainer or a bought slave might all be labelled the *ata* of the one they served.

Vast projects were completed on this basis, including the building of a magnificent fleet of war galleys, the constructions of the walls of six forts and (in 1634) a 10-kilometre earth wall along the entire seafront of the city, the diversion of the Jeneberang River, and manufacture of a large arsenal of weapons. This appears to have been done through a complex system of obligation, whereby each noble was answerable to the king to bring his dependants (*ata*, but not necessarily slaves) to labour on great projects. Gervaise (1688:174) and Speelman (1670, II:44-5) were in agreement that conquered areas close to the city (such as Maros) were divided among Makassarese notables, who were entitled to the labour of their inhabitants. The Goa diary reported the death in 1632 of a brother of the King of Goa who was the lord of Ujung Tana (between Ujungpandang and Talloq) where he had 1584 'subjects (*ata*)'. These were transferred to Pattingalloang (Ligtvoet 1880:10, 93).

Some conquered regions, moreover, were obliged by the terms of their surrender to send corvée labourers to the city, apparently on a rotating basis. Selayar, which bore one of the heaviest burdens despite its distance from the capital, was required to have 300 men in Makassar in 1660, employed in such tasks as keeping the roads clear and hauling cannons (Speelman 1670, II:21). While such impositions were expected, Sultan Hasanuddin appears to have gone too far in obliging 10,000 Bugis from twice-defeated Boné to dig a massive canal to redirect the Jeneberang River to a strategically more advant ageous location in 1660. This humiliation, and especially the share in it of certain Bugis nobles, was remembered as one of the causes of the final Boné rebellion in alliance with the VOC (Andaya 1981:49-52; Palloge Petta Naba n.d.:45-6).

Craftsmen were certainly mobilized to serve the king through corvée obligations. King Tunipalangga (1548-66), given the dubious honour by the Goa chronicle of being the first to impose heavy corvée on his subjects, also created supervisory officials called *tu makkajannangngang* (from the Makassarese root *jannang*, supervisor) to mobilize each of a number of crafts – 'blacksmiths, goldsmiths, house-builders, boat-builders, blowpipe-makers, copper-workers, grinders, turners, ropemakers' (Wolhoff and Abdurrahim 1960:25, 20). His successor added other crafts to the list and created a further office, always held by a close relative of the king, to coordinate all of these craft organizations (Wolhoff and Abdurrahim 1960:50).

Even if these groupings of craftsmen were not quite the 'guilds' which the translators of the *Sejarah Goa*, Wolhoff and Abdurrahim (1960:86) suggested, they were a step towards rational organization of the obligations of craftsmen. Unfortunately, I have not come across further details of how the system operated, and whether it left the craftsmen of Makassar free to earn their income for specified periods, which Gervaise (1688:163) understood to be a common practice among the slaves of private individuals. Like the 'follower system' described by Chabot (1950:102) among twentieth-century Makassarese, this system of labour obligation appears to have encouraged a high degree of loyalty to a superior and acceptance of heavy obligations from him, at the same time as an independent, competitive spirit towards those outside the vertical bond of obligation (see also Pelras, this volume).

Decline or defeat?

What I have argued is that the 'success' of seventeenth century Makassar owed much to some of the characteristic features of South Sulawesi: pluralism, which encouraged an openness to new ideas; a greater respect for customary rights and mutual contracts than for the authority of kings; and an hierarchical system which could extract labour without crushing initiative. Do we then conclude that without the intervention of the VOC Makassar might have gone on from strength to strength, making its own capitalist transition, or at least becoming the type of constitutional state in which order and liberty were both secure? This is a tantalizing thought. However, before proceeding, some sobering facts about the unhappy reign of Hasanuddin should be recalled.

The death in 1654 of the great chancellor, Pattingalloang, left a painful gap at the centre of Makassar politics. He left a capable son, but Karunrung was only 23 and lacked the experience and support to enforce a continuation of the dualistic policy which had served Makassar so well. Hasanuddin, himself on the throne for only a year, declared that he would act as his own chancellor. For this, however, he was not the man. The English judged him 'a dull-witted king' (cited in Boxer 1967:182) and at the same time 'of a fiery disposition, whose will none must cross that desire to live peaceably within his Territories'.[7] Speelman, a good judge of character on the whole, found he 'has only a limited intelligence, possessing neither administrative ability nor resolution [...] timid and unsteadfast in adversity; inordinately avaricious' but with all this and more 'fickle enough to be a Company's king,' were he not prevented by bolder spirits (cited in Skinner 1963:224-5).

7 Bantam Agency 7.xi.1659, IOL G/10/1:181-2.

The dualism between the dynasties of Goa and Talloq remained until the final Dutch victory of 1669, but they seemed unable to agree on who should be chancellor – Hasanuddin himself, Karaeng Sumannaq, or Karaeng Karunrung. For the first time the English complained that conflicts between the two kings 'occur upon every occasion, though as frequently resolved', and that eventually 'this may lead to ruin'.[8] They complained also that 'these kings are become unreasonable merchants, for they would have goods at their own prices', and that 'the kings, by their avarice in business, are degenerating from their ancestors'.[9] More importantly, according to some Bugis traditions it was the tyranny of Hasanuddin which was the principal cause of their rebellion (Van Eerde 1930:817; Emanuel 1948).

When success turns to failure, back-biting always intensifies; those on whom people attempt to put the blame may not be the root cause of the problem. Some of the external factors were turning against Makassar, especially in the share of the clove trade coming its way. Even after all the setbacks of Hasanuddin's reign, moreover, Makassar only fell as a result of what one Dutch military historian called 'the heaviest and fiercest war ever fought by the Company' (Krucq 1941:74). Nevertheless, these problems during the last reign of independent Makassar are a warning against identifying the cultural factors sketched above as any guarantee of success in nation-building. As in other spheres, the pluralism, the pride, the sense of hierarchy, and the binding quality of contracts could be sources of weakness as well as strength.

For a century, however, these qualities provided the basis for one of Indonesia's most successful states and most brilliant urban cultures. They should not be forgotten today, when attempts are made to define an 'Indonesian' mode of political behaviour based on a single, central source of authority.

8 Makassar factory to Bantam 31.v.1665, IOL, G/10/1:261.

9 Makassar to Bantam 22.v.1658 and Makassar to EIC 8.vi.1660, IOL G/10/1:149, 193-4.